Engineer Memoirs
Lieutenant General
Edward L. Rowly
Engineer Memoirs

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD L. ROWNY

Former Ambassador
Foreword

This is the ninth publication in the *Engineer Memoirs series* of career interviews. The series contains the selected recollections of major figures in recent Corps history. These memoirs lend important perspective to decision-making, now and in the future. By making these recollections available, the series preserves and shares the knowledge and experience of retired Corps officers and civilians.

I recommend this publication to all members of the engineer family and to all those interested in the history of the Corps of Engineers.

ARTHUR E. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
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Edward L. Rowny's career reflects the diversity of duties that an Engineer officer may be called upon to perform—soldier, engineer, combat leader, senior commander, diplomat, and negotiator.

Rowny began his military career in 1937 when he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated in June 1941 and attended the Basic Engineer Course at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Upon completing the course, he was assigned to the 41st Engineer Regiment, Fort McClellan, Alabama, where he was a company commander and later the S-3 of the regiment.

Later Rowny became the operations officer for Task Force 5889, the designation of the 41st Regiment when sent to Liberia, Africa, to build an airfield. It would be the first unit to go overseas in World War II.

The commanding officer of the 41st Engineer Regiment, Colonel "Smokey Joe" Wood, was promoted to brigadier general in 1942 and returned to the United States to establish the cadre for the 92d Division, and he brought Rowny back to work for him. The 92d was an all black division with white officers.

The division was located in four areas with each regiment in a different state. After a year of training separately, the division moved to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, where it assembled as a unit for the first time. Initially, Rowny was a company commander and later an assistant G-3. When the 92d assembled at Fort Huachuca, he became the division engineer and commander of the 317th Engineer Battalion.

The 92d Infantry Division landed in Italy in April 1944 with Major General Ned Almond as the division commander. By that time, most of the white officers in the Engineer battalion had been replaced by black officers. During severe fighting by the division, seven of the nine infantry battalion commanders were either killed or wounded in one week, and Rowny was selected to command an infantry battalion. He later commanded a division task force that drove through to the German rear to attack and keep occupied the German reserve while the division tried to punch through the German front. The task force performed admirably as a "decoy," but the division failed to achieve its objective.
Later on, the 442d Nisei regiment and the 473d Regiment, a white regiment, joined the division. The three 92d regiments were joined into one regiment, and these three made up the division. This newly reorganized division continued to drive up to the west coast of Italy until the end of the war. When the division was reorganized, Rowny became the division G-3W. During his service in Italy, Rowny earned two Silver Stars, a Bronze Star, a Combat Infantryman Badge, and a Commendation Ribbon.

The day after the war ended in Europe, Rowny left for the states and was assigned to the War Department General Staff where he worked for General Marshall as an Army planner. He initially worked on plans for the invasion of Japan. At the end of his tour in the Pentagon, he went to Yale University where he earned a master of arts degree in international relations and a master of science in civil engineering.

In September 1949, Lieutenant Colonel Rowny was assigned to the Far East Command as a plans officer. He helped draw up plans for the Inchon Invasion and participated in the invasion as the Engineer, X Corps, working again for General Ned Almond, the corps commander.

After Seoul was captured, X Corps landed on the east coast at Hamhung. When the Chinese attacked X Corps in November 1950, Rowny was personally involved in the evacuation of troops, first at Hagaru-ri with the building of an airfield to evacuate wounded troops, and at Koto-ri with the construction of a bridge, parachuted into the area by the Air Force. Rowny was in charge of the final evacuation, but his boat blew up in the harbor and he was temporarily stranded until rescued by the Air Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Rowny transferred to the Infantry in July 1951. He was executive officer, 38th Infantry Regiment, then chief of staff, 2d Division for two months before taking command of the 38th Infantry Regiment. He earned a Silver Star, two Legions of Merit, and an Air Medal while in Korea.

In September 1952, Rowny reported to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, as an instructor, and attended the Airborne Course. The Army now began to integrate the helicopter into the Army for reconnaissance, attack, logistics, and evacuation of casualties. Rowny also taught off-duty voluntary courses called PROFIT (professional improvement time). One of his ideas was to assist infantry ground attacks with nuclear weapons, followed by troops attacking behind enemy lines by helicopter. But he was ahead of his times. A student in the class, Congressman Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson, called the chief of staff of the Army concerning the Army’s reluctance to move into the nuclear and helicopter age. The Pentagon called Rowny in to tell him the Army had no interest in nuclear weapons and helicopters on the battlefield, and to stop teaching the course.

From Benning, Rowny went to the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, in February 1955, and from there was assigned as deputy secretary of the general staff at
Edward L. Rowny

SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) under General Gruenther, and later as secretary of the staff at SHAPE. These were highly demanding jobs. During his assignment at SHAPE, the Germans were brought into the organization and others besides Anglo-Americans began to fill key positions.

His next assignment was to the National War College in August 1958. After graduation he was appointed the Army member of the chairman’s staff group, U.S. Army Element, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., then under General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. He was shortly promoted to brigadier general.

At the end of his tour, he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division in September 1961 as assistant division commander for support. He also worked for General Howze who commanded the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. The Howze Board tested helicopters in nuclear situations, in "sky cavalry" roles for land warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations. Rowny was director of tests.

Having finished his work on the Howze Board, Rowny was then sent to Vietnam as chief of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) where he worked on nation-building concepts. One of the projects he worked on was the use of armed helicopters (swarm of bees) in fighting the Viet Cong.

After Vietnam, Rowny headed a special division within the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C., to further air mobility in the Army. He had some 15 officers who had worked on the Howze Board, and another who had worked with him in Vietnam. Rowny’s group oversaw the writing of the Army doctrine for air mobility and designing of organizations to incorporate air mobility into the Army.

In 1965 Rowny went to Europe to become the commanding general of the 24th Division. After a year in the 24th Division, Rowny brought the unit from the bottom rating to first in maintenance and first in training in VII Corps. General O’Meara then made Rowny the deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG) and put him in charge of FRELOC (fast relocation from France) which had fallen behind and had just six months to go for completion. Rowny made the deadline.

Rowny left his DCSLOG assignment and became deputy chief of staff to the United States Command for Europe in Stuttgart for a year before returning to the United States to become deputy chief of research and development, U.S. Army. After a short ten months on the job, Rowny was sent to Korea in July 1970 to become commanding general, I Corps. He was promoted to lieutenant general in September 1970. While commanding general, I Corps, Rowny oversaw the phase-out of the U.S. 7th division and the phase-in of a Korean division. He also presided over the integration of the corps headquarters with Korean officers.
In July 1971, Rowny became deputy chairmen for the NATO military committee. He was appointed chairman of the mutual and balanced force reduction, a new group established by Rowny.

He was then made the representative, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Washington, D.C. Rowny held this job for over six years during three presidencies. He retired in 1979 in disagreement over SALT II with the Carter administration.

In late 1979 he was called by then Governor Reagan who asked to meet him. After the meeting Reagan asked him to come work for him. When Reagan was elected president, Rowny became chief U.S. negotiator for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START). Rowny could only negotiate from weakness because of 15 years of neglect of the armed forces, but President Reagan began a five-year modernization program of the armed forces. A high priority was placed on improving C3I: command, control, communications, and intelligence.

President Reagan appointed Rowny special advisor to the president and secretary of state for arms control matters in January 1985. He performed this function until June 1990 when he resigned.

Rowny has continued his face pace in retirement. In October 1992 he published It Takes One to Tango, his book on how five presidents dealt with the Russians. He presently teaches courses at George Washington University on international negotiations. He was also on the group that helped with the return of Paderewski’s remains to Poland. On 25 May 1993, Rowny was presented with the West Point Distinguished Graduate Award.
## Career Summary

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<td>Company Commander and later S-3, 41st Engineer Regiment, Fort McClellan, AL</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, S-3, 5889 Task Force, Liberia, Africa</td>
<td>Jul 42</td>
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<td>Asst G-3, Headquarters 92d Infantry Division, Fort McClellan, AL</td>
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<td>Battalion Commander, 370th Infantry Regiment, Fort Huachuca, AZ</td>
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<td>Dec 51</td>
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<td>Administration Officer, Headquarters, 2d Major Port, FECOM</td>
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<td>Student, Infantry School, Basic Airborne Course, Fort Benning, GA</td>
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<td>Chief, Advanced Tactics Group, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA</td>
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<td>Assistant Director, Tactical Department, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA</td>
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<td>Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary later Secretary of the Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe</td>
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<td>Assistant Commander, Support, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
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<td>Chief, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV)</td>
<td>Dec 62 - Jun 63</td>
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<td>Special Assistant for Tactical Mobility to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, Europe</td>
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<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, (DCSLOG) USAREUR</td>
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<td>Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)</td>
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<td>Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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Education

**Military Schools:**
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- Armed Forces Staff College
- National War College

**Educational Degrees:**
- Johns Hopkins University: BS Civil Engineering
- United States Military Academy: BS Military Science
- Yale University: MA International Relations
- Yale University: MS Civil Engineering
Citations, Decorations, and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Legion of Merit with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal with V Device
Combat Infantryman Badge (2d Award)
Parachutist Badge
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Unit Citation
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Ribbon with 2 Battle Stars
Korean Service Medal with 7 Battle Stars
World War II Victory Medal
United Nations Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation
Cross of War Merit (Italy)
Presidential Citizens Medal
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny in front of a map of the Soviet Union hanging in his office at the State Department, 1985.
Engineer Memoirs
Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny
Former Ambassador

Early Years

Q: Ambassador Rowny, would you please describe your background and early life? That is, who your parents were, where and when you were born, and your growing-up years.

A: I was born on April 3, 1917, in Baltimore. My father migrated from the farm village of Nagoszevo, 40 kilometers northeast of Warsaw in Poland. He was born in 1893 and came to this country in 1912. He died two months short of his 98th birthday. His father, Andrew, born in 1862, lived to be 91. After a healthy life my grandfather died when he fell off his horse. My father succeeded in his ambition of outliving his father.

On one of my father’s several trips to his homeland, he found records of his family, with the same spelling, going back to 1657. Before that time it may have been spelled Rowne. The name has two meanings, one more flattering than the other. The more favorable meaning is “straight and true.” The less favorable meaning is "plain".

My mother’s parents were from Poland; her father from the Austrian portion, and her mother from the Prussian portion of divided Poland.

My father, having had only a grade-school education, went to work as a laborer on the docks in Baltimore. He then “graduated,” as he put it, to the easier job of digging ditches for the Baltimore Gas Company. Several years later he went to Fargo, North Dakota, where he worked on a threshing machine for a year. There he developed from a 100-pound youth to a strong 200-pound man. When he returned to Baltimore he went to work as a carpenter in the Sun Shipyard. He also started going to night school, something he continued to do for 14 years. He earned a diploma as an architectural draftsman from the Maryland Institute of Arts.
My father’s landlady’s daughter, who became my mother, wouldn’t marry him until he became a U.S. citizen. As my father tells it, he went before a sleepy examiner in the Baltimore immigration office. He was asked to describe the separation of powers in the United States. He began rattling off the answers when the examiner interrupted him. “You know all that,” he said. “What ship did you come over on?” My father, in his typical independent manner, sensing the dullness of the examiner, answered: “the Mayflower.” My father’s application for citizenship reads: “Ship travelled to the United States: Mayflower.”

He married my mother in 1916 and I was born a year later. He volunteered for the Army during World War I, but was deferred because shipyard workers were exempt.

When I was six years old my younger brother was born. My mother became quite ill and I was sent to live with my mother’s parents. My grandfather died a year later and I lived with my grandmother until I finished high school. By this time, my mother had recovered her health, and I went back to live at home.

My high school was the Baltimore Polytechnic Institute from which I was graduated in 1933. I then went to Johns Hopkins University from which I was graduated in 1937 with a bachelor of science degree in civil engineering.

Q: You must have attended Johns Hopkins at an early age. How old were you when you graduated?

A: I entered Johns Hopkins when I was 16 and graduated when I was 20 in 1937. While at Hopkins, I spent part of my junior year on a scholarship in Europe. I met my paternal grandparents at their farm home in Nagoszevo. My grandfather was a local magistrate, the head man of his village.

My academic studies were at the Jagellion University in Krakow. Part of my scholarship was the equivalent of a Eurail pass which allowed me travel throughout Europe. I went to Rome, Prague, Budapest, Paris, and Berlin. While in Berlin I went to see the 1936 Olympics where Jesse Owens earned four gold medals. But what shocked me was the stridency and militancy of the Nazis. I was deeply concerned and became convinced that there would be another world war. When I got back home I decided to get in on the ground floor of the war effort and attend West Point. When I was graduated from Hopkins in 1937, I gave up my commission as a reserve second lieutenant and on the first of July 1937, entered West Point.
West Point

Q: In your career at West Point, were there any extra curricular activities that you engaged in?

A: Yes. Having finished college, I was able to devote much of my time to extra curricular activities. Having come from Hopkins, the West Point coach of the lacrosse team naturally assumed I was a lacrosse player and put me on the team. It wasn’t very long before I was bounced off the team since I had never played lacrosse and was not a good athlete. However, I liked the sport and later became manager of the varsity team. In addition, I engaged in half a dozen other extra curricular pursuits. One was the West Point debating team. As a matter of fact, I was on the famous debating team that won the national championship in 1939. That team consisted of Andrew Goodpaster, who later became the Supreme Commander of NATO; William Kintner, who later became ambassador to Thailand; and myself. I was also a member of the chess club and took part in school plays. I engaged in as many extra curricular activities as I could, largely because it allowed me to get to New York City quite often. I also participated in athletics, but only got to the "B" squad of the track team. I ran the half mile.

Q: Were there any people in your class at West Point with whom you established lasting friendships?

A: Yes. I made a number of friends with whom I still keep in contact. I’m thinking of Joe Gurfein, Pete Tanous, Herb Stem, Al Moody, Spec Powell, and a half dozen others. My roommate was Larry Greene. I also became friends with a cadet who rose high in the Air Force. George Brown became chief of staff of the Air Force and later the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was my boss when I was the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s representative to the SALT II talks.

I also made lasting friendships with members of other classes. Those that stand out were Bill Kintner, Class of 1940, and Andy Goodpaster and Bill McCaffrey of the Class of 1939.

I think I should mention at this time that I made friends with several instructors with whom I was to serve later on in the Army. One of these was Captain Ted Conway who taught French. He became the commanding general of the 82d Airborne Division and when I was promoted to brigadier general requested that I be his deputy.
Another instructor, Abe Lincoln, had a great deal to do with my career. In the first place, he kept me from being discharged from West Point. Early in my fourth year my eyes went bad—from 20/20 to 20/200. To be commissioned, an officer’s eyes had to be no worse than 20/100.

Because of my interest in international relations and Lincoln’s interest in me, I became a member of the famous "Lincoln Brigade." Lincoln, who later became chief planner for General Marshall, followed members of his brigade throughout their careers and saw to it that they got plum assignments and were on a track of fast promotions.

Lincoln, as distressed as I over my failing eyes, sent me at his expense to an ophthalmologist in New York City. By giving up all reading and doing eye exercises, I was able to squeak through. I didn’t study most of the last year. I didn’t graduate as high in my class as I would have liked. Nine or ten others who had poor eyesight were not given regular Army commissions but reserve commissions instead.

Since Lincoln had so much to do with my career I’ll have more to say about him later.

Q: What made you choose the Corps of Engineers when you graduated from West Point?

A: I chose the Corps of Engineers for a combination of reasons. First, my background at Johns Hopkins was in engineering. Second, my father was a builder. Third, I thought that if I chose to stay in the Army and there was a slow period after the war, there would always be lots of action in rivers and harbors. And finally, it was traditional for cadets who finished high in their class to go into the Engineer Corps.

Q: So the Corps of Engineers was your first pick. Did you have any other picks?

A: Yes. My second pick was infantry. Later, I did become an infantry officer since I decided to stay in the service and believed that fighting was what the Army was all about.
41st Engineer Regiment

Q: What was your first assignment after you graduated from West Point?

A: My first assignment was a very fascinating one in the 41st Combat Engineers under "Smokey Joe" Wood, a colonel who became a general officer during the war. He was a very imaginative and colorful individual. Although not a graduate, he was a great booster of West Point. The unit was the famous 41st ‘Singing Engineers,” stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a Negro unit.

Wood was absolutely convinced the U.S. would soon be in a war and trained us very hard. He was the butt of many jokes; many of his fellow officers thought he was simply apple polishing and trying to get ahead of his contemporaries. Wood not only believed war was imminent but that it would start with an attack by Japan. He was imaginative to the point of being thought eccentric. He constantly avoided routine engineering tasks and during maneuvers employed us like a cavalry unit. He loved playing General Sheridan.

We were around a campfire during a maneuver in South Carolina, on December 7, 1941, when we learned about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Everyone was stunned except Wood who could have said, but didn’t say, "I told you so." What he did say was, "You men haven’t seen anything yet. Now that we’re in a war I’m going to act like I’ve gone berserk. That’s the way to rise to the top in time of war.”

Wood’s eccentricities were many-too many to go into. For one thing, he wouldn’t have any married officers in his unit. He wanted each to be, like himself, a bachelor. "I want officers to be celibates, dedicated like Catholic priests to a single cause, unencumbered with the responsibility of a family.” He often quoted the old saw: “If the Army wanted you to have a wife they would have issued you one.”

Most of Wood’s ideas, though far out, were conceived to further the Army’s missions. For example, Wood hated the idea of “fatigue details? Soldiers should “train, train, train,* he would say. "Things like peeling potatoes, cooking, washing dishes, picking up trash, and other menial tasks should be left to handicapped civilians who can’t fight. Soldiers should train and fight.”

Wood considered himself the best trainer in the Army. After the war broke out, new units began to be formed for which we had to provide cadres, a new cadre every month. Wood’s concept was to give up his best men—“We owe it to the new units,” he said, "to start them off right. Besides, who can train new recruits better than we?”
The net result of giving up our best men each month not only meant giving up our best men, but resulted in our being left with the worst ones. One Saturday morning, at an officer’s call session with his 2 battalion and 12 company commanders, the commanders complained bitterly that they were being forced to command the dregs of the Army.

"All the best men you sent off," they said, "and we’re left with the stupid, inept, lame, and blind. All we’re left with are misfits. The worst 10 percent of our units take up 90 percent of our time."

"Can you identify the misfits?" Wood asked. "Write down the names of ten soldiers you hope never to see again." When they had done so Wood told me to pick up the lists of names. I collected them and started to put them in front of Colonel Wood, but he didn’t accept them. Instead, he put them on the table in front of me.

" Lieutenant Rowny," he said, "I appoint you commander of 'J' Company, our new special training unit. These are your men." J Company doesn’t exist in the Army. It was stricken from the rosters after a mutiny had occurred in a J Company during the Civil War.

I protested that I had no staff, no one to help me train the men. "For those," he said, "you can pick a man from each of the companies. Pick any man you want." Naturally, I picked the best.

This time the commanders complained. "It's only fair," Wood said, "that if you lose 10 misfits you have to give up one of your best. Transfer the men this afternoon," he said, "to J Company. I’ll be around to inspect J Company Monday morning."

It was a challenge I never expected to have to meet. The men assigned me had low IQ's, they were slow, and many of them had physical disabilities.

But told repeatedly that they were the "41st's Finest," and drilled eight hours a day by the best noncommissioned officers of the regiment, they turned into the unit’s elite company. Three months later, of 12 monthly competitions for best soldier, best driver, and the like, J Company captured 10 first places, 1 second place, and 1 third place. A month later, J Company was disbanded and the men sent back to their original companies. Wood had proved his point. "There are no good units and no poor units; only good commanders and poor commanders."

We were the first unit to go overseas in World War II, mostly because Wood told Washington we were ready. We weren’t; but because Wood had trained us hard
we were readier than any other unit. We were sent to Liberia in early 1942 to construct an airfield and be a possible base of operations for combat in North Africa.

The day after we sailed from Charleston for our 10-day trip to Liberia, Colonel Wood opened up his secret instructions. They were in the form of a 20-page letter of instructions and five volumes of detailed plans. Colonel Wood assembled the officers in his cabin and read aloud the letter of instructions. He then asked me-1 was then the operations officer-to open the porthole. I thought it was to let in some fresh air. To the astonishment of all of us, Wood got up on a chair and tossed the five volumes out to sea.

“These damned bureaucrats in Washington don’t know how to assign mission-type orders,” he said. “The letter of instructions is all we need.” And at that he instructed us to draw up detailed plans to carry out the instructions.

To this day, I don’t know whether the detailed plans we threw away were any good. But it gave us something to do for the next nine days at sea, and we had no one to blame but ourselves for how the instructions were carried out. In retrospect, I think we did pretty well. The planning exercise forced us to think through what needed to be done.

Later in 1942, Colonel Wood was promoted to brigadier general. He returned to the U.S. to establish the cadre for the 92d Division. He had me come back to work for him. General Wood had a lot to do with initiating basic reforms in the Army. He was ahead of the times in developing concepts to promote military efficiency.

**92d Infantry Division, Fort Huachuca**

**Q:** Where was the cadre for the 92d Division located?

**A:** The division cadre was divided among four locations. The headquarters and division artillery were at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Each of the three regiments was located in a different state, one at Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky, a second in Anniston, Alabama, and the third in Fort Donaldson, Tennessee. The Army was afraid to put more than one regiment in any one state in the South. In 1943 we assembled the entire division at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, replacing the 93d Division which had been sent to the Pacific Theater.
Q: Tell me something about the organization of the division. Did you have white or black NCOs? And how about the officers, were they white or black?

A: We started out with all black NCOs and no black officers, only white officers. Gradually, the white officers were replaced by black ones. I originally had 27 white officers in my engineer battalion. By the time we arrived in Italy in the spring of 1944, my unit contained 24 black officers and 3 white ones besides myself.

Q: What jobs did you hold during the training of the division?

A: I started out as a company commander, and later became assistant G-3. When we assembled the entire division at Fort Huachuca, I became the division engineer and the commander of the engineer battalion.

Q: What kind of training did you do at Huachuca?

A: My engineer battalion conducted normal engineer training. We built Bailey bridges and various types of floating bridges. We trained in demolitions, mine-laying, and mine-clearing. We also learned how to build roads and airfields. This was in addition to our training as combat engineers. Very often during maneuvers my engineer battalion was thrown into the fray in a combat role.

Q: Can you tell me something about the type of individuals you had in the 92d? Were they poorly educated or highly educated?

A: By the time our division was formed, most of the better men had volunteered or been drafted. Although there were a few exceptions, most of our men were in the lowest 20 percent profile, both intellectually and physically. None of our men had been to college and only two or three had finished high school.

Q: How about your cadre?

A: The division cadre was excellent. Many of the noncommissioned officers had been in the 9th and 10th Cavalry which were black units. The NCOs were all seasoned soldiers with 20 to 25 years of service. They did a good job as trainers, but by the time we went into combat they were too old to stand the rigors of fighting and were either retired or put into labor battalions.
Q: Where did you get your black officers?

A: We originally started with all white officers. Washington decreed that we would replace all our white officers with black officers by the time we were committed to battle. We didn’t achieve this goal. We went into combat with nine out of ten black officers. While we were training at Fort Huachuca, we sent our smarter enlisted men to officer’s training school. Many of these soldiers, after finishing OCS [Officer Candidate School], came back to the same units they had left. This was, in my opinion, a mistake. Although they had higher IQs, they were seldom among the better soldiers. The men they commanded didn’t respect them. The units were commanded largely by the NCOs.

**92d Infantry Division, Italy**

Q: After you arrived in Italy in 1944, what kind of work did your battalion do?

A: My engineer combat battalion spent most of its time clearing minefields. The area was heavily mined. We tried different ways of clearing minefields, for example, snakes, cordite, and flails. In the end, we wound up with the old reliable method; probing with bayonets. We were out in the front lines, clearing the way for the infantry and armor as they inched along. I’m certain you’ve seen the famous cartoon: A long line of tanks behind a single engineer soldier probing for mines with his bayonet. We had only partial success. Quite often vehicles were blown up trying to traverse a "cleared area? It was a messy business. We also maintained roads and built bridges. On one occasion there was a flash flood which took out a bridge across the Serchio River. We had to put in a bridge in a hurry, because the Serchio separated a regiment from the remainder of the division.

Q: What type of men did you have in your battalion in Italy? Were they good engineers? Did they respond to their training?

A: Our men were rather good so long as we kept them back of the front lines and away from enemy fire. Under fire, it was a different story. You should remember that my battalion, as was our division, consisted of marginal soldiers. All the better Negroes had either volunteered or been drafted earlier. Most of our men were substandard physically and had low IQ scores. They did reasonably well on engineering tasks so long as the jobs did not entail actual combat. In combat, the troops didn’t do very well.
Q: After you were there with the 92d Division for a while, you became an infantry task force commander. Can you tell me how this came about?

A: Our commander, General Almond, like General Wood, the assistant division commander, subscribed to the theory that there were no good units and no poor units; only good commanders and poor commanders. They set very high standards. They insisted that we be assigned the finest white officers in the Army because, they maintained, it took good officers to lead poor soldiers. Because Generals Almond and Wood insisted on results, we lost a lot of good battalion commanders. Seven out of the division's nine infantry battalion commanders were either wounded or killed in one week. As a result, there was a critical shortage of infantry officers in the division. Since I had a very good executive officer in my engineer battalion to whom I could turn over the command, I was assigned the command of an infantry battalion.

Q: Do you remember your executive officer's name?

A: Yes. Major Alvin Wilder, a very good man. Wilder later worked for me in X Corps in Korea. I had two other white officers. One was Captain Creston Alexander. The other was Captain Nicholas Piccione, who was born in Italy. This was helpful because he organized large numbers of Italians—those too old or too young to fight—to repair roads and do other work in rear areas.

Q: As commander of the infantry task force, what operation were you involved in?

A: After I'd commanded the infantry battalion for several weeks, the corps commander got together with our division commander and came up with a highly ingenious plan. I would lead a task force composed of an infantry battalion, a company of engineers, a company of tanks, a signal platoon, and a platoon of medics and move into the enemy's rear. The plan was to have us wade in shallow water along the beach when the tide was out. We were then to cross a sand bar where the Cinquale Canal exited into the sea. The plan was to have us march inland about a kilometer and a half along the beach and then turn 90 degrees and march another kilometer. The idea was that we would move into the enemy's rear while attacked along the high ground. My job was to get the German reserve to attack my task force. This would allow our division to take its objective without the Germans having the benefit of their reserves. In other words, my task force was to act as a decoy and lure the enemy's reserve into attacking us.

We started out fine, but when we got on the sand bar at the front line, my lead tank hit a mine. We were then heavily shelled by mortar and artillery fire. One
shell hit in the middle of my command group. Of the nine people who were with me, seven were killed or wounded. Only three of us were spared. We tried to outflank the disabled tank with another tank further out in the water, but it drowned out. We then tried to clear a path through the mines on the land side. This tank also hit a mine. We had it pulled back by a tank retriever and moved in the tank’s tracks with another tank. With a great deal of difficulty we moved up along the beach and then moved into the enemy’s rear, encountering only light resistance. We captured a German battalion command post which was located at the spot where we were to dig in. This took all day. That night, as we had expected, we were attacked. We lost quite a few people. Some were killed and some were wounded.

The next day, we had to repel two additional attacks. Meanwhile, we were in communication with the division which had attempted to attack along the high ground. But the division’s attack didn’t get beyond the front line. The next night, we were attacked again. By this time, out of the 1,250 men in my task force, only 120 to 125 were left.

The following morning, Colonel William McCaffrey, the division G-3, fought his way to my position with a platoon of men. He came up to survey the situation and asked if I wanted to pull back. I said I was there to take orders, and I would do whatever I was ordered to do.

When McCaffrey returned to the division command post, the division commander ordered a regiment to attack up along the coast. The regiment met only light resistance but did strike the Germans who had surrounded my outfit. We then fought a rear guard action back to our original front line. This had been the latest of four division attacks, all of which had ended in failure. It was the last attack the division, as such, would undertake.

Q: I understand that the 92d Division was reorganized after this failure and you picked up the 442d Nisei Regiment.

A: Yes. The 100th Nisei Battalion had been expanded into the 442d Nisei Regiment. The 473d regiment, a white regiment, also joined us. It had been an anti-aircraft unit which was retrained as infantry. It was commanded by Colonel William Yarborough, a truly outstanding officer who later commanded the Army’s elite troops, the Green Berets.

We took the best Negroes from the three regiments of the 92d Division and placed them in the 370th Regiment. The remainder were sent back to the rear and organized into labor battalions.
Q: Was this when you became the division G-3?

A: Yes. Colonel McCaffrey, who had been the division G-3, became the division chief of staff and I took his place. Our newly formed division worked like a charm. The 442d, a crack outfit, would lead the attack and cut through the Germans like a hot knife through butter. The 473d would back up the 442d, and the 370th would bring up the rear. Our artillery had always been pretty good, but we didn’t have good forward observers. Once the 442d and 473d joined us, we drew our forward observers from their ranks. From then on we enjoyed good artillery support.

The real stars, the true professionals, were the Japanese-Americans. They fought incredibly well. They scaled hills and otherwise got in behind the Germans by coming from directions where the Germans didn’t expect them. Normally they would pin Germans down by fire in the front and move around one or both flanks.

Q: When you were G-3 was there any particular action or event that you recall?

A: Yes, I do recall one event. We were moving up the west coast of Italy rapidly. One of the battalions of the 473d Regiment didn’t pay enough attention to security. Instead of making a careful reconnaissance, the entire battalion entered a long tunnel. The Germans blew up both ends of the tunnel and trapped the battalion inside. It was a massive carnage. But it taught us a useful lesson. After that, instead of going through a tunnel, we would send scouts over the high ground to make sure the far end of the tunnel was secured before we marched a unit into it. Since that part of the Italian coastline was one long series of tunnels, we moved rather slowly. Fortunately we met only light resistance from Massa to Genoa. The Italian partisans had already taken Genoa and we didn’t have to fight for it. Our only actions were against scattered German units which had been cut off.

A humorous incident occurred when we entered Genoa. There was a huge banner across the road with the “N’s” backwards. It said: "Welcome Americans. One of our boys discovered your country."

I remember another humorous incident. After we’d taken Genoa, several German units surrendered en masse. To guard them more easily, we put them into a cemetery surrounded by a wall and placed sentries on top of the wall. The partisans were still burying members of their unit who had been killed taking Genoa. When they fired a grave-site salute, our guards thought the German prisoners were shooting at them, and they ran away. However, the German
soldiers were glad to have the war over with and stayed in place, sentries or no sentries.

From Genoa, we continued along the coast until we got to the town of Savona on the Italian-French border. The French moved their troops south of the town behind us. They were trying to establish a new border several kilometers to the south of the original border. Our maps indicated that Savona was in Italy; the French claimed it belonged to France. Rather than fight our allies, we took the matter up in diplomatic channels. President Truman responded immediately. He cut off the petroleum supply for the entire French armed forces. Within 48 hours, the French got the message and moved their troops back. It was my first experience at international negotiations. I learned that there was no substitute for a bold, decisive leader in charge at the top.

Q: How long after the war was over did you stay before coming back to the States?

A: Less than 24 hours. On the afternoon of VE Day, General Almond, my division commander, called me into his van, opened the safe, and took out a message. He said: “For some months I have had these orders. You are to return to Washington to take part in planning the final invasion of Japan. I told them I wouldn’t let you go until VE Day. Well, it’s VE Day, and you’re now released. Good luck.” The next day I caught a plane and returned to Washington. Two days later I reported for duty in the Pentagon.

Staff Officer, War Department General Staff

Q: Where were you assigned in the Pentagon?

A: I was assigned to the Strategic Plans Section of the Operations Division: OPD. You will recall that OPD was a ‘kitchen cabinet’ that General Marshall had assembled to run the war, allowing the rest of the War Department to stay intact. However, the Operations Division made the operational plans and the top-level policy recommendations to the chief of staff. The remainder of the War Department implemented the instructions and provided the logistical support.

The Strategic Plans Section, a stable of highly qualified officers, only had 12 officers in it. Half a dozen of them were Rhodes scholars: men like Tick Bonesteel, Abe Lincoln, Larry Lincoln, Hank Byroade, John McCormick, and Dean Rusk. Bonesteel rose to become the commander of the Eighth Army. Abe Lincoln became the Army planner. Hank Byroade went with General Marshall to the State Department and later became ambassador to India. McCormick went on
to head MIT, Dean Rusk became Secretary of State. The Strategic Plans Section contained other fine officers who were not Rhodes scholars. Among them were Andy Goodpaster, Ted Conway, and Bob Porter, all of whom became four-star generals.

About a week after joining the section, I was given the job of developing a portion of the plan for the final invasion of Japan, the landing at Tokyo Bay. In about ten days I was ready to submit my plan for approval. It had not gone unnoticed that my seat in the section had been occupied by four officers in the previous 12 months, whereas the other seats were occupied by officers on a more permanent basis. Obviously, my predecessors hadn’t done very well. I wanted the seat permanently and was quite nervous about my plan.

I took my plan to Andy Goodpaster, whom I had known since cadet days. In fact, he was the first cadet I met on entering the academy. A tall, good-looking man with a stentorian voice, he was a natural leader. He rose to become Regimental Adjutant of the Corps of Cadets, the number two spot under the First Captain of the Corps. Although Goodpaster had struck terror in my breast when I was a plebe, we had become friends later on.

I asked Goodpaster to read over my plan. He did so quickly and said, “Ed, you’ve got all the right ideas. But you haven’t presented them in a way that will appeal to General Marshall.” He then took my plan into his office, called in his secretary, and dictated my plan to her in a different format. It was then typed twice. We didn’t have Xerox machines in those days and plans had to be submitted in 10 copies.

Goodpaster looked over the final product quickly, brought it to my office and said, “Just sign it and submit it to General Marshall.” I looked it over. It retained all of my ideas but was presented in a way with which I was unfamiliar. I signed it and sent it to General Marshall.

About 9 o’clock the next morning General Marshall sent for me. “Colonel Rowny,” he said, “we’ve been trying to find someone to fill the 12th seat in the Strategic Plans Section and haven’t had much success. Now we have someone who can do the job. I don’t think your seat will rotate any longer. Congratulations.”

I was elated, yet felt guilty. “General Marshall,” I said, “I must confess to you that the plan I submitted is not my plan. The ideas are mine, but they were rewritten by Colonel Goodpaster.”
General Marshall peered out over his spectacles and said, "Young man, I wasn’t born yesterday. It’s obvious that the plan was written by Colonel Goodpaster. But anyone who can get Goodpaster to do his work for him is good enough to occupy that seat. It’s yours?

Meanwhile the plan to invade Kyushu fell by the wayside. More and more Japanese units showed up on Kyushu as we got closer to the final invasion date. General MacArthur recommended that the War Department scrap the plan to invade Kyushu and that our troops strike directly at Tokyo. It was in keeping with his island-hopping strategy. He believed in going right to the heart of the objective and simply bypassing other islands. The Japanese had figured out that we would attack Kyushu and had moved a large number of troops to the island. By bypassing Kyushu and going directly into Tokyo, we could hit the Japanese where they were weaker. But as MacArthur wanted, we would go directly to the capitol of the nation. The timetable to attack Tokyo Bay was moved up.

My part of the plan for the final invasion of Japan was to develop an artificial harbor nicknamed “Mulberry.” For the invasion of Normandy we had sunk a number of ships around the harbor to make a breakwater, turning it into a protected harbor. Our plans for the final invasion of Japan, having been moved up, placed the invasion right in the middle of the typhoon season. As a safeguard against the typhoon we needed a sheltered harbor.

One day, while developing my plan for the Mulberry, I received a message which read: “The steel for your artificial harbor at Sagami-Wan [Tokyo Bay] is disapproved. Signed Manhattan District Engineer.” I became quite upset and took the message to the office of my boss, Abe Lincoln, the Army planner. Lincoln wasn’t in and I took the plan to his deputy, Bob Porter. “This is terrible,” I said. “We can’t let some engineer in New York interfere with our fighting a war.”

Porter said, "You're right. Take this right up to the front office.” I went to General Marshall’s office with the telegram, feeling indignant and self-righteous. General Marshall was not in, but General Thomas Handy, the vice chief of staff, received me.

Handy took a look at the message and said, "Sit down, young man." He then pushed down all the buttons on his intercom and said: "Attention all officers. Anyone having a message from the Manhattan District Engineer will bring it directly to me. Furthermore,” he added, "If anyone gets any requests from the Manhattan District Engineer, be advised that he enjoys a higher priority than you and his request is automatically approved? I asked General Handy if he could give me any further explanation. "No," he said, "just carry out my orders."
I went home pretty upset. I complained to my wife that, for the first time in my career, I was disappointed. The military was letting commercial and parochial interests interfere with the conduct of the war. About six weeks later the atom bomb was dropped. I heard for the first time that the Manhattan District Engineer was the code word for the head of the atom bomb project. Just to show you how well that secret was kept, not even the deputy Army planner knew about it. The war came to a close soon after the two bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Immediately after VJ Day, we shifted into a postwar mode. We began planning for the future of the Army. General Norstad took over from General Hull as head of OPD. This was a brilliant stratagem thought up by General Hap Arnold who was chief of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps wanted to be a separate service. The Army, and especially the Navy, were opposed. By placing a bright Air Corps officer at the head of one of the most important staff sections in the Army, it immediately solidified the Army and the Army Air Corps, banding them together against the Navy.

Q: Was this General John Hull?

A: Yes. General John Hull was in charge of OPD toward the end of the war. I think Norstad was Hull’s deputy for a while.

The interesting thing to me was the elaborate plans OPD made for the postwar Army. It made an even more ambitious plan for the new air force. Even before there was a separate air force, the Air Corps made strong arguments for a 50-wing air force. The Army and Navy could see a large segment of their budget being diverted to accommodate this new air force. The Army believed a separate air force was a good move, but had no idea that the air force was planning to be so large. Having spawned the idea of a separate air force, the Army then ganged up with the Navy to keep the air force from becoming too large.

Studies made by the proponents of a separate air force believed that future wars would not need a large Navy or Army. The Douhet theory of winning wars by air power was popularized. The theory held that we could bomb an enemy into submission and needed only a few Army units to guard the airfields and occupy the enemy after it had succumbed. While these studies helped create a new separate air force, they alarmed the Army and Navy so much that they kept the size of the new air force in check.

One of the things I remember about this time in the Pentagon was General Norstad’s so-called “dream sessions.” Norstad was a broad-gauge thinker,
interested in global strategy. Even though he was an Air Force officer, he didn’t share many of the Air Force officers’ ideas of an air force-dominant strategy. He had a moderating effect on the new Air Force. Norstad saw a need for a sizeable Navy to maintain control of the seas, and also saw a large role for the Army in physically taking and holding land objectives. While he saw in this scheme a role for the Air Force, it was not nearly as large as his brother officers in the Air Force wanted.

During our dream sessions, General Norstad would have us speculate about the future. We talked about international issues we expected to emerge and how the military fit into them. Several of us were quite critical, even though we were otherwise great admirers of General Marshall, as to how he had handled events toward the end of the war. We felt he had put an overriding requirement on getting the troops out of Europe and rapidly drawing down the Army. We thought he had overlooked the real objective of the military in peacetime, that is, complementing and implementing our political objectives. For example, some of us were critical that U.S. officials had stopped our Army from advancing, thus allowing the Soviets to move into Berlin. We also felt the U.S. should have moved its forces into what Churchill called the "soft underbelly of Europe."

Norstad had us analyze and discuss the telegrams George Kennan was sending in from Helsinki about Stalin’s expansionist goals. We critiqued the famous telegram which later became the “Mr. X” article in Foreign Affairs recommending that the U.S. contain the Soviet Union.

Norstad believed that science would play a large role in the future of the military. One of our officers dreamed up the idea of ablative nose cones for nuclear weapons. If this could be developed, we could envision an intercontinental ballistic missile force. In other words, the warheads could fly long distances and in space not bum up when they reentered the atmosphere. If this could be done, we could foresee the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Even more revolutionary, if the weapon’s nose cone could survive, then so could a man inside a capsule. Norstad’s officers dreamed up the idea of putting a man on the moon within 25 years.

These were mind-boggling and mind-stretching ideas. We worked hard at preparing for these dream sessions, reading history, being briefed by scientists, and talking to global strategists and heads of think tanks.

About the time that our tours of duty in the Pentagon were coming to an end, General Norstad came up with the idea that several of us should go to graduate school to study international relations. Colonels Goodpaster, Dziuban and I were
all engineers scheduled to go to graduate schools to pursue engineering studies. It was General Norstad’s idea that we should keep in touch with him and with one another. In this way, we could continue to participate in his dream sessions. However, the Army was opposed to sending us to school to pursue international relations, saying it was not part of the Army’s mission. They didn’t have the money and couldn’t see how it could be done.

**Yale University**

Nevertheless, we all managed to go to graduate school on the Engineer Corps’ program. The plan was to pursue studies in engineering and piggyback additional studies in international relations. In Andy Goodpaster’s case, he finished his studies in engineering and then pursued international relations under a Princeton University grant. Colonel Stanley Dziuban was able to work out a similar scheme with Columbia. Like Goodpaster, he stayed on for three years instead of two. In my case, I could not get a separate grant from Yale, but I had to pursue both courses of studies simultaneously. At the end of two years, I earned both a master’s degree in engineering and a master’s degree in international relations.

In retrospect, I believe I was the most fortunate of those of us officer students at that time. Yale had the country’s largest collection of strategic thinkers. They tried to design ways in which atomic weapons could advance our national objectives. Our professors included Bernard Brodie, Klaus Knorr, William Kaufman, Arnold Wolfers, and W. T. R. Fox. During the time I was there Brodie was writing *The Absolute Weapon.* Among my classmates were Ray Garthoff, Dixie Walker, Lucian Pye, and Roger Hilsman. Our class was a small one, only about 15 in size. We critiqued the draft of Brodie’s seminal book in our graduate seminars. I like to think some of my ideas are contained in the book.

Q: Let me return to General Marshall. Why do you suppose he was interested in moving U.S. troops out of Europe so fast? Would you say that he was opposed to it himself and was ordered to do so by Roosevelt, or was this his own view?

A: I don’t know what happened at the higher levels. But in our internal discussions and in talking to people who were closely associated with General Marshall, I came to the conclusion that this was his personal philosophy. I believe he considered that military forces were to be used only for fighting wars and had limited value in peacetime. I think he felt that a war should be terminated at the earliest possible date and the troops immediately demobilized. I don’t know how President Roosevelt felt about it, but from Roosevelt’s broader perspective and experience, I would guess that he would have gone about demobilizing the Army more slowly.
But I do know that Marshall had a great influence on General Eisenhower, who admired and respected Marshall. At any rate, after Marshall left the Pentagon, Eisenhower pursued the idea of demobilizing troops rapidly after VJ Day.

Q: What was General Norstad’s thinking about rapid demobilization?

A: Norstad did not think rapid demobilization was a wise policy. He believed that the military had important political goals to achieve following our having won the war. He believed that defeating the enemy was only part of what the military needed to do. Norstad thought what we should do was to assess where we were and how to position ourselves for the next round of political objectives. He believed you either had to fill power vacuums or prevent a potential enemy from filling them.

Norstad had very much in mind, of course, what the Soviet leaders planned to do. His ideas had a great deal of appeal for us in the Strategic Plans Section. We felt that the military in general, and the Army in particular, had not really assessed the proper role of military force and how it should be used in the postwar period. We believed that it was essential that the U.S. win the war as quickly and efficiently as possible. But we also believed we should posture ourselves to prevent a future war or be in a position to win one if it occurred. We agreed with Norstad that our mission was to try to anticipate what would happen in the world and to use our military force to enhance U.S. political objectives. We believed that a great power like the United States should play an active role in world affairs and not simply leave things to chance. The United States had gotten into World War I and World War II by not positioning itself properly, we did not use our military force to the best advantage in peacetime. These ideas appealed to me particularly. It was the main reason I wanted to study international relations.

There was another aspect to our postwar situation. We realized that the atom bomb would change the influence of warfare and influence our strategy. Having atomic weapons would open up an entirely new relationship with other nations. In the mid-1940s we had proposed the Baruch Plan under which we would put our nuclear weapons under the control of the United Nations. But the plan was torpedoed by the Soviet Union. Now, in the late 1940s we began to study how best to integrate nuclear weapons into our foreign policy.

There was still another important development underway which had its genesis in the War Department’s Operations Division IOPD. OPD sowed the first seeds of the Marshall Plan which General Marshall, as Secretary of State, carried out. Andy Goodpaster was brought back from Princeton and made an assistant to General Gruenther [Alfred M., Class of 1919]. Gruenther traveled throughout
Europe and discussed with European leaders many of the ideas which were later incorporated into the Marshall Plan.

Q: Did you have any impact in planning for the postwar Army?

A: Yes, I think I did. I worked with several officers in the Strategic Plans Section, Bob Wood, Bob Porter, Ted Conway and others, on the future structure of the Army. We saw a big role for the Army and didn’t want to let the Army dwindle in size to a point where it would have little influence. We didn’t want to contemplate an Army which again would be caught by surprise and be forced to mobilize in a hurry. We thought it best to take a preventive attitude and station Army forces in the right places around the world. We wanted to influence the worldwide situation consistent with U.S. goals and objectives. We also wanted to train a ready reserve in the U.S. and provide it with strategic mobility. These were the kinds of things we were planning after the war. It was a very exciting time, especially since we were fighting the battle of roles and missions. On the one hand, we fought the Navy so an Air Force could come into being. On the other hand, we had our problems with the new Air Force which was trying to be bigger than the Army and Navy combined.

Q: After you went off to Yale did you come back from time to time to attend General Norstad’s dream sessions?

A: Yes. Those of us who had been sent off to study came back periodically to attend General Norstad’s dream sessions. Norstad saw to it that we got copies of studies drawn up in the Army. They were classified and had to be hand-carried to us by couriers. We had great difficulty in finding safes to keep them secure. It was an interesting extracurricular duty for us to comment on these studies. On occasion, we would travel to Washington and dictate our views to a stenographer who would type up our views and distribute them throughout OPD.

We also reported to General Norstad on what we were studying at our respective universities. In my case, I discussed the ideas Bernard Brodie was developing for his book, *The Absolute Weapon*. One of Brodie’s points was that the Air Force couldn’t do in World War II what Douhet claimed it could because we lacked the type of weapons that could do the job. But now, Brodie said, nuclear weapons were making Douhet’s theories workable.

At Yale I had my feet in two camps. With one foot I tried to influence the Brodies and other professors who were developing a postwar strategy. They would supplant the need for large armies and navies, by asserting that we could win wars
with atomic bombs. With a foot in the other camp, I tried to influence future strategy in the Pentagon. It was a fascinating time and I was in the center of most of the finest intellectual activity going on at the time.

Always thinking ahead, General Norstad was responsible for getting Goodpaster, and later me, into NATO. When I came to NATO in 1955, Colonel Goodpaster had already served a tour under Norstad and had gone off to commanda division in Europe. General Norstad was then a deputy to General Gruenther and later took over from Gruenther and became the Supreme Commander. For the first 18 months of my tour I served as the secretary of the general staff to General Gruenther. I kept the same job under General Norstad when he became SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]. What had started out as a number of ideas at dream sessions turned into opportunities to carry out those ideas in practice in NATO.

Q: You said that at Yale you studied international relations and nuclear strategy. Did you study in other fields?

A: At Yale I took the standard courses in international relations such as diplomatic history, international law, and political science. The international relations course was largely devoted to the role nuclear weapons would play in the future. Our principal teacher in this area was Bernard Brodie who was then writing his book, *The Absolute Weapon*. Brodie had cut his eyeteeth in the Navy, writing a book on the influence of steam power on naval strategy.

Yale was a particularly interesting place at that time. Of the 20 or so people in the country who were experts on the future of nuclear strategy, probably a dozen were at Yale. In addition to Brodie, who later went to RAND, there was Klaus Knorr, who later went to Princeton; J. T. R. Fox, who went to Columbia; and Bill Kaufman, who went to MIT. Another professor, Arnold Wolfers, started the strategic studies branch of Johns Hopkins in Washington. Wolfers had written a definitive work on French and United Kingdom policies after World War I. Others at Yale were Gabe Almond, Fred Barghom, and several others. Probably one of the reasons I didn’t get to stay on for my Ph.D. at Yale was that the professors all went in different directions. There were so many talented and high-spirited professors in one place that there was an explosion of personalities—they exceeded the critical mass. All went their separate ways with only a few staying behind. Among those who stayed behind were Gabriel Almond, who worked on public diplomacy, and Fred Barghom, who was a leading Sovietologist. Once the others scattered and went their separate ways, Yale was no longer the exciting place to study as it was when I first went there.
Plans Officer, General Headquarters, FECOM

Q: When you graduated from Yale you went to the Far East. Where were you assigned and what did you do?

A: I was sent to Japan to join the plans section of G-3 [plans and policy] of General MacArthur’s headquarters. There was an interesting windfall occasioned by my early arrival. The officer I was replacing was not ready to leave and the headquarters didn’t want a long overlap. As a result I was given an open ticket-air, rail and ship-to travel around Japan for 30 days. By coincidence, a civilian historian-anthropologist Dr. Kenneth Morrow, had also planned a 30-day tour. I enjoyed his company and profited a great deal from his expertise. We started from Tokyo, then down the east coast of Japan, around the southern islands, and up the west coast. We then went to Hokkaido and back down the east coast to Tokyo.

Q: Was your trip strictly a pleasure trip or did you also look at military installations?

A: While my purpose was not to inspect or check on military installations, I could not help but note the failings of the so-called “occupation force.” There were small detachments of U.S. troops in every village and hamlet not serving any useful function. There was no need for occupation forces in Japan because there was no danger of a Japanese military revival. In fact, our troops were only interfering with the Japanese civil authorities who were functioning well. General MacArthur’s instructions were carried out in the name of the emperor.

When I returned from the tour I wrote a trip report to General Almond, the chief of staff to General MacArthur. I said that our so-called “occupation forces” were not carrying out any real function; in fact, were interfering with the Japanese civilian authorities. Almond directed Colonel Dewitt Armstrong, the G-3, to have me make a study of the occupation. My recommendation that the troops be pulled back to training camps for possible use elsewhere was approved. The "elsewhere" I had in mind was, of course, Korea. To replace the occupation forces, I recommended formation of "Japanese Self Defense Force,” patterned after the U.S. National Guard. Their mission would be to handle disasters and maintain law and order.

In retrospect, the idea of pulling out our occupation forces didn’t happen any too soon. We were still pulling out the remainder of the troops in June 1950 when the Korean War broke out. But we had been able to reassemble some of the troops into regimental&e units which were available to go to Korea soon after the North Koreans invaded South Korea.
This planning for the retraining of the occupation force and the Japanese Self Defense Force was done by a rather small number of officers. As I recall, there were not more than eight or nine officers in the entire plans section.

Q: Did you work in both the military and civilian side of MacArthur’s staff?

A: No, I worked exclusively on the military side. But I made friends with a number of planners in the civilian side through Doctor Morrow with whom I had traveled around Japan. I was fascinated with the way General MacArthur’s civilian staff, SCAP [Supreme Commander, Allied Powers] was restructuring the entire political, social and economic fabric of the Japanese government. This staff contained a number of the best minds in the United States—all experts and highly regarded in their respective fields. MacArthur was revolutionizing—and this is an understatement—the entire Japanese society. He drew up a new constitution, redesigned the judiciary and economic systems, and set up industrial standards. The Japanese industry had a very low reputation up to that time because of shoddy workmanship and low standards of quality. MacArthur turned all that around; in fact, the Toyotas and Sonys which are so reliably built today can trace their success to MacArthur’s directives.

Q: Did you get involved in drawing up the peace treaty or the constitution?

A: No. These were done on the civilian side of the headquarters. We in FECOM [Far East Command], the military side, coordinated with the civilians, but the drafting of the peace treaty and constitution were assigned to SCAP.

Q: On January 5, 1950, the President made a statement on Taiwan in which he said, essentially, that there would be no military assistance given to Chiang Kai-Shek. And shortly thereafter, Dean Acheson made a statement on Korea to the Washington Press Club on January 12 saying that Korea and Formosa were beyond the U.S. sphere of strategic influence. What reaction did these statements cause in MacArthur’s headquarters?

A: I don’t recall any reaction to the President’s statement. But I remember well how stunned we were when Acheson made his public statement. It would have been one thing to say privately among ourselves that Korea would no longer be within our sphere of interest. But to say this publicly seemed to us the height of folly and irresponsibility. We were shocked that anyone in a high place, and especially a man with the reputation that Acheson enjoyed, would make such a statement.
I might add that now, in hindsight, I feel even more strongly about Acheson’s statement. On one occasion a high-ranking Soviet negotiator told me in Geneva in the late ’70s that it is hard for the Soviets to understand Americans. He said that the Soviets were surprised when Acheson, in 1950, announced that Korea was outside the area of U.S. strategic interest. This caused the Soviets, he said, to “unleash” North Korea and authorize them to invade South Korea. “At that,” he said, “the U.S. went back on its word and mobilized not only its own forces but called on the United Nations to come to the aid of Seoul.” He said: “We can’t trust the United States to keep its word. The U.S., he added, is very volatile; it changes its mind.”

“You’d better believe it,” I said, not wanting to disabuse the Soviets of our volatility. I told him that Americans are slow to anger, but once aroused are quick to react when our national interest is threatened.

Q: Up until the time the North Koreans attacked south of the 38th Parallel, what were your main functions as a planner in MacArthur’s staff?

A: I worked on plans for the Japanese Self Defense Force and on contingency plans in the event the North Koreans attacked South Korea. I remember sending a memorandum to my boss early in June 1950 telling him that from reading intelligence reports and reporting cables I believed we should be more alert to a possible attack in Korea. My boss, Colonel Armstrong, sent my memo to the chief of staff, General Almond. He, in turn, sent it to the G-2. General Willoughby, the G-2, took a dim view of anybody in G-3 interfering in his business. He said the North Koreans would not attack. Moreover, he said G-3 should in the future send memos on intelligence matters to him and he would decide whether or not to send them to the chief of staff. Fortunately, General Almond did not listen to Willoughby. He sent my memo to General MacArthur.

Q: What were you doing when the Korean conflict broke out in June of 1950?

A: By coincidence, one might say poetic justice, I was the G-3 duty officer the Sunday that the North Koreans attacked. When the news came in, I went to see the G-2 duty officer and we called the chief of staff. He told us to meet him in General MacArthur’s apartment.

General MacArthur said, “Rowny, are you going to say ‘I told you so?”’ I didn’t say anything, but must have looked like the cat that swallowed the canary. I recall that General MacArthur was quite calm and appeared unperturbed. He directed General Almond to call the military staff back to work immediately.
Almond had the staff prepare messages for MacArthur to send to Seoul and Washington. MacArthur, meanwhile, was on the phone to Seoul, Washington, FECOM military headquarters, and the Japanese government. He ordered all U.S. troops in Japan to return to barracks.

I disappeared into the Dai Ichi building. For the next several days my wife brought me clean clothing and toilet articles. We worked around the clock, except for time off for catnaps on cots in our offices. For a week we worked, slept, and ate in the Dai Ichi building.

Q: What specifically did you do in the first hours and days after the invasion?

A: I don’t recall precisely. I’m certain we were trying to decide how best to cope with and stabilize the situation. I recall it was a very chaotic period. Most of our contacts in Seoul were with a remarkable individual, Ambassador Muccio, our ambassador in Seoul. He was well-organized, calm and courageous. We were getting better estimates about the situation from him than from our military headquarters. This, in hindsight, is understandable because the military had its own problems trying to cope with the enemy. However, we were fortunate that Muccio was a broad-gauge and capable foreign service officer. He believed our troops could be organized to stand and fight. He did not think that we should simply pick up and move to the rear.

Q: After you finished the initial period of trying to get everything organized, when did you start planning for the Inchon invasion?

A: Several days after the attack a crisis developed within MacArthur’s staff. His public relations advisor couldn’t cope with the situation. Reporters had started to arrive from the United States almost immediately and were putting General MacArthur under a great deal pressure. The public relations officer, having fortified his courage with several stiff drinks, passed out while briefing reporters.

Later that day I received a two-line directive from the Supreme Commander. It read:

1. Effective immediately, you will-in addition to your other duties-act as my official spokesman.

2. You will tell the press everything they need to know and nothing they need not know.

Signed:
Douglas MacArthur
It was a very simple, direct order. While it didn’t give me much guidance, it certainly gave me a lot of freedom.

Q: Why did General MacArthur pick you?

A: I’m not entirely sure. Perhaps he felt I knew something about the Korean situation. Or perhaps he felt I was known to the chief of staff who had confidence in me. Or perhaps I was simply “Mr. Available,” someone who was in the plans section and could explain to the press corps what was happening in Korea.

Q: How long were you at this job before you moved on?

A: I was the spokesman and continued to work in the plans section until we left Tokyo to join the invasion forces headed for Korea. I think this was around September 5th, about ten days before we landed at Inchon. During the early days of the war we were looking everywhere we could throughout the Pacific Theater and throughout the Army for troops to send to Korea to stabilize the situation.

Within the FECOM staff there were, broadly speaking, two schools of thought. One school of thought, the prevailing one, was that we should pull our troops back into a perimeter at Pusan and evacuate them to Japan. The second school of thought, the one held by my boss, Colonel Armstrong, was that we could land an amphibious force in Korea instead of evacuating our forces. He believed, and we in the plans section concurred, that once we evacuated Korea, there would be very little opportunity to go back. Accordingly, we began thinking along these lines in mid-July. It took that much time to determine what was happening in Korea and how seriously the situation would deteriorate before we could stop the enemy. Around the first of August, we planned an amphibious force to outflank the North Koreans and thus save us from having to evacuate our troops.

Q: Would you tell me about the idea of a landing farther up the coast from Pusan and how you were involved in it?

A: Once we got the okay from our boss, three of us worked up an invasion plan. One was Colonel James Landrum, who was a distinguished war hero who had been seriously wounded in the Pacific War. He is now a retired major general, living in Hawaii. The second was Colonel Lynne Smith, who became a brigadier general before the end of the Korean War. Smith was a very bright officer but a practical one. I’ve lost track of him. And I was the third.
It is interesting that when we developed our plans, all of us had the same idea of landing on the west coast behind the enemy’s front lines. One of my fellow planners, I think it was Smith, thought we should land at the “hinge,” the front line itself. The other, Landrum, thought we should land farther up, about 10 kilometers behind the front line. My idea was to penetrate deep, about 25 kilometers beyond the front line. Colonel Armstrong decided not to make the decision himself, but had us present our plans directly to General MacArthur.

General MacArthur listened carefully to the first plan of hitting at the hinge. It was the classic solution. He then listened to the plan of landing farther up the coast. By the time he got to me, I was trembling. I thought MacArthur might not consider me bold but simply foolish for recommending we land so deep. MacArthur, however, surprised us all. He went to the charts, picked up a grease pencil, and drew a big arrow more than 100 kilometers up the west coast opposite Seoul. “One should land as close as possible to the objective, and the objective is the capital,” he said. “You’re all too timid. You’re pusillanimous. You should think boldly and decisively?” He said he had learned from the Pacific War that the best way to produce results was by island-hopping. So why not terrain-hop? “Land at Inchon,” he said, “have you considered that?”

“Yes, General, we thought of it briefly,” I said. “But we decided there were several good reasons against it. First, it is very close to Seoul and the enemy would certainly be defending the capital in great force. Second, it was the most difficult of all areas for a landing because the tides are so great. Inchon has a 31-foot tide—the second largest tidal area in the world. We would have difficulty getting a force on land, and it would be hard to support them once they got there.”

MacArthur simply said: “Go for the throat, Seoul is the objective. And as for the tides,” he said, “don’t take counsel of your fears. Physical obstacles can be overcome by good planning, strong nerves, and will power.” We went back to our office and developed the plan to land at Inchon.

But the plan was far from having the approval of Washington. In the first place, the Pentagon thought it might be better to evacuate our troops from Pusan. They thought a Dunkirk back to Japan was the best solution. However, if there was to be an amphibious landing, they thought that the worst place to land was Inchon.

General MacArthur invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Tokyo to discuss the plan. After we had presented it to the chiefs, the Air Force chief spoke first. He thought it unnecessary to land troops amphibiously. “Given sufficient priority,” he said, “the enemy’s supply lines could be so heavily bombarded that he would have to pull back.”
The chief of Naval Operations was next. "A 31-foot tide," he said, "made an amphibious landing infeasible. We could not get sufficient troops in before the tide turned," he said, "and the troops ashore would be driven back into the sea. Besides," he said, "the area is heavily protected with powerful sea mines and underwater obstacles."

The Army chief of staff thought we were planning to land where the enemy would defend most strongly—Seoul.

The chairman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], General Lawton Collins, was quiet. He knew MacArthur well and hesitated to take him on.

Then General MacArthur took the floor. Crisply and elegantly, often citing examples from the Peloponnesian Wars and other classic battles, MacArthur began to charm the Chiefs. His lecture to them was a tour de force. After he finished, General Collins said, "I think we all approve, don’t we?" The other Chiefs were too intimidated to object.

The next day, General MacArthur called us into his office, one at a time. When it came my turn MacArthur placed his arm around my shoulders and said, ‘Colonel Rowny, Inchon shall go down in history as the 22d Great Battle of the World.” From my West Point studies I knew there had been 18. My mind wandered for a second—where were the other three? But I soon came back to earth as MacArthur pumped my hand.

Feeling about eight feet tall, I went home and told my wife what MacArthur had said. "I believe he can put on his trousers two legs at a time,” I said. "I really believe he can walk on water.”

Q: To go back a bit, Task Force Smith was the first U.S. group to meet the enemy. They came up just about to Osan where we later had K-55 and Fifth Air Force Headquarters. Did you follow that operation from Tokyo?

A: Other officers, perhaps the operational side of the G-3 staff followed it while the three of us worked on the landing up the coast. I know I was personally quite busy because I had to brief the press every day. I probably briefed them on Task Force Smith, but don’t recall it.

Q: Did you have any real problems with the press?
A: Yes, I had problems with the press, but nothing to compare with the problems of today’s world. Today, the press is much more demanding and much more insistent that they need to know details. They speculate upon and criticize everything in sight. They editorialize more today than they did back then when they were content simply to report the news. Every day I had some minor crisis or another in dealing with the press. But overall, it went fairly well and I had a rather good rapport with the press.

Several of the reporters got wind of the fact that we were working on an amphibious plan and questioned me about it. I told them it was nothing I could comment upon. Off the record, I told them they were correct but appealed to them not to tip off the enemy. The press corps kept the secret and did not telegraph our plan to the enemy. I was pleased that no leaks occurred.

Q: Let me revert back to your days at OPD. Did you have any influence on the Japanese peace treaty or the planned occupation?

A: Yes, I had a piece of the action, working on studies, even before VJ Day, pertaining to the postwar period. We didn’t know just how the war would come out. But even then we were making plans for the future of Japan and tried to shape a long-term Japanese-U.S. relationship. We dealt with such questions as the final disposition of the emperor and how to best handle the Japanese after the war. All this, of course, was well before the days of the Marshall Plan. But we had the same kinds of ideas for rebuilding Japan that we did for Europe. General MacArthur wanted to see Japan get on its feet and established as a going economic society as rapidly as possible. He rejected any idea of revenge or vindictiveness. MacArthur said we should give the Japanese all the help we could, once we had defeated them.

MacArthur had a strong hand in our planning, and we relied heavily on his input. We drew up our studies, summarized them, and sent them to MacArthur for his comments. He influenced many of the plans for the better. I have previously mentioned that most of Washington thought that the emperor should be executed. MacArthur disagreed. He believed we would have to exercise strong authority in Japan and could only do so through someone in whom the Japanese had absolute faith. I’m now repeating myself, but MacArthur thought the emperor was the only person who could keep the Japanese society together. He was convinced that an occupation force would not be able to control and guide the destiny of Japan.

Another controversy at the time was whether or not there should be a fourpower occupation of Japan. The State Department favored it, but the Pentagon opposed it, as did MacArthur. I recall that MacArthur said that under no circumstances
would he countenance heading a four-power occupation. If Washington wanted such a solution, he said, they’d have to get themselves another U.S. commander. He did not believe a four-power occupation was necessary, desirable, or even workable. In retrospect, seeing what happened in Berlin, he was right to put his foot down.

Q: Once General MacArthur got the Chiefs’ approval for the landing at Inchon, what happened?

A: We got down to serious planning on the details, of which, of course, there were many. We had to alert the troops, assemble the ships and supplies, and do it all in a big hurry. It was not an easy task because the troops, ships and supplies had to come from all over the Pacific Theater and even the United States.

Q: Let me go back once more to the days immediately following the time North Korea attacked Seoul on the 25th of June. What units went over first?

A: General MacArthur called General J. Lawton Collins, the chairman of the JCS, on the 25th of June. Collins approved MacArthur’s request that the Fifth Regimental Combat Team be dispatched to Korea immediately to reinforce the troops there. We were thankful we had at least one regimental combat team to move to Korea at the beginning of the war.

Q: Where was the team located?

A: It was located in Hawaii. General Almond kept pushing General Walton Walker, the Eighth Army commander, to train the infantry divisions and get them in shape for combat. Walker believed there was no real urgency; he did not want to make extraordinary demands on the training establishment or the troops. But Almond kept pushing and complained to MacArthur that Walker wasn’t vigorous enough. MacArthur called Walker in and said, “Look, when Almond tells you to do something, he speaks for me.” From then on, there was no love lost between Walker and Almond. When the plans were being drawn up for the Inchon invasion, Almond insisted—and MacArthur approved—that the X Corps, which Almond would command, not report through Walker, but directly to General MacArthur. In addition, Almond was to continue as MacArthur’s chief of staff. X corps was to be a separate force and not a unit under Eighth Army.
I’m getting ahead a bit, but by the time Walker was killed in a jeep accident on Christmas Eve, had MacArthur lost faith in Walker’s ability?

I’m not certain. But the fact that MacArthur backed Almond was undoubtedly a blow to Walker’s morale. MacArthur obviously believed that Almond was on the right track. He approved Almond’s ideas that we had better get the U.S. out of being occupation troops and begin training them for combat. Our troops in Japan were in unbelievably bad shape physically, mentally, and morally. Many U.S. soldiers had Japanese live-in girlfriends and there were thousands of Japanese-American babies. The troops had become lazy and fat. Pulling them back into training camps was long overdue.

But to get back to Walker, if MacArthur had lost complete confidence in him, he would have relieved him. You will recall that MacArthur was a man of strong loyalties and believed that Walker was loyal to him. Still, a gulf opened up between Walker and Almond, and when push came to shove, MacArthur backed Almond.

Engineer, X Corps, Eighth Army, Inchon, Korea

Let’s get back to the planning for the Inchon invasion. When did you learn that you were going to be the engineer for the landing?

I learned I would be the engineer for the Inchon landing the day after MacArthur got final approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the plan. I was notified that I would be the corps engineer of the X Corps operation. Although still a lieutenant colonel, I would have all the privileges and authority of a brigadier general.

There were many problems involved in getting the troops together, putting them on ships, and getting them moving in a short period of time. The first favorable date for a landing was September 15th. If we failed to meet that date we would have to wait 60 days for the next favorable set of tides. By then the weather would be freezing and the troops in the south of Korea overrun. We had to make the 15 September date.

Another problem we had to resolve was whether to have the troops hit the beach from small assault boats or from LSTs [landing ships, tank]. The troop ships would have to stay several miles away because of the tides. This meant that small boats would have a long way to come—two or three miles—and the troops would be subject to enemy fire. On the other hand, if we landed troops by beaching LSTs, they would be vulnerable to North Korean counterattacks until the next high tide. We spent a lot of time and effort trying to figure out from aerial photographs
whether or not we could repair the damaged locks of the harbor basin. We decided it was unfeasible. We decided that it was too far for the troops to come in on small landing craft. In the end, we decided to take a chance on landing the troops directly from LSTs. We knew that once they beached, the LSTs would be stuck for 12 hours until the next tide. This turned out to be the best plan. We were lucky.

We also spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to bring in a large supply of fresh water. We learned from intelligence sources that the fresh water for all the area between Inchon and the Han River, received its water supply from Seoul through a single pipeline. The North Koreans could simply turn off the water at Seoul and dry us up. There were no deep wells in the area, and the shallow wells produced only brackish and contaminated water. Accordingly, we spent a lot of time trying to procure tankers to take in fresh water. But the only tankers available in the Pacific Theater were vessels that had transported oil. After three steam cleanings, the tankers were tested and the water was still covered with oil slicks. We knew it would make our troops sick. The dilemma was whether to count on trying to treat brackish water that was highly contaminated with dangerous bacteria or to take in fresh water that contained some oil and would therefore nauseate the troops. As it turned out, the North Koreans did not think to turn off the fresh water and it continued to flow. All our prior planning proved unnecessary; we did not need our tanker-transported water at all.

Another major problem was to assemble enough floating bridging to span the Han River, which in the vicinity of Seoul was a mile wide. It took every piece of floating bridging in the Pacific Theater to span the Han River. Even then, there were three different types of bridges involved. We had to plan on setting up forge shops after the landing and manufacture connectors to get these bridges to link up with one another.

We were faced with still other problems. One was to assemble enough explosives, such as the snakes we had used to clear minefields in World War II, against the eventuality that we had to clear underwater obstacles to reach the beach. Intelligence reports held that the entire area at Inchon was full of mines and underwater obstacles. Fortunately, these reports were highly exaggerated and we faced an easier problem than we had expected.

We were also fortunate that the enemy resistance we expected was grossly overestimated. This made those of us who planned the invasion happy because, as I have mentioned, MacArthur’s idea was to have the planners go in on the first wave. In retrospect, this had the desired effect. It caused us to think carefully about the safety of our troops knowing that we would be the first troops to hit the beach.
While we proceeded to plan the Inchon invasion, we assembled our staffs. I was somewhat amused to pick up a lieutenant on my personal staff because I was now a temporary brigadier general. I was also assigned a full colonel as my deputy and two other full colonels to command engineer brigades. Major General Clarke Ruffner, then an Army general in Hawaii, was named chief of staff of the X Corps. Because Ruffner had worked closely with the Marine Corps, it was natural that we would take charge of planning for the landing. He brought with him Colonel Tom Fomey, a highly capable Marine Corps officer who was an expert on loading ships for amphibious operations. He also knew a great deal about the organization and capabilities of Marine Corps units. This was very useful since I knew little about the Marine Corps.

Another problem we anticipated was the strong current of the Han River, which, as I recall, was in excess of eight feet per second. We doubted that we could make the river crossing in the little plastic boats the Army used for river crossings. This turned out to be the case. Accordingly, we planned on using the powerful amtracks of the marines for the river crossing.

One of the curious and entirely unexpected problems we faced was that the marines assigned to us had no prior training in river crossings. They knew how to assault a beach, but they didn’t know how to make a river crossing. I had to convince them that the two types of operations were closely related. Two or three days after we landed at Inchon, I had to conduct classes at the Kimpo Airfield for the marines who were scheduled to make the river crossing. In the end, we turned over the amtracks of the marines and a marine driver for each to the 7th Division. The 7th Division, which had been trained in river crossing, made the main crossing of the Han River; the marines made a feint crossing upstream.

Immediately after landing at Inchon, a rift occurred which continued to widen between General Almond and General Oliver Smith, the commander of the 1st Marine Division. Following Marine Corps doctrine, Smith believed it necessary to “tuck up his tail” and get everything in good shape before moving inland from the beach. Almond didn’t give a fig for Marine Corps doctrine. He believed that when you’ve got the enemy on the run, you should continue to push him and not let up. The tension between Almond and Smith was further exacerbated when Almond jumped the chain of command and dealt directly with Smith’s regimental commanders. The marines had very good regimental commanders who seemed to enjoy dealing directly with Almond. One was Chesty Puller, a highly decorated marine who had two Navy Crosses. Another was “Big Foot” Brown, an artilleryman who preferred to be a foot soldier. The third, whose name I don’t recall, was also very good. After being shot in the leg, this officer continued to command the regiment while on crutches.
Almond would pop in on the regimental commanders at the front and give them direct instructions, sending information copies of his instructions back to the division commander. This naturally infuriated General Smith.

The invasion itself was carried out remarkably smoothly. The diversionary force which landed at the island of Walmido also came off well. The troops debarked at Inchon against light resistance and quickly established a beachhead. The next day, a North Korean tank column started down from Seoul toward Inchon. The Air Force performed magnificently. They swooped down and with several passes knocked out the tanks. Enemy resistance was light. Almond kept pushing the marines to move rapidly, pushing them to capture the near side of the Han quickly. He told the regimental commanders: "Get going and capture the river bank. Don’t let the North Koreans build up a force south of the Han." At the same time General Smith was trying to slow the marines down. He felt they should wait until all their supporting artillery and ammunition was ashore. Fortunately, the regimental commanders listened to Almond and not to Smith.

The marines arrived at the south bank of the Han on the third day after the landing. Once the enemy tank column had been knocked out, there was not much enemy resistance. General Smith continued to try to slow down the marines. He warned that they would run into stiff resistance when crossing the Han. He said they would need artillery support and lots of ammunition to get to the north bank of the Han.

Almond said, “We’ll solve that problem when and if we have to. If we need fire support we’ll use mortars and call on the Air Force. The Air Force has done well, and if the weather holds we can count on close air support to substitute for artillery.”

Q: Smith’s philosophy sounds like Montgomery’s tidying up the battlefield.

A: Exactly. It was a repeat of the classical problem: Patton’s lightning thrust versus Montgomery’s rolling masses. It’s curious that in the midst of battle one remembers the more ludicrous incidents. On the third day after the landing, we were on a hill in sight of the Han River. General Almond was talking to Colonel Chesty Puller. There were only a handful of North Koreans south of the Han River, and sporadic small arms fire was coming in on the hill. Colonel Puller, who you will recall had two Distinguished Navy Crosses, was crouched down quite low while Almond was standing up straight.

Almond said, “Chesty, why are you cringing down there?”
Puller said, "I'm not cringing, I'm just playing it safe. By unnecessarily standing up, you're drawing fire in on us. I don't know why you feel you have to stand up."

Almond said, "Don't worry, we're pretty much out of range, what's coming in are spent bullets."

Puller said, "Listen, General, I lost a brother to one of those spent bullets."

Finally, Almond knelt down. He said, "I want to present you with a Silver Star for your gallantry in action. Now stand up and salute me while we get a photo of me pinning the medal on you."

Fuller stood up but snatched the silver star medal and stuffed it in his pocket. "You can dispense with reading the citation," he said. "I can read that later." As soon as the photo was taken, he pulled General Almond down with him. "Let's be sensible," he said, "and talk over things in a foxhole." Reluctantly, Almond crawled into the foxhole with Puller.

It was at this location that I conducted classes for the marines on how to make a river crossing. But, by this time, the 7th Division had come ashore. We turned over many of the marines' amtracks to them for the main crossing.

Q: Wasn't the 7th Division headed south toward Suwon?

A: One regimental combat team went south to block the North Koreans who had been cut off, in the event they would turn around and attack our rear. The rest of the 7th Division was used in the river crossing.

Q: Did you have any problems bridging the Han?

A: My main problem was assembling the bridging and making sure it would all fit together. We assembled about a third of the bridge upstream on the near bank and then wheeled it out into the river. We brought additional segments from the rear until the bridge reached the far side. Fortunately, we had brought in a number of 60-inch searchlights so we could work around the clock. One of our officers, a very fine engineer colonel, had developed the 60-inch searchlights for use in World War II. He commanded one of the two engineer groups assigned me.

Q: Was the 19th Engineer Group one of them?
Yes. Its commander, whose name I can’t recall, was the one who had developed the searchlights. He was killed on the near bank by sporadic small arms fire from across the river. The other engineer group commander was from the Class of 1937, Colonel Leigh Fairbanks. His unit may have been the 8224th Engineer Group, but I don’t recall precisely.

Both colonels were good officers and very fine commanders. This caused me some embarrassment because, even though I was acting in the capacity of a brigadier general as corps engineer, I was only a lieutenant colonel. Moreover, I had previously served under Fairbanks. However, we got along fine; he bore me no resentment. The other colonel, the one who was killed, also took the rank problem in good grace.

General MacArthur wanted the bridge in place by September 25th. He wanted to ride into Seoul to celebrate the date Syngman Rhee had become president of Korea. MacArthur wanted to show that we had established a solid link between Inchon and Seoul. He wanted to drive into Seoul with Syngman Rhee sitting beside him.

We had a great deal of difficulty meeting MacArthur’s timetable. A squall blew up some 12 hours before MacArthur was due to cross which knocked out part of the bridge. Since there were no spare parts, we had to straighten out pieces of the bent bridging in the forges we had set up. We made the deadline with less than an hour to spare. MacArthur landed at Kimpo Airfield and rode across the bridge in a jeep. Looking at the bridge, one would have thought it had been in place for a long time and not for less than an hour. I recall writing to my wife that we encountered so many difficulties getting the bridge in place I wished MacArthur could really walk on water. MacArthur, with Rhee beside him, rode over the bridge without incident.

Was Seoul solidly in American hands by then?

Seoul was in American hands, but not solidly. The marine division crossed the Han west of the city limits and the 7th Division occupied the hills northeast of Seoul. Except for a few pockets of resistance, the enemy had been pretty well cleared out. The small pockets of enemy left behind were not organized and fired mostly in self-defense: the sporadic small arms fire did not interfere with the ceremony which MacArthur and Rhee had later that day.

We’ve about reached the end of the first phase of the war in Korea. Before we move into another phase, would you comment on the caliber of your engineer troops?
The engineering troops assigned to me performed extremely well. With a few exceptions, we had first-class leaders and soldiers. One poor lieutenant colonel saw his commander killed while working under fire and cracked up under the strain. He couldn’t understand why we had to push so fast to construct the bridge.

“Why build the bridge under fire?” he argued. ‘Why not wait until the infantry has cleaned out the enemy pockets of resistance and then finish building the bridge?” But we were under orders to finish the bridge before noon on September 25th. MacArthur had attached a great deal of importance to the symbolic significance of that date.

Although all units performed well, there was one National Guard battalion from Alabama that did exceptionally well. There had been some discussion at headquarters over whether or not a National Guard engineer battalion could hold its own in competition with regular Army units. But the National Guard battalion assigned to me was absolutely superb. It caused many officers to change their minds about the performance of National Guard units.

**Engineer, X Corps, Eighth Army, East Coast, Korea**

**Q:** After the capture of Seoul, how soon was it before you began thinking about the next step, the landing on the east coast?

**A:** The X Corps staff had made prior plans to follow up the capture of Seoul with an amphibious landing on the east coast. However, our movement into Seoul went so quickly that it took several days to regroup and prepare for the next stage.

**Q:** At that time was there a question about whether UN forces would be allowed to move north of the 38th Parallel?

**A:** No, We were not looking at the situation politically but only from a military point of view. While the 38th Parallel came in for a great deal of discussion later on, it did not have much impact on our planning at the time.

The basic question to be decided was whether we should introduce more forces through Inchon and move to the north, or whether it would be better to go around to the other side where the enemy was weaker and move north from there. The decision was to move to the east and then proceed north from there.
Q: I gather that after the Inchon landing and the capture of Seoul you made an amphibious landing on the east coast at Hamhung.

A: We planned but did not make an amphibious landing on the east coast. The marine amphibious force sat offshore from Hamhung because the waters were heavily mined. Meanwhile, the South Korean 3d Division pursued the North Koreans as they retreated up the east coast and secured Hamhung. I flew into the city from Seoul with an advance contingent of X Corps headquarters. We operated out of its headquarters well before the marines came ashore. They came in mostly by helicopter from their ships because the mine-clearing took several weeks.

Q: Did the X Corps keep the 1st Marine Division and 7th U.S. Infantry Division under its command on the east coast? What about Korean units, were they attached to X Corps?

A: Yes. Part of the 1st Marine Division came in by helicopter from their transports and the remainder of the division landed administratively once the mines were cleared. The 7th U.S. Division arrived on the east coast by air from Kimpo. The 3d ROK Division, the best unit of the South Korean Army, was attached to the X corps.

Q: Did X Corps then advance north to the Yalu River?

A: Yes. As soon as the 1st Marine Division and 7th U.S. Division closed in on Hamhung, General Almond sent reconnaissance forces north to the Yalu River. These advance reconnaissance forces were largely unopposed. I rode up to the Yalu in a jeep with the chief of staff, General Ruffner. What surprised me was that the frozen river was not an obstacle. It was only a hundred yards or so wide and was completely frozen over.

Q: What about the terrain? Are the mountains much steeper and higher in the north than in the south?

A: Yes, the terrain becomes much more rugged once you move north of the Chosen Reservoir and stays rugged up to the Yalu. The Chosen Reservoir was on a plateau several thousand feet above sea level.
On November 24, 1950, X Corps and Eighth Army were getting ready to make their final moves to the border between North Korea and China. Was it then that the Chinese intervened? Had you prior to that time heard about the Chinese coming in?

We had heard rumors that the Chinese were in North Korea through the X Corps’ own intelligence network. Our confidence in Eighth Army intelligence was so low that X Corps set up an intelligence net on its own. On November 22, as I recall, we captured several Chinese. This made it now certain that the Chinese were in North Korea.

However, we had difficulty convincing Eighth Army that there were Chinese in North Korea. Eighth Army intelligence officers said they didn’t have any evidence.
to that effect. General Willoughby, the Army G-2, flew to X Corps headquarters to determine for himself whether or not the soldiers we captured were Chinese. I remember Willoughby saying to me, “They’re not Chinese, they’re North Koreans.”

"I'm certain they’re Chinese,” said. I told him I was no anthropologist, but the epicanthic fold of their eyes proved that the prisoners were Chinese and not North Koreans.

"Don't give me that scientific nonsense,” Willoughby said.

Willoughby remained skeptical up until the time the Chinese hit us in force on November 27th. Only then did he become convinced that the Chinese had moved south of the Yalu.

When the Chinese struck, they did so in their classical manner. They blew bugles and whistles, beat metal drums, and yelled as they attacked at night. They struck terror in the hearts of our soldiers who were not used to this type of warfare. The Chinese went directly for our logistical supply bases, our artillery, and our tank parks. They hit us where it would do the most damage, that is our firepower and logistical support.

The Chinese ambushed an artillery battalion of the 7th Division, killing many of its men and burning its artillery pieces and vehicles. They blew up the division’s artillery ammo dumps, leaving it in shambles.

Q: How long after the Chinese hit was it decided to evacuate?
A: Immediately after the Chinese struck, the decision was made to pull back into defensive perimeters and then move south and east toward Hamhung. The 7th Division rolled up into defensive positions rather quickly. The marines were more dispersed and moved more slowly. By the time the marines formed a perimeter, a bridge across the chasm at Koto-ri near the Chosen Reservoir had been blown. The marines finally gathered into a defensive perimeter on the Chosen plateau but were cut off from evacuating to the south.

Q: I understand your engineers were involved in building a C-46 airstrip for medical evacuation and in air-dropping a bridge to allow the marines to move out of their perimeter.
A: Yes. We had two major engineer problems facing us. The first was to build an airstrip within the marine perimeter so we could evacuate the many casualties they had suffered. Some casualties were caused by enemy gunfire, but many more were caused by frostbite and extreme cold.

There was a fairly flat piece of ground within the perimeter for a runway, but it needed smoothing out. There was about a 6 percent slope on the runway but this was manageable. The marines had several pieces of engineering equipment with them, but the problem was to keep the equipment operating in the extreme cold which hovered between 30°F and 20°F below zero. Because the ground was frozen to quite a depth, to bulldoze the strip we set off explosive charges to loosen up the ground. We also erected warming tents-large tents with space heaters in them—at each end of the field. In this way, the operators who were running the equipment and the equipment itself would warm up between passes as the dozers smoothed the airstrip. The theory was good, but in practice it didn’t work very well. The warmed up dozer blades melted the moisture in the earth and caused the dirt to stick to the blades. We solved this problem by applying to the blades ski wax which was dropped in by air from Japan. When the dozer and grader blades were waxed, the dirt did not stick to the metal. Some press wag accused me of having ski wax air-dropped into Korea so we could enjoy skiing on the slopes.

The warming tents we set up came under fire. The Chinese moved in close to the perimeter, lobbed in some mortar shells, and then disappeared. By the time a patrol would locate the base from which the mortar shells were fired, the Chinese were gone. They would then set up another base and hit us again.

When the wind blew up, which it did sporadically, the temperature dropped another 10 to 20 degrees. Fortunately, the winters in North Korea were quite dry and there was very little snow. It was very light and powdery, more like dust than snow. When the wind blew, it formed clouds of dry snow and dirt that were like dust storms.

Nevertheless, after a great deal of hard work, we were able to construct a fairly decent airfield. With a number of courageous pilots flying the planes, we were able to airlift out all of the casualties. With this problem solved, Colonel Chester Puller was able to organize an effective defensive perimeter.

Q: And the other problem, I take it, was spanning the chasm at Koto-ri?

A: Yes. I put the question of how to get across the chasm to my engineer staff back in Hungnam. The best suggestion came from an engineer officer, Major Al Wilder, who had been my battalion executive in World War II. He had the idea
of bolting together some rigid frame bridging and dropping it from a C-119 into the perimeter. By cantilevering the bridge over a fulcrum, it would bridge the chasm.

We quickly worked out the engineering aspects of the plan. The main problem was to find an Air Force pilot who was courageous enough to drop the bridge. Most of the pilots we talked to said it couldn’t be done. If a bridge was dropped from a C-119, they said it would be impossible to keep the aircraft under control. Fortunately, we found one pilot who said it could be done. To test the concept, we dropped a bridge south of Hungnam. The pilot was able to keep the aircraft under control. However, the parachutes didn’t open properly and the bridge wound up in a big pile of wrecked and bent-up steel. With more careful rigging, we believed we could correct that problem. The next day we actually dropped the bridge successfully into the southern portion of the perimeter. The marines then laid down a barrage of small arms fire at the narrowest part of the chasm where we had planned to place the bridge. While the marines kept up the barrage, engineers manhandled the bridge and spanned the chasm. The marines were then able to come out in an orderly fashion, fighting a rear guard action as they evacuated the perimeter. They sent out patrols to the right and left as soon as they crossed the bridge to-protect their flanks. It was a professionally executed military operation.

Q: Let me ask about the bridge. When you read the Marine Corps history, you learn that the bridge was put up in its entirety by the marines.

A: Such accounts are not true. The bridge was assembled and put together by our X Corps engineers. They rigged it and loaded it into the aircraft. After the bridge was dropped into the perimeter, it was pushed across the gap by marine engineers. The idea of putting a bridge of this type together and dropping it was our idea. I personally talked to Colonel Chester Puller, the commander who thought it was a good idea and approved the plan.

Q: The marines started moving across the bridge and back towards Hamhung and Hungnam on 8 December 1950. Was it about two weeks later that the port was evacuated?

A: The date sounds correct. The 7th Division embarked on evacuation boats which took them out to the troop transports. The marines followed. I stayed back with an engineer detachment to assure that there was maximum destruction to the port and to destroy whatever supplies we were unable to evacuate. We wanted to make certain that nothing of any value was left in the hands of the Chinese.
Q: Was that your responsibility as the Corps engineer?
A: Yes. I was put in charge of planning and executing the evacuation of supplies. We got out most of the supplies. I was also put in charge of setting explosive charges to damage the port so it could not be used by the Chinese without a good deal of work. When the explosive charges went off, it was a rather spectacular sight.

Q: Did you feel satisfied about the evacuation?
A: Yes, I think the job was well done. The evacuation was carried out in an orderly fashion. The perimeter was kept intact, and we did not suffer any real interference with the work of evacuating the supplies and setting the explosive charges. It was all done in an efficient and professional manner.

Q: Did the Chinese press you?
A: Yes. The Chinese struck us with hit-and-run attacks, but there were no concerted attacks. While we were subjected to sporadic attacks, there was no big push to cut us off or to drive us into the sea.

Q: After the evacuation where did X Corps go and where did you go?
A: The X Corps staff evacuated to a command ship and landed well to the south on the east coast of Korea. Since I was in charge of the final evacuation, I was one of the last persons to leave. The boat in which I was to leave blew up and sank. One of the soldiers lit a cigarette and set on fire a stack of mortar charges. The charges exploded and the boat sank in a matter of minutes. This left us stranded ashore. Luckily, a U.S. plane was hovering above. We had no way of communicating with the plane, so we spelled out “HELP! U.S. TROOPS” with powdered milk on the runway. The plane landed, picked us up, and took us back to Japan. We landed at Tachikawa on Christmas Eve.

Q: How long was it before you returned to Korea?
A: I stayed in Japan just three days. My family, which was in Tokyo, was surprised to see me and glad to have me home for Christmas. General Almond was worried about me. When I didn’t come out to the command ship, he thought I might have
gone down with the boat that sank. But when he learned I was okay he sent me a message: “Fine, be back at X Corps headquarters on December 27th.” I caught a plane at Tachikawa and got back to X Corps headquarters on time.

Q: Let me ask you at this time to comment on the KATUSAs, the Korean augmentation to the United States Army program. As far as the engineers were concerned, was it a good program?

A: Yes, the KATUSA program was a good one and it helped us considerably. However, we only used them intermittently and in small amounts before our evacuation of Hungnam. We made much greater use of the KATUSAs when we started going north again in 1951. At one time I believe X Corps had over 7,000 KATUSAs. They worked alongside our engineers to build roads, repair railroads, and otherwise help out the logistical efforts. They also manhandled supplies and ammunition.

Q: Did you have any problems with the KATUSAs?

A: There were no particular problems, they were easy to deal with. The KATUSAs learned quickly and worked hard. We screened them and put those who were more mechanically adept to work at first maintaining and then operating equipment. Some of them made excellent equipment operators. Many KATUSAs who maintained our equipment believed that if the equipment looked well, it would work well. As a result, they polished the vehicles but didn’t pick up the hoods and look at the oil levels. We had to teach them to change the oil and use grease guns. After that the vehicles not only looked good but ran well. We also used KATUSAs to manhandle supplies at which they performed well. A KATUSA could put 100 pounds of supplies on an A-frame and walk right up the side of a mountain. For one attack I recall using 500 KATUSAs as a human supply chain.

We also used KATUSAs to carve out roads on the sides of mountains. We tried to avoid disrupting the rice paddies that had been terraced over centuries with much care. In general we tried to do as little damage as possible to Korean ecology. We had an unlimited supply of dynamite and taught KATUSAs how to drill and emplace explosive charges. Building roads by cutting into the side of mountains had another advantage. The rice paddies in the flat lands required enormous amounts of rock to act as a foundation, whereas a road carved out of the side of a mountain had a natural rock foundation. Moreover, building roads on the sides of mountains left us lots of rock to lay down foundations for roads in the flat ground. Accordingly, we carved out roads on the sides of mountains whenever possible.
When X Corps began to move north again, how long did you continue to work as X Corps engineer?

I remained Corps engineer for only a week or so. Shortly after I returned to Korea the Corps G-4 was killed. For the next six months or so, I was the X Corps logistician. After that, when my one-year tour was up, I volunteered for a second year and joined the 2d Infantry Division.

By the first of June had the X Corps pushed north again?

Yes, X Corps pushed up north considerably. My job as logistician was a critical one since we had difficulty moving supplies forward. We built supply depots as we went forward and built airfields wherever we could find a suitable piece of flat land. At that time we were still bringing in a sizable portion of our supplies from Japan by air, dropping much of it by parachute. Air dropping was a costly way of bringing in supplies and many supplies were destroyed or scattered about. The supplies had to be picked up and the parachutes folded and returned. As a result, we tried to build airfields so we could land the aircraft rather than air drop the supplies.

Were there any particular problems that you ran into as the corps logistician?

These were no particular problems but a great number of ordinary ones. Keeping several divisions resupplied in an area where there were few roads was quite a challenge. This was also the time when the Army decided to multiply the daily amount of artillery fire by a factor of 2 or 3. The infantry welcomed the extra firepower, but we had difficulty getting the ammunition up to the guns.

What caused you to change jobs and move from X Corps to the 2d Division?

In the first place, I had a great amount of experience as an infantry battalion commander and a regimental task force commander when I was in General Almond’s division in Italy. In the second place, there were few infantry officers who came up to General Almond’s standards.

Infantry officers assigned to Korea were either too old or poorly qualified. As a result, many commanders were relieved, making for a shortage of infantry
regimental commanders. I saw an opportunity of getting to command an infantry regiment and therefore joined the 2d Division. At first I was the regimental executive of the 38th Infantry and later became chief of staff of the 2d Division.

Executive Officer, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division

Q: How did the opportunity arise? Were you asked for or did you volunteer?

A: I let it be known that I would extend for a second tour in Korea if I could join the infantry. The fact that I was known to the corps commander and the division commander made such an assignment easy. They knew I wanted to command an infantry regiment but made me pay my dues by first taking the job of regimental executive officer and then for a while chief of staff of the 2d Division.

Q: When you extended to stay in Korea for another 13 months, did you get another R&R back to Japan.

A: Yes, I got a second three-day R&R back to Japan. My first R&R was an unscheduled one during the Christmas of 1950 when we evacuated Hamhung.

Q: Could you describe for me your work with the 2d Infantry Division during your second tour?

A: My work with the 2d Division was divided into three parts. First, I was the executive officer to the 38th Infantry from July to October. Then, I was the chief of staff of the 2d Division until December. Then, from December of 1951 until April of 1952, I commanded the 38th Infantry Regiment.

Commanding Officer, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division

My job as executive officer of the 38th Regiment was a very satisfying one because I worked for an absolutely first-class infantry commander. Colonel Frank Mildren had extensive experience in Europe in World War II where he distinguished himself in combat. He was also a good staff officer, I had worked for him previously and therefore knew him well.

Mildren let me plan and execute one of the principal battles of the 38th Regiment, even though I was his executive at the time. First, he wanted to take a rest--he didn’t think that anyone was physically capable of commanding troops all the time.
He said he would take the responsibility, but would allow me to plan and execute a large-scale operation in September of 1951. It was one of the last big operations of the war and a memorable one for me.

The operation was to take an enemy position on a mountain which rose to 1,215 meters. The operation was named, appropriately enough, “Operation 1215.” Taking the objective was key to opening up operations for other regiments which were pinned down on lower ground at Heartbreak Ridge. Dislodging the Chinese from the top of the mountain, to understate the case, was not an easy job. Tanks could get only a quarter of the way up the mountain, and there was no place to station artillery to support the attack. To provide fire support, we set up the bases with mortars and hand-held 57- and 75-mm. rockets. We parked the artillery and tanks, much to their displeasure of the tankers and artillery men, we put them in charge of KATUSAs who carried ammunition up to the fire bases with which we ringed the mountain.

It was a hard 8-hour climb up to the fire bases, and these human supply trains walked around the clock, many dropping out because of fatigue, while others continued to climb, even though their feet were swollen and bloody. They carried pack loads of ammunition up to the places from which we could hit the top of the hill. Artillerymen and tankers not supervising the A-frame KATUSA “Chogi-bearers” were given jobs assisting the mortarmen and rocket launchers. We established six fire bases as close as we could to the enemy position. The idea was to put down a murderous rain of fire. Then, when the fire lifted, the could quickly charge to the top of the mountain.

On the day of the attack, September 15, 1951, a heavy fog set in. I postponed the planned dawn attack to 10 a.m. The commanding general was not happy with the delay. At 10 a.m. it was still foggy and I postponed the attack another hour. At
10:30 the commanding general called to ask if I had taken the hill. I told him it was too foggy to attack. “Damn it,” he said, “I need that hill. The troops in the lower hills are taking a beating? At 11 a.m. it was still foggy and I postponed the attack once more—this time to 12 noon. The commanding general was highly annoyed. He ordered me to take the hill by noon or he would relieve me.

Just before noon the fog lifted and we began putting down a murderous barrage of fire from the six fire bases. It was something the Chinese did not expect; it completely unnerved them and put them in a state of shock. We walked the fires forward with the troops following close behind. When the troops were 100 yards from the top, we put down a 10-minute heavy barrage of fire. When we lifted the fires, the infantry rushed forward and took the mountaintop.

To me, the best part of the operation was that while there were numerous Chinese killed and wounded, our troops did not suffer a single fatality. Some of our men, of course, were wounded, but there was not a single soldier killed. The Chinese, on the other hand, suffered close to 200 killed. The attack was a great success because we had put down large amounts of fire in a place where the Chinese didn’t think it could be done. By hugging our fires closely, and then charging up the hilltop immediately following a final heavy barrage of mortar and rocket fires, we took Hill 1215. Once the hill fell, the troops on the lower terrain were able to move forward. I consider commanding this highly successful operation to be the high point of my military career.

As his executive, Mildren used me for the most part to make certain he had good logistical support for the regiment. This allowed him to devote his energies to commanding the regiment without having to worry about the mundane but essential job of providing the regiment logistical support. In Korea, logistics often took priority over tactics; the availability of supplies determined what could and what could not be done.

Q: I gather that you next became the chief of staff of the 2d Division?
A: The job as chief of staff was a temporary one until the officer designated for the job arrived. I was chosen because I knew the local scene and had field experience. It was an interesting job because I could see the big picture and become familiar with the division’s goals and plans. Also, I got to know the commanding general, Major General Robert Young; the deputy assistant division commander, Brigadier General Hayden Boatner; and the rest of the staff quite well. This proved invaluable to me later when I became a regimental commander.
If I may, I’d like at this point to leap forward a year or so. General Young took over the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and brought me and two other of his regimental commanders to the school. He put each of us in charge of a major division of the Infantry School, instructing us to bring the school up-to-date on what we’d learned in Korea. In a matter of months, we revolutionized the teaching and brought it up-to-date. Prior to that time the Infantry School was still teaching World War II tactics.

The association I developed with General Boatner, the assistant division commander, also paid off handsomely. Soon after I took over the command of the 38th regiment, a truce was declared. We were forced into a “no war, no peace” situation. We were under instructions from Washington to present an alert appearance, to patrol, and to capture prisoners. But we were not allowed to commit units larger than a platoon to combat.

Early in 1952, I repeatedly tried to capture Chinese prisoners. The usual tactic was to strike at some small outpost occupied by two or three Chinese soldiers. We would try to hit them by surprise and bring back a prisoner or two. This became extremely difficult-almost impossible-to pull off. By this time, the Chinese had dug in and were well protected in bunkers and underground tunnels. We didn’t really know where they could be found. Moreover, they were always within supporting distance of their fires or reinforcing troops.

On one occasion I committed a platoon against an outpost of what I thought was a squad or so of Chinese. The Chinese brought a great deal of firepower against my platoon and it completely bogged down. I went to see for myself what the situation was. What I found was that the platoon was pinned down by fire; they could neither move forward nor backward without taking casualties.

My platoon just lay there in the extreme cold, &fording themselves what little cover the terrain provided. They were simply frozen in position, frozen in by the firepower and frozen in by the weather.

My solution was to order the rest of the company into action. They were to attack through the platoon and take the outpost. The attack proved successful. Our troops snatched two prisoners before the Chinese reinforcements arrived. Several of our troops were wounded, but there were no fatalities.

The next day General Hayden Boatner, who was then acting division commander, came to my headquarters with orders from Washington to relieve me. I had violated instructions by committing more than a platoon. I explained to Boatner the situation I had faced, saying that I had no choice. If I didn’t want to lose the entire platoon to the weather or to enemy fire, I had to apply more power. The
men of the platoon had stripped themselves of several layers of cold weather gear so they could move more rapidly. As a result, they were freezing and in no position to lie in the cold. And because of the accurate and withering fire, they could move neither forward nor backwards.

General Boatner was convinced that I had done the proper thing. He saw that I had no alternative but to commit more troops once the platoon had bogged down. He reported to Washington that he had investigated the situation and had absolved me of any wrongdoing. The next day he received a message which read: “Obey instructions. Relieve Rowny for having violated the policy of not committing more than a platoon. Notwithstanding the extenuating circumstances, we cannot allow commanders to violate instructions from Washington. Other commanders must realize that we are serious.”

General Boatner wired back: “If you want to relieve somebody, relieve me. I’m in command here.” He left me in command and I never heard any more about the incident. Washington knew Boatner was not bluffing. He was a man willing to stand up to higher authority, even though the pressure was great. He could have simply carried out his instructions and relieved me. To put it mildly, I was elated; it was a lesson in moral courage.

Q: What became of Boatner? Did he suffer any consequences for his action?

A: No. Washington had great confidence in Boatner who, among other skills, could speak Chinese. He had been a Chinese language student and had served in China. He was sent to Koje-do to secure Chinese prisoners there had captured two U.S. general officers and held them hostage. When he was sent to Koje-do, I pleaded with him to let me go with my regiment which had orders to back him at Koje-do. But my time was up. The Army was rotating regimental commanders every six months and my six months had expired. I was told I had done my job and that it was time for me to turn over my command.

Q: So where did you go from there?

A: I went to Tokyo. I had accrued some leave and used it to pack up my family and came back with them by boat to San Francisco. There, I picked up a new car and drove across the United States to Fort Benning to take over my new job as chief of the regimental tactics department.
Q: I note from Army records that you were assigned as administrative officer, Headquarters, 2d Port, Pusan, Korea.

A: That was simply a way of assigning me somewhere until I arrived at Fort Benning.

**Infantry School**

Q: I note from Army records that the first thing you did at Fort Benning was to go to jump school.

A: Yes. This was one of General Young’s requirements. All instructors at Fort Benning had to be jumpers. I had always wanted to jump anyway so this was no big problem. However, I was in my mid-thirties and most of the students were in their early twenties. It was a rigorous schedule. It made me wish I had taken the course as a young lieutenant.

In jump school a humorous incident occurred. While we were still in the combat phase in Korea, the 2d Division had conducted a bloody operation which turned out well. It succeeded largely because a sergeant took over when his platoon leader was killed. He rallied the men and stormed the hill. I commended the sergeant and told him he deserved an award for valor. I told him I had seldom seen anyone do a better job of turning certain defeat into victory. The sergeant said, "Of course we took the hill, don’t you know who I am?" He said, “I’m Lou Jenkins, the ex-welterweight champion of the world. What else would you expect from me?” Later, Sergeant Jenkins came to Benning to work for me. I told him he had to take jump training, the way I had. "I can’t," he said. “It’s my back.” He pulled up his shirt and undershirt and asked me to take a look.

"I don’t see anything wrong with your back,” I said.

"Don’t you see the big yellow streak?” he asked.

At this point I have a comment to make. General Bruce Clarke, a former engineer officer who rose to four-star rank, once said: “We’ve never won a war since the Airborne took over the Pentagon.”

I got to know Bruce Clarke quite well. He considered himself the best trainer in the Army and was interested in my ideas about training. But he had several idiosyncrasies. One of them was that he didn’t like elite units, and this included jumpers. He felt all soldiers should consider themselves to be elite troops.
Q: What did you do at the Infantry School?

A: My work at the Infantry School was of two types: official and unofficial. Officially, I headed the group of instructors who taught the infantry regiment in the attack. I redesigned the course and incorporated the lessons we had learned in combat in Korea. The instruction included the use of helicopters for reconnaissance, attack, logistics, and evacuation of casualties. It also stressed how to maximize the use of firepower. We taught that infantry has to move in very rapidly as soon as supporting fires are lifted so as to maximize the shock value of the fires. Several of these ideas were new to the extent that new weapons and new methods of mobility were available. But for the most part, the new equipment brought old ideas back into prominence.

As for my unofficial job, I had become quite interested in new regimental infantry tactics. It was contrary to Army policy to teach anything but approved tactics at the Infantry School. The fundamental idea was that Benning was to indoctrinate and not innovate. I thought that Benning should do both and received permission to hold courses where attendance would be voluntary. We called these unofficial instruction courses PROFIT: professional improvement time. One of my ideas was to assist ground attacks with nuclear weapons, a new and controversial subject. At that time the possession and use of nuclear weapons were the sole prerogative of the Air Force. The idea was to use helicopters in combat to exploit rapidly a nuclear attack. The concept was to drop a nuclear weapon in the enemy’s rear. Before the enemy could react from the shock, we would land troops, dressed in protective clothing, from helicopters. I called this the “swarm of bees” concept. I also developed concepts of moving troops in helicopters behind enemy lines. I had experimented with helicopters in Korea and was convinced that the mobility and discriminating fires they afforded could be used in counterinsurgency warfare.

My PROFIT courses became quite popular; there was standing room only. At one session, a young captain began asking me some very intelligent and provocative
questions. In desperation, I said, “Captain, you obviously know a great deal about nuclear weapons and how they might be used in ground warfare. Why don’t you come up to the platform and let us ask you questions?”

Unabashed, he did so, and for the next hour or so performed brilliantly. I invited him home for dinner and we talked into the early hours of the morning. It was only then that I learned the young captain was a reserve officer performing his two weeks of annual active duty. He was Congressman Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson from Washington state, who later became a United States senator.

The next day I was called into General Fritchie’s office, the acting commandant of the Infantry School. He said the chief of staff of the Army wanted to see me in Washington the next day. He had been called by Congressman Scoop Jackson.

Elated, I traveled to Washington, believing that I would be commended for my innovative ideas. Instead, I was taken to task by the chief of staff, Robert Stevens, for having “exacerbated the services’ roles and missions fight.” The Army, he told me, had no interest in nuclear weapons. The same went for helicopters, he said; they were the province of the Air Force. Moreover, he admonished me for “putting Jackson up to calling him.” I told him this was not so, but he said he didn’t believe me.

That marked the end of my unofficial teaching. I was ordered not to hold PROFIT sessions, not even on an unofficial basis. There was simply too much interservice rivalry over the use of nuclear weapons and combat helicopters. Accordingly, I was silenced for the remainder of my stay at Benning. As for Scoop Jackson, the episode did not faze him at all. More than once, at later times, he egged me into sticking my neck out.

Jackson urged me to push both ideas: the use of nuclear weapons and combat helicopters in the Army. He was instrumental in getting me assigned to Vietnam where I introduced helicopters into combat and helped develop the Army’s air assault doctrine. My work with helicopters resulted in setting back my Army career. Later, Jackson had me assigned as the JCS representative to the SALT II negotiations.

It came about this way. In 1972 Jackson decided that General Royal Allison, the Air Force general representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT II talks, was not doing a good job. Jackson felt Allison had undermined him when Allison pushed hard for approval of the ABM treaty [antiballistic missile] and interim accord on strategic offensive arms, SALT I. Jackson engineered a deal with Henry Kissinger. Jackson told Kissinger he would vote for the ABM treaty and interim agreement only if certain demands were met. One of these demands was that I
would be put into Royal Allison's place. It was a job I didn't seek and didn't want. I thought it would set back my Army career, which in fact it did. But Jackson always lectured me on "Duty, Honor and Country." I knew in my heart he was right and couldn't say no to him. But I'm getting well ahead of my story.

Q: To get back to Fort Benning, did you look for officers who had tours of duty in Korea to be instructors at the Infantry School?

A: Yes. I inherited a number of good instructors but got others through a very elaborate screening process. Teaching at Benning was a very popular assignment and many good officers wanted to teach at the Infantry School. As a result, the Infantry School had an outstanding group of instructors. One, the head of the weapons department, was Frank Mildren. He had been my regimental commander in Korea. Another was Bill Lynch. Still another was Fred Weyand, a contemporary of mine, who went on to become the chief of staff of the Army.

We completely rewrote the Army field manuals for the regiment and battalion in attack, and regiment and battalion in defense. It was a busy and fruitful time. This helped push into the back of my mind the fact that I had been silenced and that my career might suffer. The courses of instruction were completely turned around during the couple of years I was at Benning.

Q: How long was the course at the Infantry School?

A: The regular course of instruction was nine months. But we also conducted refresher courses for officers being assigned to Korea since the Korean War was still going on. General Young convinced the chief of staff of the Army that all future battalion and regimental commanders should take a month-long course to familiarize them with the unique problems of Korea. This meant extra work for the instructors, but we felt it very worthwhile to have newly assigned commanders oriented before they left for Korea.

Q: Did you get any feedback from them?

A: Yes. All battalion and regimental commanders, upon completing their tours in Korea, were ordered to Benning for a two-week debriefing session. We told them our new ideas and asked them to critique what we were teaching at Benning. It was a dynamic learning experience. It also gave us a chance to size up the better battalion and regimental commanders for teaching jobs at Benning. It was a good
way to inject realism into the instruction. Instructors were not teaching out of a book, but from their own combat experience.

Q: I don’t seem to remember anything like that going on during the Vietnam War.

A: I don’t either, but there should have been. There probably wasn’t one because they didn’t have a General Robert Young, an officer dedicated to the notion that officers should learn from the experience of others. Moreover, Young greatly streamlined the review process that instruction had to undergo before the instruction was approved. His idea was that the best is the enemy of the good. The normal one-year review cycle for new instruction was cut to three months.

Q: When you left the Infantry School, did you feel you had left your mark on the school?

A: Yes, I had a feeling of satisfaction about the job I had done there. We were able to rewrite the infantry instruction manuals, bringing World War II tactics up-to-date to reflect the lessons learned in Korea.

Essentially, these lessons were that infantry tactics could benefit from more mobility and greater fire power. Mobility and fire power were always a part of infantry tactics but now they got more emphasis. The main idea was to avoid set-piece operations, to get away from the idea of slugging it out with the enemy. The object was to out-maneuver him, to move around the enemy rather than hit him head-on. By using either more mobility or greater fire power, or a combination of both, the object was to destroy the enemy and capture the high ground more quickly. Importantly, it would be done with a minimum of friendly casualties. Korea had also taught us the value of paying more attention to logistics. It takes good logistical support to achieve more mobility and greater fire power. We taught that we were trying to avoid the set-piece tactics of World War II which resulted in so many casualties. What we were seeking was the combination of the shock effect of superior fire power and the surprise effect of moving quickly against the flank or rear of the enemy.

Besides, I was able to see two of my basic concepts advanced. One was to see if we could use tactical nuclear weapons in our infantry doctrine. The second was to use helicopters to achieve greater mobility and deliver more accurate and discriminating fire power. We tried to improve on ground cavalry by utilizing helicopters to create sky cavalry. The two concepts really dovetailed. A tactical nuclear weapon exploded in the rear of an enemy could be exploited by moving troops into the area of the explosion. If we could move our troops quickly into the
area while the enemy was still in a sense of shock from the nuclear explosion, we would be able to exploit his temporarily weakened condition.

Rewriting the manuals and teaching the students new ideas gave me a great feeling of satisfaction. I felt we were contributing in a major way revolutionizing the thinking of our younger officers and advancing the Army’s professionalism. We got the Infantry School out of the rut of simply indoctrinating officers by encouraging them to think for themselves.

Q: How did you deal with the students who were concerned that teaching tactics applicable to Korea was not the type of war they might have to fight in the future?

A: You’ve raised an important question. The answer is that we had to hedge our bets. We had to admit we didn’t know what kind of wars we would have to fight in the future. The more probable wars we would have to fight were the kind we experienced in World War II. Therefore, we had to pay a lot of attention to possibilities of a return to set-piece warfare. But we were concerned that the lessons learned from Korea could be put to great advantage in other wars. More fire power and greater mobility were basic elements which could enhance all types of operations.

At the same time, we were thinking about the kind of warfare we later encountered in Vietnam. I don’t want to claim that we predicted what was going to happen in Vietnam. But we did pay a great deal of attention to the use of helicopters in guerrilla warfare situations.

Armed Forces Staff College

Q: When you left the Infantry School, I take it you went to the Armed Forces Staff College. What was that like?

A: The Armed Forces Staff College was a breeze. It was like a vacation to me because I was the senior officer at the course. The relaxing atmosphere gave me an opportunity to get to know officers of the other services. I was also able to read a great deal. It was a broadening experience, a break from the intense period at Fort Benning and a welcome sabbatical. I had few responsibilities and could just sit back, think and enjoy life.

Q: Did you have any contemporaries or friends at the college?
A: Yes, several of my West Point classmates were there. I remember one classmate in particular, Robert “Woody” Garrett. I also made lasting friendships with officers of other services, such as Captain Cy Young who got to command a nuclear submarine. He was godfather to my son John who was born at Norfolk. I made another friend, an Air Force officer, Vincent Rethman, from whom I learned a great deal about Air Force doctrine. All in all, it was an enjoyable time; the six months passed quickly.

Q: After that school assignment you were sent to Paris, first as deputy secretary of the general staff to General Gruenther and later secretary of the general staff to General Norstad. What did those jobs involve?

A: I went from a low-key assignment at Norfolk to a very high-key job in Paris. General Gruenther was highly demanding. He expected his staff to work at white heat 12 hours a day. I was motivated to work hard at this job because General Gruenther looked to the secretary of the general staff to run the entire staff. He used his chief of staff, the usual person to run the staff, as a second deputy.

Most of the officers who had been Gruenther’s secretaries of the general staff either suffered nervous breakdowns or had heart attacks. Because General Gruenther was highly demanding, it was a stressful operation. I was at first deputy to Colonel [later general] Jerry Folda. When I joined him he was close to burnout.

Q: Did you become the secretary of the general staff to General Gruenther?

A: Yes, after a year as his deputy I took over from Folda and became the secretary of the general staff to General Gruenther. Six months later General Norstad became SACEUR. I stayed on with him as his secretary of the general staff.

Secretary of the Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers

Q: Could you tell me what you consider as high points of your assignment in France with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe]?

A: Some of the high points were procedural and others were substantive.

On the procedural side, we brought the first Germans into SHAPE. I made the original contacts with the German government, selected two officers to come to the staff and decided where to assign them. We put one in the operations directorate
and the other in my own office. Both of them rose to become chiefs of their respective services in the German armed forces. It was a time when we were branching out and bringing officers of other nationalities into key positions in SHARE. Up until this time, most of the key jobs had gone to Anglo-Americans. Now we started to bring in officers of other nationalities. For example, the logistics division went to an Italian. We brought in several French officers and arranged for other key spots to be filled by officers from the Low Countries.

On the substantive side, it was also a fascinating time, largely because we were redoing the basic strategy of NATO, MC 14/2. MC 14/2 was the document outlining the basic strategy of NATO for the 1950s, the strategy of massive retaliation. When he became SACEUR in 1955, General Norstad began to study the strategy of forward defense and flexible response. It later became MC 14/3.

In addition to changing NATO strategy, we were also faced with international crises. One was the Suez Canal crisis, which involved all of NATO but particularly the British and French.

A second crisis was the invasion of Hungary by the Soviets. I recall that quite distinctly because General Gruenther was called hourly by Clare Booth Luce, our ambassador to Italy. She was highly disturbed and wanted him to do something to help Hungary. Her main idea was to have U.S. troops move into Hungary to reinforce the Hungarian resistance. Failing that, she wanted U.S. troops to move to the Hungarian border. And, at the very least, she wanted Gruenther to have Red Cross supplies flown into Hungary. But Gruenther was unable to get Washington to move on any of these ideas. At first, they said it wasn’t a NATO responsibility. And later they said the U.S. should not interfere in Hungary’s internal affairs.

A third crisis at NATO was General de Gaulle’s return to power in France. We worked very closely with our French contacts and wondered how things would sort out. It was fortunate that we had a French officer, General Allard, at the head of our operations division. He was a personal friend of General de Gaulle’s who had served with him in Algeria. Through Allard we were able to keep in close touch with what was going on politically in France. This paved the way for amicable relations with General de Gaulle when he came back into power.

Q: What was General Gruenther’s background?

A: I had come to know General Gruenther in Italy during World War II when he was chief of staff to General Mark Clark in the Fifth Army. After the war, General Gruenther went back to Washington on the War Department staff. He was in on the ground floor to set up NATO. He took Colonels Goodpaster and Robert Wood
to Europe with him at the time the Marshall Plan was being drawn up. He sowed the seeds for what later became the political and military policies of NATO. Gruenther rose rapidly in the Army, moving from one staff job to another. He was brilliant and worked very hard. However, he worked his subordinates even harder.

Q: Can you give me some personal insights into your tour at SHAPE?

A: General Gruenther was a Class A, high-pressure type of boss. He loved to give the impression that everything he did was smooth and easy, that he had total recall, and that he was a superman. Although he was a brilliant officer, he was no superman. What most people don’t know is that he did a great deal of preplanning and spent a prodigious amount of time attending to details.

Gruenther had a habit of waking up at night whenever he had an idea and dictating a half dozen or more so-called “Gruenther-grams.” We would pick up the Gruenther-grams at his residence when he came down to breakfast. By the time he came to the office, he expected us to have answers to his questions and plans for those things he wanted done. These Gruenther-grams became a major source of our heartburn. He expected us to spring into action immediately and produce instant results. He left nothing to chance, everything had to be checked and double-checked.

I remember particularly a Gruenther-gram on General Gruenther’s last day on the job at SHAPE. The Suez crisis was still not settled, causing us a great deal of work. We received a Gruenther-gram about 0630 which read: “By the time I arrive in the office at 0830, I want a plan on how to dispose of my toys.” A famous toy manufacturer, Marx, admired Gruenther greatly and over the years gave him hundreds of toys.

We quickly went to work and devised a basic plan. It would allot toys on a priority basis first to the children of enlisted men, then to civilians, and finally to officers. It would give the highest priority to children of officers of the smaller countries, all worked out on a point system. No toys would go to Americans.

General Gruenther looked over the plan and said, “This is pretty good. You’re finally learning how to operate around here. However," he said, “you’ve made some assumptions I don’t understand. You’ve developed one plan on the assumption that there are 500 toys, another on the assumption that there are 1,000 toys and a third on the assumption that we have 1,500 toys to distribute. Why three plans? Don’t you know how many toys we have?”

"No," I said, “we don’t.”
“G-damn it,” he exploded, "Why don’t you find out?”

“Because,” I said, “I couldn’t. One was never allowed to say much to Gruenther; he wanted only answers to his questions.

‘Why not” he asked.

"Because,” I said,” Mrs Gruenther has the keys to the attic where the toys are locked up. She says that they are her toys.”

Gruenther got quite annoyed: “They’re not her toys, they’re my toys. She wants to give them to charity. But charity begins at home,” he said. “We have to give them to children of those who have served at SHAPE. The poor we will always have with us,” he said, “but there will only be one NATO.”

I needed to get out of the middle of this one and asked Mrs. Gruenther to let me count the toys. I said I would draw up a plan whereby she got half and General Gruenther got the other half. She readily agreed, but General Gruenther only agreed reluctantly. There were 800 toys. She got 400 for her charities, and General Gruenther got 400 for NATO.

By 11 a.m. we had developed a plan which General Gruenther approved, saying he wanted the toys delivered later that day. General Gruenther personally wrote notes in five different languages to the parents of the children. We left the office at midnight, exhausted, having gotten most of the toys distributed. We didn’t have the nerve to tell him that some of the recipients were not at home. I told this story to my wife, who became quite annoyed with me. “With all the other things you have to do of a serious nature,” she said, “why are you wearing yourself and your staff out on trivial matters?”

The next day was a Sunday. As we were returning home from church, General Gruenther’s driver drove up with a big box. With it was a note addressed to my wife: "Dear Rita: Your husband worked very hard on the plan for distributing toys to my wonderful people of SHAPE. I gave none to the Americans, but for Marcia, age six, is a doll, and for Peter, age four, is a train, and for Paul, age two, is a set of building blocks."

My wife beamed and said: “Isn’t he wonderful?” It was my turn to be annoyed with her. I later learned that our three toys had come out of Mrs. Gruenther’s quota for her charities.

General Robert J. “Bob” Wood, one of my predecessors as secretary of the general staff, kept a collection of some of the more interesting Gruenther-grams. One
Edward L. Rowny

dealt with a letter delivered to the prime minister of Turkey in Ankara eight hours after the time it was signed. That took considerable doing. Another was a letter personally delivered by me to the chairman of the British chiefs of staff.

This would have not been too difficult had it not been for the unexpected closure of the British military airfield near London. I was dropped off at an airport 60 miles from London at 10:30 a.m. and was to deliver the letter at noon. I had to commandeer a British Army vehicle, “in the name of the Supreme Allied Commander,” to drive me to London.

I arrived at high noon, the time the letter was to be delivered, just as the changing of the guards began. I ran through the ranks of the guards to deliver my letter to the chairman of the British chiefs. He didn’t expect me to arrive on time after he heard that the airport had been closed. He complimented me on my “Yankee ingenuity- for commandeering the British vehicle.

Another humorous incident I recall was when General Gruenther came in one morning and saw that not all of the 14 NATO flags were up. One flag was stuck several feet below the top of the mast. He called in Colonel Wood, then secretary of the general staff, and said, “When I came in this morning, I noticed that one of the flags was not fully up at the top of the mast. I expect the secretary of the general staff personally to supervise these important things.”

Colonel Wood answered, “Sir, at the time we have to come to work, it’s not yet reveille and the flags have not yet been hoisted.”
Q: Gruenther, I take it, took over the American Red Cross. Who had to adjust to the other-Gruenther or the Red Cross?

A: I heard that Gruenther had to adjust. The people at Red Cross told him they worked for salaries and not for promotions. He started out demanding that things be done instantly and correctly. But he soon had to scale down his expectations. The Red Cross staff just didn’t respond to his Gruenther-grams. They didn’t mind working on real substantive issues, but they rebelled at working on things which they felt only inflated Gruenther’s ego and maintained his “superman” reputation.

We spent an enormous amount of time on Gruenther’s speeches. A major speech would call for three to four weeks of staff work by several officers of the secretariat. Gruenther wanted to know exactly how many people would be in the audience, what their backgrounds were, and what questions they were likely to ask. We would send an officer to the scene of the speech a week in advance to do research on the spot, read local papers to get the "feel" of the place, and so on.

Gruenther would always go armed with gifts for those he expected to meet. We researched these matters carefully, but he would make it appear spontaneous. For example, on a visit to Canada he said: “Prime Minister Trudeau, the last time I saw you was on July 16th of 1950.” He not only had a gift for Trudeau and his wife, but for their children and grandchildren. He’d say, “Here’s a toy for your granddaughter, Jennifer, who must be about six, and here’s a toy for your driver’s son, John, who must be about four.” All of this was painstakingly orchestrated but done surreptitiously behind the scenes to make it look unpremeditated and spontaneous. It was phony, and at times corny, but it paid off, they loved it.

Gruenther was best with large audiences but uncomfortable when he spoke to one or two people. If he had an audience of 100 or 200 people, it turned him on and he would come alive. He was a great actor and loved to play to crowds, the larger the better.

General Norstad was just the opposite. He was low-key, shy, thoughtful, and reflective. He didn’t care much for grandstanding. The smaller the audience, the better he performed. When he spoke to a large crowd, he was nervous, but when he spoke to only a few persons he was more comfortable. He was most comfortable in a one-n-one situation. Although he and Gruenther were opposites, each was effective in his own way. Norstad didn’t write "Norstad-grams" He would write out instructions to the staff and explain in great detail what he wanted.

Q: When General Norstad became SACEUR, did you have any of the type of meetings you had back in the Pentagon where you got together and talked about the future?
A: Yes, Norstad continued his dream sessions. One of the subjects we discussed, a brainchild of Norstad’s, was the evolution of NATO strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. Updating MC 14/2 to MC 14/3 was worked out in detail by Colonel Richard "Dick" Stilwell, who later commanded our forces in Korea as a four-star general. Norstad was a young and dynamic officer. I recall he celebrated his 50th birthday while I was his secretary. He was an inspiring man to work for and employed none of the high pressure tactics that General Gruenther used.

Q: General Norstad must have ushered in a completely different atmosphere.

A: Yes. As I said earlier, the two SACEURs were effective but in different ways-General Gruenther was effective with large audiences while Norstad was effective with small ones. Gruenther believed that strategy would take care of itself. He felt it was his job to look after the support for and morale within NATO. Gruenther felt it important to have all the countries, and especially the smaller ones, feel secure by being a part of one big family.

By way of contrast, General Norstad believed that if he developed a good strategy, it was the best thing he could do for NATO. He felt his subordinates could take care of details and could take charge of their own morale.

Q: Is there anything else you want to tell me about your assignment at SHAPE?

A: Yes. While at SHAPE I got interested in how decisions are made at high levels. There were a number of studies being done in academia, especially Harvard and Yale, on the decision-making process. Some of the ideas developed at that time were applied later on, for example at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The decision-making process fascinated me, and I started gathering notes for what culminated about 20 years later as my Ph.D. thesis on decision-making in NATO.

In my Ph.D. thesis on the decision-making process in NATO, I drew largely from my notes taken at tours of duty then, and later, at NATO. I wrote that there were three types of decisions made in NATO.

The easiest type of decisions were those that had to be made in times of crisis. I learned this at first hand because during my first months in Brussels in 1970, I was the deputy to General Johannes Steinhoff, commander of NATO’s Military Committee. Dom Mintoff, the prime minister of Malta, had Malta defect from NATO the day I arrived in Brussels in 1970. On that same day, Steinhoff left for a month’s leave. The month of August is a dead month all over Europe. Yet,
during that month of August we had something like 20 high-level meetings on the Malta crisis which I chaired. I complained at the time that I had to carry the Maltese Cross."

The second part of my thesis was on a more difficult type of decision to make: how does an organization change its basic strategy? Here, I wrote about the shift from MC 14/2 to MC 14/3 which had been initiated by General Norstad. It took several years to complete the shift in strategy from that of massive retaliation to one of forward defense and flexible response. Although I left SHAPE before the shift was completed, I was able to assess its effectiveness during my second tour in NATO.

The third and most difficult type of decision I covered in my thesis was how an organization changes its structure to accommodate new situations. One would think that international organizations change easily and rapidly, but they don’t. There’s a great deal of inertia in large organizations. In fact, some things we tried mightily to change never succeeded. For example, we were never able to put together a viable public relations program for NATO.

**National War College**

Q: After you left SHAPE I gather you were assigned to the National War College.

A: Yes. I went to the regular course at the National War College in 1958 and finished in 1959.

Q: Was this an easy course? It seems like you were pretty experienced.

A: Yes, it was an easy course and a lot of fun. They let you set your own pace and I decided to work hard. I wrote a ten-year projection of what would happen in foreign affairs and how it would affect the military. I wanted to see how well one could project what might happen ten years hence. I thought that no one could, of course, predict precisely what would happen. But I believed that one could project trends and the general course of events. In retrospect, I was right. The projection held up remarkably well. It taught me that a good strategy and plan could absorb many unexpected events and still have us come out where we wanted to be.

The good news about my paper was that I tied for first prize for the class’ best thesis. But the bad news was that I tied with Dr. Fritz Kraemer, a friend of long-standing. The winning papers were presented orally to the class and college alumni during their annual reunion. We flipped a coin to see who would go first.
and Kraemer won. He was—and still is—a powerful, dynamic and articulate speaker who illustrates his points in four languages. I became so fascinated listening to him that I forgot much of what I was to say during my own presentation.

Army Member, Chairman’s Staff Group, JCS

But, apparently, it went over pretty well. There were several talent seekers in the audience, and I was tapped to become a member of the chairman’s staff group. The group consisted of three officers—one Army, one Navy and one Air Force—who acted as personal assistants to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We reviewed his papers, did our own research, and gave completely independent and confidential recommendations to the chairman. As his personal assistants we were completely answerable to him and responsible to no one else. It was a very fascinating job and a powerful spot, powerful because one could influence important decisions. Even after recommendations had gone through the entire bureaucracy and put forward by a number of high-ranking officers, we could give a completely candid and separate view on what the chairman should do.

Q: Before we talk about your job in the chairman’s staff group, could you summarize what you thought about the National War College?

A: Yes. The National War College is a great place for three reasons. First, it exposes you to a broad cross-section of high-ranking people in Washington who come to the War College and speak frankly and off-the-record. It opened my eyes and broadened my horizons considerably.

Second, the college allows you to make life-long friendships with people in the Air Force, the Navy and the State Department. A number of those friendships I established at the college proved invaluable later on. For example, when I went to Vietnam, I had trouble finding a place to set up headquarters. Because of roles and missions fight, I was dispossessed from my office every other week. An Air Force officer I met at the War College took me in and let me share his office. He did this even though General LeMay had labeled me as “Air Force Public Enemy No. 1.” He gave me this title because I was introducing armed helicopters into Vietnam.

Third, we learned a great deal from the month-long trips the college took. I elected to go back to Africa where I had served early in World War II. Even though I had spent several months in Africa during the early days of the war, I still felt Africa was the continent I knew least. It was interesting to go back to Liberia.
and see how little things had changed over the 15 years since I had served there.
It was also interesting to go to the other parts of Africa. In those days the Mau Mau were still in Kenya. It was also the beginning of the apartheid riots in South Africa. All in all, the trip to Africa was a fascinating one.

Q: You said this was one of your better tours. Apparently you feel the education system for Army officers is important. In this connection, did you go to the Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth?

A: Yes, I went to the Command and General Staff College [CGSC] at Leavenworth during World War II. Because the war was on, the year-long course was compressed to six months.

I was then in the 92d Division and my commanding general thought going to CGSC was a waste of time. However, I was in a jeep accident in which I broke my shoulder. The general thought I’d be of little use around the division for a couple of months, and felt I could recuperate at the Command and General Staff College as well as anywhere else. I went to the course with my right shoulder in a cast. I was assigned a WAC, a Women’s Army Corps corporal, to do my writing for me. On the whole, I found it a fairly good course. I had already done most of the things they taught at the college but it was a good refresher. It showed me that some of the things we did in the field had a good academic rationale. At the college I made some lasting friendships which served me throughout my career. Next to fighting side-by-side in combat, school is one of the best places to make friends.

Q: Let’s get back to your time with the chairman’s staff group.

Who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and what do you remember about him?

A: The chairman was General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. Working for him started an association which lasted for about 20 years. He was a remarkable man who actively promoted NATO for years. For a man who was born in the last century [1899] he was an exceptionally vigorous person. I hit it off fairly well with him, something which helped me get back on a fast career track. I had been the first of the West Point Class of 1941 to be promoted to 1st lieutenant, the first to make captain, the first to make major, and the first to make lieutenant colonel, the first to be promoted to colonel, and the first in my class to be promoted to brigadier general.
I remember the day General Lemnitzer pinned on my first star. Two days earlier
the general gave me a highly sensitive secret document that, he said, only he, the
President of the United States, and now I knew about. He asked me to study it and
give him a recommendation.

I analyzed the paper and next day gave him my recommendation. Lemnitzer
accepted my view and that same day talked to the President about it. The
following morning I was called at home at 7 a.m. and told that General Lemnitzer
wanted to see me in his office at 8 o’clock. It was unusual that he would want to
see me that early. While drinking my coffee I took a quick look at the paper and,
to my horror, saw my memo in the Evans and Novak column of the Washington
Post. I went to the office worried about how my memo had leaked. I recalled that
Lemnitzer told me that only he, the President, and I knew about it. I had even
typed my recommendation to him myself so not even a secretary would know about
it.

When I got to the office, I had to cool my heels outside his office for half an hour.
This was also highly unusual since General Lemnitzer was always very prompt.
It made me all the more nervous. When I finally entered his office at 8:30, there
were my wife and family. Lemnitzer said he called me in to have the pleasure of
pinning on my star. I was as surprised as I was relieved. I said, “I thought you
were calling me in to bawl me out for having leaked that document.” Lemnitzer
gave me his characteristic giggle and said: "You have a lot to learn about how this
town launches trial balloons. This government is the only ship of state that leaks
at the top? He said the document was leaked from the White House to see what
the public reaction would be. I’ve learned a lot about deliberate leaks since then.
But at the time it was a rude shock.

I recall another interesting incident while I worked on the chairman’s staff group.
It was the time of the Cuban invasion. I knew something unusual was going on
because the same officers were going in to see General Lemnitzer and we on the
staff were excluded. Only two or three officers in the JCS worked on the Cuban
invasion and they worked directly for the chairman. While we overheard a few
things, we were not involved in planning the invasion and not certain what was
going on.

After the invasion failed, we shared our office with the persons who were
investigating why it failed. One was Robert Kennedy. Another was General
Maxwell Taylor and the third man was Richard Helms who later became head of
the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].
I was fascinated by what I overheard. Richard Helms was quite silent, but there couldn’t be two more contrasting personalities than Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor.

General Taylor would come to meetings in a well-tailored, perfectly pressed uniform. He sat ramrod straight at one end of the table. Robert Kennedy came dressed in sports shirt and slacks, loafers and athletic socks. He sat slouched over at the other end of the table. He’d tie off his loafers and put his stocking feet up on the table. The two went at it hammer and tongs. At one stage, General Taylor made some remark Robert Kennedy didn’t agree with. Kennedy got up, walked to the other end of the table in his stocking feet, and punched his finger into the general’s chest. "Maxie," he said, "you’re full of s—!"

I’ve never seen anyone more stunned or shocked than General Taylor. Here was this staid and reserved general, being upbraided by a member of the younger generation. I had heard that not even Mrs. Taylor called him Max but referred to him as “General.” Taylor contained his anger and answered Kennedy in reasoned and convincing terms. It was quite an insight into their manner of doing business.

While in the chairman’s staff group, I was asked to write an outline plan for how to improve the logistical situation in Europe during the second Berlin crisis. Just as the plan for the invasion of Europe during World War II was written by General Alexander and turned over to General Eisenhower, I wrote a plan which was to be turned over to an officer who would carry it out.

Having written the plan, the major general who had been designated to carry out the plan became ill. A second major general selected to carry out the plan was not acceptable to Secretary McNamara. As a result I, then a brigadier general, was moved to the secretary’s office to execute my own plan. For the next several months I worked directly for Secretary McNamara. It was a busy and interesting time. I got to work with McNamara’s whiz kids: Enthoven, Hitch, and Rowan, and got to know McNamara quite well.

Working for McNamara gave me a good insight into his mind and personality. As I recall, I moved to his staff late on a Friday afternoon. I spent Saturday and Sunday putting a staff together. Early Monday morning I was summoned into McNamara’s office. He asked: "Well, what are your conclusions?" I answered that I had not even put my staff together yet. McNamara said, “You’ve got a lot to learn, young man. If you don’t know what the conclusions are before you start, you’re not my kind of man. What I want you to do is write your conclusions and bring them in to me by noon.” McNamara’s theory was that a good operator put together a plan in his head, decided on what to do, and filled in the details as he went along.
I received good support from the whiz kids, two of whom, Alain Enthoven and Harry Rowan, I had worked with previously. The third person, Charles Hitch, had worked with McNamara at Ford. Every Wednesday afternoon I would bring McNamara and his staff up-to-date on my plan and get approval for the next week’s actions.

At the first such Wednesday meeting, I had prepared some charts and was going through them. Every time I got to a sticking point, Hitch would wink at me. It encouraged me to go on. Afterwards I said to him: “Mr. Hitch, I don’t know you very well, but I’m certainly appreciative of the encouragement you gave me.”

“Encouragement hell,” said Hitch. “I thought much of what you said was wrong. Every time I did,” he added, “my nervousness made me wink.”

Q: Who were the two officers with you on the chairman’s staff group?

A: One was a colonel, Thomas Wade, a tactical pilot in the Air Force. Tom was killed several years later in an auto accident just 200 yards from where I lived in Brussels. He was coming up to visit me from Italy and after a 10- or 12-hour drive, apparently fell asleep.

The other officer was Captain Norman Gray of the Navy. Captain Gray was a lawyer. Later he successfully defended the captain of an aircraft carrier who was relieved because there had been a fire on board. Up until this time, in strict accordance with the Navy tradition that a captain is responsible for everything that happens on his ship, no commander who had a ship fire had been acquitted.

Assistant Commander, Support, 82d Airborne Division

Q: When you left the chairman’s staff group I gather you were assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. Had you completed your tour?

A: I was nearing the completion of my tour when General Ted Conway, who later became a four-star general in command of U.S. Army, Europe, took over command of the 82d Airborne Division. I had known Conway in Italy when he was an assistant to General Gruenther who was then Mark Clark’s chief of staff.

Q: Were you then in the 92d Division?
A: Yes, Conway knew what had gone on in the 92d Division and knew of my experience with the ill-fated Cinquale Canal operation. When Conway took command of the 82d Division he brought into the division two assistants. I was the youngest brigadier general in the Army. The other assistant division commander, Bruce Palmer, was the most senior brigadier general in the Army.

I became the assistant division commander for support. General Conway had a rotation policy. After a year, if the junior general did well at logistics, he would take over the job of operations. Accordingly, after a year Conway moved me up to become the assistant division commander for operations.

This move was prejudicial to Bruce Palmer, but he accepted it with grace. We have remained friends over the years. General Conway was a very energetic and innovative officer—one of the most imaginative officers I have ever known. He was a fanatic when it came to physical fitness and insisted that his officers set an example for their men. You may have heard about his famous Winged-Foot Society which sponsored a 10-mile run every New Year’s Day. He believed that his officers should not sit around and watch TV and drink beer, but instead run a ten-mile race on the holiday. We not only benefitted from running but from the fact that we had to train for the race and therefore drank little, if at all, on New Year’s Eve.

Member, Howze Board

A month or so after becoming the assistant division commander for operations, I was shifted over to work for General Howze, who commanded the 18th Airborne Corps at Bragg. The Department of Defense, unhappy that the Army was not moving rapidly enough to capitalize on the advances in aviation technology, especially in the helicopter field, issued a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army.

It wanted a bold “new look” at land warfare mobility and firepower. The Department of Defense directed that the Army examine how to substitute air mobile systems for traditional ground systems. That gave rise to General Howze forming the famous "Howze Board" of which I was made his director of tests. This amounted to my wearing a second hat since I kept the job of assistant division commander for operations in the 82d Airborne Division.

This didn’t sit too well with General Conway since General Howze employed most of the troops of the 82d Airborne Division to carry out his tests. Generals Conway and Palmer, in effect, became administrators and housekeepers for the troops. For
all intents and purposes, General Howze actually commanded the troops of the 82d Airborne through me as his director of tests.

Q: What kind of tests did Howze carry out?

A: General Howze was given authority from the Secretary of the Army to assemble all of the Army’s helicopters from the United States at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. We tested helicopters in nuclear situations, in "sky cavalry" roles for land warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations.

This first-named role was a concept I had developed when I was an instructor at the Infantry School in 1952. The notion was to simulate dropping an atomic weapon in the enemy’s rear. While the enemy was still stunned, our troopers were to hop out of their helicopters into the area where the burst had occurred. They were to wear protective suits to protect them from the radiation of the atomic burst. At Benning I had called this the “swarm of bees” concept.

The second idea was to use helicopters in air cavalry roles. We were to do with helicopters the kind of things General Stonewall Jackson had done in the Civil War with horse cavalry and General Patton had done in World War II with tanks. The Army had gotten too laden down with equipment and we wanted to see if we could make Army units lighter and thus more mobile.

The third concept we worked on was how one might use helicopters in counterinsurgency operations. This was becoming popular because we were at that time in the early stages of the Vietnam War. I had experimented with this type of operation in Korea. As a result, the largest segment of our tests had to do with how best to use regular troops in irregular counterinsurgency operations.

Our tests proved beyond a doubt that the use of helicopters in counterinsurgency was here to stay. But the concept became highly controversial from the beginning. General Howze recommended that the Army form five air assault divisions, three air cavalry combat brigades, and five air transport brigades. This was an unpopular idea in the Pentagon because the people around the chief of staff of the Army were, for the most part, armor officers. They felt that every helicopter introduced into the Army would mean one less tank. As a result, they opposed the concept.

Moreover, the Air Force and the Navy vigorously fought the concept. The Air Force felt that helicopters were usurping their mission of close air support. The Navy believed the air mobility concept spelled the death of aircraft carriers, that helicopters would replace carrier--based aircraft. General Earle "Bus" Wheeler,
an Army general, had become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wanted to be popular with the other services and said he would be “objective in the roles and missions fight. As a result, he backed the Air Force and Navy. His protege, General Harold K. Johnson, replaced Wheeler as the chief of staff of the Army and followed in his footsteps. Besides, many of Johnson’s best friends were armor officers who opposed air mobility. Nevertheless, a number of highly professional and courageous officers continued to back the concept. Given the unpopularity of air mobility in the Army, they did so at considerable risk to their careers. I refer to officers like Jack Norton, Harry Kinnard, Jack Tolson, Bob Williams, Bill Terrell, and others.

Q: Didn’t President Kennedy pay the 82d Airborne a visit at about that time?

A: Yes, President Kennedy came to Fort Bragg to inspect the division for a check on our state of readiness and to get a briefing on the air-mobility tests. General Conway, as I mentioned, was a highly imaginative officer. He divided the division into five groups, each group in a different uniform to show how versatile the division was to take on assignments in any part of the globe. One group was in standard fatigues, ready to fight in Europe. A second group was in jungle camouflage fatigues, ready to deploy to Vietnam. A third group was in desert camouflage fatigues, ready to go to a desert operation. A fourth group was in winter uniforms, the kind we dressed in during the Korean War. And the fifth group was dressed in white ski suits and carried skis, showing that we were ready to fight in the Arctic. It was a hot day and those dressed in jungle or desert suits were quite comfortable. However, the groups dressed in winter clothing were very uncomfortable. General Bruce Palmer, with his face made up with camouflage paint, was the commander of troops. One of his proudest moments was to have his photo taken with President Kennedy and have it splashed across the U.S. papers.

One of the interesting events was that Conway quickly chartered a commercial plane and within several hours after the President returned to Washington, he personally delivered the fur coat Mrs. Kennedy had forgotten. He also presented her with 50 long-stemmed American Beauty roses, representing the 50 states of the 82d, “All American” Division. When General Conway was promoted a year or so later, we chided him on having used this incident to get him a third star.

The air-mobility tests proved to be highly fascinating. We not only had a fine group of officers to work with, but were fortunate in having General Howze leading us. Howze was very energetic, a helicopter pilot and a Civil War buff. He was ideally suited for the job. We were also fortunate that General Art Trudeau was the chief of the Army’s research and development division. Trudeau
was highly imaginative, especially in developing equipment for us. For example, instead of having troopers slide down ropes into simulated jungles, Trudeau devised a device resembling a roller shade. When a trooper was ready to get back into the helicopter, he simply tugged on the rope attached to his harness and up he went.

Another of Trudeau’s ideas was to blow a hole in the jungle canopy by using explosives. A helicopter wishing to land in the jungle would first drop a large charge of explosives. After the explosive charge went off, troopers would descend into the area with chain saws, cutting down any trees which might still be standing. Within a few minutes, a landing area would be ready to receive a helicopter.

The imaginative spirit caught on quickly and other officers began to dream up concepts and gadgets for us to test. One set of ideas came from General Andrew P. O’Meara. He was not a member of the Howze Board but followed our activities closely. He believed that there was a possibility that the U.S. would get into a nuclear war and that helicopters were ideally suited for use in conjunction with tactical nuclear weapons. Once a week we would put on a show to which we invited officers and civilians from the Pentagon. I remember particularly one demonstration that we put on for Secretary McNamara and his civilian whiz kids, because of an accident involving one of the Army’s fixed-wing logistical airplanes.

Q: Was this the Caribou?
A: Yes. The Caribou was a rugged fixed-wing aircraft which could take off and land from fields or cow pastures. We had several of these Caribou outfitted with bladders carrying helicopter fuel. The idea was to turn it into a roving filling station. The plan was to have a Caribou, loaded with fuel, land in the middle of a cow pasture. Five troopers would jump out and extend hoses to five points on a star. The helicopters would then land and be refueled at each of the stations. To gain surprise, the Caribou, like the helicopters themselves, would fly the nap of the earth and come in right over the tree tops. In this way they avoided detection by radar. They would come into an area so quickly that the enemy wouldn’t see or hear them until it was too late to react.

In preparation for McNamara’s visit we had practiced the exercise four or five times. Each time, the Caribou would come in a bit lower. The final rehearsal was perfect, the Caribou flew in just a few feet above the tree tops. During the exercise, I was standing next to Secretary McNamara when the Caribou, having come in too low, caught the tops of the trees and crashed right in front of us. Fortunately, the fuel did not explode or catch fire and no one was killed. But it had been a close call. A few minutes later the five helicopters arrived and we had to describe to the secretary what would have happened had the Caribou not
crashed. All was not lost, however, because the helicopters were able to show their versatility and take the wounded pilot and other crew members to the hospital.

It was a rather disastrous day for McNamara. After he left us he went aboard an aircraft carrier which was involved in another accident. A plane about to land on the carrier lost one of its bombs which came loose. It skidded along the deck, narrowly missing the secretary. One of the whiz kids reportedly quipped that he should get combat pay for attending military demonstrations.

The Howze Board tests were a lot of fun, but they also involved a lot of hard work. We not only had to write and execute the tests, but had umpires evaluate them. Unfortunately, the tests were conducted in the days before there were video cameras. Nevertheless, we documented the tests with still and moving pictures. We then critiqued the tests and wrote our final reports. Based on these reports General Howze and his board of officers wrote their conclusions and made recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. As a result of these recommendations an air assault division was subsequently formed to take its place in the Vietnam War.

Chief, Army Concept Team, Vietnam

Q: Ambassador Rowny, after the Howze Board tests were finished, where did you go from there?

A: While the Howze Board was putting together its final report, I was elated to learn I had been selected for a second star. I was assigned to Korea to become the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division. I was particularly pleased on two counts. First, that I had been selected for promotion after having been a brigadier general for only a year. Second, that I would be allowed to put on my two stars and command the division while waiting for my number to come up on the promotion list.

I wound up my work with the Howze Board on a Friday afternoon and drove up to Washington on Saturday. The moving van would arrive on Sunday and begin unloading our household goods on Monday morning. Early Monday I was awaiting the moving van when a limousine drove up. The driver said he had a note for me from Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of the Army. The note said that the secretary had tried to get in touch with me over the weekend but couldn’t do so because my phone was not hooked up. He asked me to get into his limousine and come have breakfast with him. You can imagine that my decision to do so was not a very popular one with my wife.
Vance said he was quite impressed with what he had seen of the Howze Board tests and said he was thinking about sending some helicopters to Vietnam to act in a counterinsurgency role. You will recall that this was still 1962 and the U.S. role in Vietnam was limited to providing advice and logistical support to the Vietnamese. He asked me to describe to him in detail how I thought helicopters could be used in Vietnam. For the next two hours I did so. I told him that helicopters could be used for command and control purposes, that is, ferrying commanders about the battlefield where they could meet face-to-face with subordinates, explain orders to them, and see how they were doing. Helicopters could also be used to pick up wounded, much as they did in Korea in bringing the wounded soldiers back to MASH hospitals. I told Vance what he already knew about the great value of getting wounded rapidly to places where they could be operated on and given blood transfusions. Before Korea, 90 percent of all soldiers with head and belly wounds died. During Korea, 90 percent of all such casualties survived. Helicopters could also be used to ferry critically needed supplies of ammunition, radios, and food to units needing them. But the greatest use of helicopters, I thought, was to arm them with rockets and machine guns so they could perform armed reconnaissance and offer highly discriminating fire power to troops in rounding up or fighting guerrillas. I told Vance I hoped he would assign some helicopters to me in Korea where I could experiment further along the lines of the Howze Board tests.

Vance thanked me and asked me who I thought should be put in charge of taking armed helicopters to Vietnam. I said that any one of a number of officers on the Howze Board could do the job and gave him the name of one officer I thought was particularly qualified. I left the meeting quite pleased, especially at the thought of getting some helicopters to experiment with in Korea.

On Tuesday morning Vance’s limousine showed up again, asking if I would come have breakfast with him. By this time my wife was becoming more than a little annoyed. Our furniture had arrived and she was left by herself to tell the movers where to place it and also to mind our four children. Time was running short since I was due to leave for Korea on Wednesday.

Vance told me that the general I had recommended did not want to leave his family and had been asked to resign. He said he had talked to Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson and the chief of staff of the Army and had decided that I was the one who should take the helicopters to Vietnam. He told me to draft up a charter and tell him who I wanted for my staff. The idea was that I would assemble about 25 Army officers and a few Navy and Air Force officers to act as liaison-and about 25 scientists from think tanks working for the Army. I would, he said, take armed helicopters to Vietnam and experiment with ways to use them to fight counterinsurgency operations. The officers and scientists would help me devise
schemes and test them under conditions of actual combat.

Vance also told me that this new assignment would mean that my promotion would be put on hold. He said there were two reasons for this. First, the idea of arming helicopters and giving the Army a role in close tie support from the air was highly contested by the Air Force and Navy. Keeping me at a one-star rank would help to promote a low profile approach. Second, General Joseph Stilwell (my former boss at Benning, whom we had nicknamed “Cider Joe” because he was not up to his father’s reputation as “Vinegar Joe”) was in charge of Army support for the Vietnamese in Saigon. It would be difficult if I were promoted to two stars, to work under Stilwell, who was a one-star general.

Incidentally, I had sent my uniforms to Korea to have them retailedored and to have the large yellow 1st Cavalry patches sewn on them. It was not until more than a year later, after I had returned home from Vietnam, that my uniforms were shipped back to me. The 1st Cavalry Division had sent them to the Deceased Effects Bureau of the Army, who forwarded them on to me after they established that I was, in fact, still alive.

I was quite disappointed at the notion of having my promotion delayed. I had set my heart on commanding the 1st Cavalry Division and now the opportunity was being snatched away. But I had to admit that taking armed helicopters to Vietnam and experimenting with them in combat was a fascinating challenge. In the end I simply licked my wounds and accepted my new job as a matter of fate.

I spent the next week writing my charter and getting my staff lined up. I was very fortunate in getting Colonel Frank Clay assigned as my deputy. I had known Clay as a highly principled man who would fight my battles vigorously with the other services over roles and missions. My idea was to establish Clay in the Pentagon as my liaison man. The fact that Clay was highly respected as an armor officer would help me, especially since I knew I would get most of my opposition in the Army from armored officers. Clay was also on good terms with General Creighton Abrams, then a deputy in the Army’s office of force development, ACSFOR, [assistant chief of staff, force development]. As it later turned out, Abrams played a critical role in keeping my efforts in Vietnam from going under.

I was also fortunate in getting assigned to my staff the Army’s best writer. Colonel Robert Kinkor. He and Clay helped me pick officers to serve on my staff. One outstanding officer we picked was Colonel William Tyrell, a man of uncommon moral courage. They, in turn, helped me choose outstanding civilian scientists, some of whom I had met through my work on the Army’s Scientific Advisory Board.
Having chosen the staff, I next turned to finding a name for the group. I came up with the acronym ACTIV, which stood for Army Concept Team in Vietnam. ACTIV had a catchy ring to it and helped advertise the image that we were a highly motivated, can-do group. I got the name from reading about a Soviet elite group with the same name.

My next step was to call upon Admiral Harry D. Felt, who commanded the Pacific theater of operations. As soon as I began briefing Admiral Felt I realized that I was walking into a buzz saw. He told me straight away that he thought arming helicopters was a bad idea. In the first place, he didn’t like helicopters. Second, and more importantly, he believed strongly that if the Army armed helicopters and supported ground troops with fire power from air platforms, it would adversely affect the Navy’s roles and missions. Felt commanded all U.S. forces in Vietnam and had not received any orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support ACTIV.

Meanwhile, the machine guns and rockets that we were to attach to the helicopters and the helicopters had been shipped to Manila. I as well went to Manila and from there spent a lot of time on the phone with Vance and Colonel Clay. Vance was encountering difficulty getting General Wheeler to issue orders to Admiral Felt to allow me to proceed with the helicopters to Vietnam. Vance had to go to Secretary of Defense McNamara to get an order issued to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which, in turn, would be transmitted to CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific (Admiral Felt)]. I had worked for McNamara in 1959 when I was a member of the chairman’s staff group and drew up plans for the buildup of U.S. forces in Europe during the second Berlin crisis. McNamara thought the Army’s air mobility concept had merit and backed Vance. In the end, McNamara prevailed upon Wheeler to issue the necessary orders to allow me to proceed to Vietnam.

However, I was not well received in Saigon. The headquarters commandant in Saigon was a Marine Corps officer, who told me he had received no orders to support my experiments. Unable to get a separate office, I moved into an Army installation several blocks away from the MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. One morning shortly after moving into my newly established office, I arrived to find the desks, tables, file cabinets, and typewriters out in the street. I had been dispossessed by the Saigon headquarters commandant who said that I had no authority to occupy the building the Army had assigned me. While standing on the street with my office equipment around me, Brigadier General Robert “Buck” Anthis drove up. I had come to know Anthis when we were classmates at the National War College. He thought I was being treated shamefully and, even though the Air Force was opposed to the air mobility concept in principle, Anthis invited me to establish an office in his headquarters. He had some temporary partitions and I was able to operate from his headquarters until I straightened out things with the headquarters commandant and moved into my own building.
always been grateful to General Anthis. His magnanimous support for my effort was one more proof of the great value of the personal relationships established at the National War College.

At about this time an officer arrived in Saigon to join my staff who had been our headquarters commandant in Paris when I was the secretary of the general staff there. Colonel Jack Hertzog was the most outstanding can-do officer I have ever known. He was the kind of an officer who would complain to me if I had not assigned him an “impossible task” that day. In Paris he had accomplished difficult tasks like getting a new roof for our headquarters when there was no money for one. He also produced an air conditioner on 24-hour notice over a 4th of July holiday when General Norstad thought that General De Gaulle should have one in his office.

Hertzog found a burned-out building in Saigon and somehow or other got the Army Corps of Engineers to send him lumber, plumbing and electrical supplies. In about a month I had a more modern office than General Paul D. Harkins who commanded MACV. Hertzog even had the walls covered with silk wallpaper. I was nervous about this because General Alden K. Sibley had been reprimanded for having the bathroom in his St. Louis office covered with silk wallpaper. But Hertzog was very careful not to get me implicated and always covered his own tracks. When the office was ready for occupancy, complete with a large kidney shaped desk, I joked with Hertzog that a comer of my office looked rather bare. I told him it needed some "junk" to spruce it up. The next day, Hertzog brought in a beautiful 10-foot model of a Chinese junk. He had taken me literally. From then on I never joked with Hertzog about sprucing up my office.

As soon as we moved into our new office building we went into high gear and developed about 30 to 40 experiments. These were of two types: how to assist the Vietnamese nation-building concept and how to help counterinsurgency operations.

In the first category we dug deep wells for water supply, helped establish pig farms, dug large ponds for growing fish, helped fishermen get boats and nets, and implemented a half dozen other such projects. Most of the money for these endeavors came from charitable organizations in the United States and Europe. Germany contributed the largest share of the money for these nation-building projects.

Another one of our projects was to stimulate ways of improving rice production. The Japanese had, in the days before World War II, experimented with ways of getting more rice per square meter of rice paddy. They tried different spacings of rice seedlings, different types of fertilizers, and different planting schedules. As
Edward L. Rowny

As a result of these basic experiments they introduced new techniques into Korea which doubled their harvest. We sent for these studies and attempted to introduce some of the same techniques in Vietnam. It was difficult, however, because in the first place, communication was a problem. Second, traveling about the countryside was dangerous. Third, there was great resistance to changing centuries-old habits. As a result, we did not accomplish any revolutionary changes. But we were able to make a dent. One of the project’s biggest values was that it raised the morale of a number of village and hamlet chiefs.

Q:

What about your second mission, that of experimenting in the military field?

A:

Although arming helicopters was our main task, it was by no means our only effort. For example, we placed single artillery pieces in villages where local militiamen could fire against mass attacks. This turned out to be highly controversial, since the Army’s Artillery School taught that artillery should always be massed and never deployed as single pieces. We did the same thing with mortars. The ability of villagers to send up flares to light up the countryside when terrorists were attacked at night and to fire artillery and mortars against attackers proved a highly effective effort and did much to build morale.

Another idea we put into practice was to import a huge Weyerhauser tree cutting machine. This machine, which was used in the U.S. to produce wood pulp, could cut a swath through the jungle 10 yards wide at one pass. By cutting 50-yard swaths north and south and east and west through the jungle at intervals of one kilometer, we were able to establish “killing zones.” Trip wires and listening devices would alert our artillery and helicopters whenever a band of guerrillas tried to cross one of the killing zone swaths. It proved very effective at breaking up enemy attacks.

We also experimented with air-cushion vehicles. The Army and Marine Corps were at that time developing a platform built around a large fan. The fan, when it worked properly, could transport 20 to 30 men rapidly over rice paddies, swamps, and rivers. It was a good idea, but the fans were not powerful or rugged enough to operate well.

One of our important programs was to train the younger and older men, those who had not been drafted. We formed them into local militia units to help protect village and hamlet chiefs. We set up programs whereby the Vietnamese army taught these militia to shoot carbines. It was a risky business because the Viet Cong targeted the militia in order to steal their weapons. But it was better than not protecting the chiefs—and hence the villagers themselves—from attack. We extended this program to the training of women. In some regions, especially in the
Delta region in such villages as Bat Lieu, the women did remarkably good jobs of defending the populace from Viet Cong attacks. In all such programs we had one idea in mind: protecting the village and hamlet chiefs from being assassinated.

Another program we instituted was to get the Vietnamese army to erect barbed wire fences around key villages. Into the barbed wire they sowed mines and flares. Here again we had to take calculated risks. Many villagers lost their limbs or lives because they did not know where the mines were planted. But we did our best to assure that villagers knew where the cleared paths were. It was another way of trying to protect villages and hamlets from Viet Cong attacks.

Our main efforts, however, were devoted to experimenting in combat with the helicopters which we had jerry-rigged with 2.75-inch rockets and .50 caliber machine guns. The idea was simple: helicopters could swoop in suddenly, having flown the nap of the earth, and by discriminating carefully between friend and foe, deliver accurate firepower to drive the enemy off. The main difficulty was with operating under the rules of engagement then in effect. U.S. pilots were not allowed to engage in combat but only to support the Vietnamese. This meant that our U.S. pilots were simply chauffeurs who carried Vietnamese soldiers who did the actual firing of the rockets and machine guns. Vietnamese soldiers were prone to air sickness and we had to provide them with special incentives to get them to fly in the helicopters.

The idea enjoyed initial success because it was novel. The Viet Cong were at first frightened by the choppers and would break and run when they saw them approaching. Later, they became bolder and tried to shoot down the choppers. But this proved very difficult because the helicopters would appear so suddenly that the Viet Cong were surprised. Moreover, they hit very few because they did not know how to take a lead on the moving targets. As time went on, however, they got better at hitting the choppers. But even then, it proved not very effective. A chopper which had been shot down could be lifted out by a sling from another helicopter, be repaired, and come back to fight another day. What was described in the U.S. press as a “disaster” when six helicopters were shot down at Ap Bac proved not to be disastrous at all. All six helicopters were lifted out, repaired, and brought back to fight again. Besides, we had learned a lesson and changed our standing operating procedures [SOP]. Before Ap Bac, the orders to pilots were to go immediately to the rescue of a pilot who had been shot down. In this way five choppers were shot down trying to rescue the pilots from the first one. After Ap Bac, when a chopper was shot down, other choppers would be sent to the rear or flanks of the attacking force. We learned how to avoid sending good money after bad.
Nevertheless, the bad publicity we received from the Ap Bac operation set us back. In fact, the U.S. press was one of our most serious problems in Vietnam. The newspapers and wire services were in keen competition with one another and sent some of their most ambitious reporters to Vietnam. For example, David Halberstam reported for the New York Times and Neil Sheehan for UPI. Some of these reporters, Halberstam in particular, were more interested in pursuing their own political agendas than they were in reporting on the military situations. On several occasions I would take a reporter with me when I went to witness an operation. After one such trip I read in the following day’s New York Times that the Vietnamese did not do very well. The reporter said that this was due to the unpopularity of Madame Nhu, Diem’s sister. After reading the article I approached Halberstam and said, “You know, Dave, that the operation was rather successful. And whether it was or not had nothing to do with Madame Nhu. The soldiers don’t even know who she was.”

“Ed,” he said, “the readers don’t want to read anything about these military skirmishes. What they are interested in is the Dragon Lady [Madame Nhu].”

The New York Times had one objective reporter, Peter Braestrup. But his stories were not often picked up. He subsequently quit his job and wrote the best book about reporting in Vietnam. The Big Story told about how the reporters operated and denounced them for their misrepresentation of the U.S. effort in Vietnam. It’s a pity that The Big Story did not get as much attention as it deserved because it outlined in detail the way in which U.S. public support for Vietnam, especially after the military success of the Tet operation, was undermined.

One of the main difficulties in Vietnam in the early 60s was the serial killings of the village leaders. The Viet Cong systematically singled out and assassinated the village chieftains. As a result, the villages were unable to put up any serious resistance to the guerrillas. In the calendar year 1962 over 1,200 village and hamlet chieftains were killed. It was an effective way of demoralizing the Vietnamese and preventing any organized resistance against the Viet Cong. The Dragon Lady had nothing to do with this situation. Nor was the Viet Cong able to infiltrate the Vietnamese because the leaders had not been elected by a democratic process. Had there been a free electoral process, no candidates would have been found to take on the suicidal jobs of becoming village chiefs.

Shortly before I left Vietnam in 1963, Diem was assassinated. Since there was no one of stature to take his place, Diem’s death marked the beginning of the end of the South Vietnamese effort. Events unfolded rapidly after Diem’s brother, the Bishop of South Vietnam, got involved in a religious squabble at Hue. The bishop, a Catholic, was able to get South Vietnamese troops ordered to attack a Buddhist demonstration at Hue. A number of messages passed quickly between Saigon and
Washington over a weekend when all of the senior officials at the State Department were out of town. These messages reportedly blamed Diem for the killings at Hue and threatened to withdraw U.S. support. This led to a lack of confidence in Diem and resulted in a series of events which led to his death. Diem was, at the time, what Syngman Rhee was to Korea, the father of his country. After his death, one leader after another tried to take over therein of the Vietnamese government. But none emerged who were able to take charge and from then on the Vietnamese fought a losing battle against the Viet Cong. Even so, after the North Vietnamese organized regular units and the U.S. entered the war, we could have defeated them. However, by that time the support of our soldiers back home was so weak that winning the war was impossible.

Our ACTIV reports recommended that U.S. troops not enter into combat but remain as support troops for the Vietnamese. But these recommendations were not very popular back home. Neither General Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor Mr. McNamara, the secretary of defense, took hold of our recommendations. As a result, they poured in more and more U.S. troops in the face of rising opposition of the press and the U.S. public. In the end, even though Tet was a military victory, the war was lost. We finally pulled out of Vietnam, making it a tragedy. It was particularly damaging to the U.S. military establishment.

Q: Weren’t you shot down in a helicopter? When did that happen?

A: Yes. After I had been in Vietnam about 11 months, I was shot down in a helicopter not far from Saigon. We were taking off at Tan Son Nhut, the military airfield, when a sniper’s lucky shot hit the tail rotor of my helicopter. The pilot tried to maneuver the chopper but couldn’t do so because without the tail rotor he could not steer it. He engaged the overhead rotor into an auto-rotation mode and we started to drift towards the earth. However, without its tail rotor the helicopter began spinning faster and faster. I was strapped into the middle of the back seat. Otherwise I would have been thrown out when the helicopter hit the ground, as were my aide and a sergeant who was manning a machine gun. The sergeant suffered a broken arm and leg, and my aide fractured his tailbone. The pilot had both his legs broken and subsequently died in the hospital as a result of an embolism. He had saved my life because he stopped me from getting out of the helicopter after it hit the ground.

The main rotor was still rotating and in my haste to get out, fearing a fire, I would have walked into the rotor. My aide was evacuated to the States. Six weeks later he was sent back to Vietnam to finish his tour. As for me, I was kept in the hospital overnight because of bums from the seat belt.
Q: Didn’t you later get hurt when you parachuted with the Vietnamese?

A: Yes. The Vietnamese paratroopers were good soldiers but their morale was low. Unlike the U.S. airborne units, their officers did not jump into combat with them.

To set an example, I decided to jump with the Vietnamese paratroopers. They jumped first into the jungle area and set up a perimeter, after which I jumped into the center. However, just as I was about to hit the ground, a gust of wind blew up.

I tried to break my fall with my arm and as a result dislocated my shoulder. I was in great deal of pain and couldn’t straighten out my right arm. The Vietnamese paratroopers thought I was saluting them and it took a bit of talking to convince them that my shoulder was really dislocated.

They sent up a purple smoke flare, which was the signal that helicopter evacuation was required.

In about five minutes a chopper landed, but it was not configured as an ambulance. The pilot, Colonel Ivan Slavich, put me in the co-pilot seat and began to transport me to the hospital in Saigon. However, Slavich spotted some Viet Cong along the way, and for the next ten minutes chased after them. He wanted to show me how effective an armed helicopter could be. However, I was more interested in getting back to the hospital. Besides, Slavich had put the Vietnamese gunner in the back seat and had to be content in trying to scare the Viet Cong rather than shoot them.
I was greatly relieved when I landed, a half hour later, and had my arm twisted back into my shoulder socket. But I have never forgotten the ride I had with "Wild man Slavich."

My right shoulder and arm were taped up. It was close to the time when my year was up, and since I was told it would take several days for me to recuperate, I decided to go home by the Western route. I went to Thailand, then to Indonesia, to India, and then to Pakistan. I wanted to go to Afghanistan to see some friends there but couldn’t fit it into my schedule. Instead I went to Lebanon, then to Israel, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and France. The trip took about 30 days but I had a fascinating time, largely because I traveled with my new aide, Captain David Young. Young was an outstanding officer, a West Point graduate, who later left the Army in order to care for his dyslectic son. After he retired, he became a successful stockbroker and entrepreneur.

Q: Did you consider your tour in Vietnam a success?
A: Yes. I think we brought several innovative ideas on nation-building to Vietnam. But our biggest success was the work we did in demonstrating that the air mobility concept was a good one for fighting a counterinsurgency war. I believe our studies were the necessary link which led to the formation and deployment of the air mobile divisions in Vietnam.

Q: Was Colonel Frank Clay very helpful to you?
A: Yes. Frank Clay was extremely helpful to me by supporting me and fighting for my needs in the Pentagon. He established my office in ACSFOR, which was headed up by General Ben Harrel. Harrel was very much in tandem with Harold K. Johnson, who went from being deputy chief of staff for operations and plans [DCSOPS] to become chief of staff of the Army. Johnson, like Wheeler, his predecessor, was against the air mobility concept. However, Harrel had as his deputy General Creighton Abrams. Although Abrams was an armor officer and not keen on helicopters, he was an honest, fair, and objective officer. Besides, he was on a first-name basis with Frank Clay. As a result, I was able to get support from the Army despite the obstacles that the Army staff put in my way.

Q: Who put the biggest obstacles in your way?
A: General Harold K. Johnson. He was a relatively junior officer when he was selected to become the chief of staff, a major general who jumped over 250 officers
and made a four-star general. He was a protege of General Wheeler’s and had the support of the powerful group of armor officers who were then running the Army. Johnson did not like Howze and was dead set against the air mobility concept. Later on, when he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the air mobile concept had proved itself in Vietnam, Johnson became a supporter of the concept. But before that time he did everything he could to try to kill air mobility.

Q: Before we leave Vietnam, let me ask you a fundamental question. In ACTIV you made efforts to combat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. But another way of combatting the North Vietnamese was through the use of traditional battlefield linear formations. Do you think that the ACTIV concepts were done away with because it was decided that counterinsurgency operations could not be carried out or was the high command just flat-out opposed to the whole idea and felt that nothing could beat normal linear battlefield operations?

A: I think it was a combination of both. Our original idea in ACTIV was that the only way to win a war against Viet Cong infiltrators was to help the Vietnamese help themselves. But this idea lost a lot of steam after Diem was assassinated and after successive Vietnamese leaders found they were unable to pull the Vietnamese people together. You will recall that our original ACTIV recommendation was to keep the war in Vietnamese hands. We insisted that the U.S. stay out of combat, believing that if we did, the Vietnamese would cease fighting for their own freedom. Only the Vietnamese, we said, could defeat the Viet Cong.

After the U.S. introduced its own forces into combat it forced North Vietnam to change their tactics. Instead of relying upon the Viet Cong, they went to linear formations themselves. We could have won that kind of a war if we had been willing to accept the large number of casualties it would involve. But by the time we became effective on the battlefield against North Vietnamese units, the war was already lost at home.

The North Vietnamese mounted one last-ditch effort at Tet. The battle of Tet was actually a military victory for the United States. But the TV coverage of our people climbing aboard helicopters to get out of Saigon unnerved the U.S. public and caused us to throw in the towel. Once we had lost the hearts and minds of the U.S. people, the net effect was the same as it had been when the French pulled out their support for the French military. The French military did not lose the war in North Vietnam, nor did the U.S. military lose the war in South Vietnam. The U.S. people-led along by the U.S. press-in my opinion, lost that war.
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Q: After you left Vietnam in June of 1963, you became special assistant for tactical mobility to the assistant chief of staff for force development. What did that involve?

A: My job was to head a special division within ACSFOR to further air mobility in the Army. I was charged with integrating the ideas which had been tested by the Howze Board with the results of the helicopter experiments in Vietnam. I was established in the job by Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance who was intent on pushing the idea of air mobility.

I was allowed to recruit some 15 officers who had worked on the Howze Board and another 15 who had served with me in Vietnam. Our task was to write doctrinal manuals for teaching the air mobility concept and to design air mobility units to go to Vietnam.

Q: Who headed ACSFOR at that time?

A: The chief of ACSFOR was Lieutenant General Ben Harrel. He had two deputies, Major General Creighton Abrams and Major General Ralph E. Haines, Jr.

Q: Can you describe some of your accomplishments while you were in ACSFOR?

A: One of my accomplishments was to oversee the writing of Army doctrine for air mobility. We circulated these ideas throughout the Army staff and also famed them over to a number of think tanks for comment. The second accomplishment was to design organizations to incorporate air mobility into the Army. The units we designed were of two types. The first was a unit of helicopters and trained people which could be attached to a standard division having the need for tactical air mobility. The second was a light division which integrated helicopters throughout the entire division. Some of these helicopters were for reconnaissance,
some for fire support, some to transport soldiers and supplies, and some, of course, for command and control purposes.

Q: Wasn’t the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) formed about this time?

A: Actually, the test division had already been formed. The 11th Airborne Division was recalled to active duty on February 15, 1963, and redesignated the 11th Air Assault Division. The Secretary of Defense had instructed the chief of staff of the Army to form this unit so it could carry on experiments which had been conducted by the Howze Board and by our ACTIV team in Vietnam. General Earle Wheeler, then the Army’s chief of staff, issued the necessary orders to activate the division.

Q: Was it organized as a full-blown division?

A: No. The concept was that it would grow by stages. Taking men and equipment from the active Army, it was to start out as a battalion, then build up to a brigade and then finally to a division. The first battalion to join the division was the 3d Battalion of the 187th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hennessey, who had commanded the battle group of the 82d Airborne Division that conducted our Howze Board tests.

Q: Who commanded the division, and had he taken part in the Howze Board tests?

A: The test division was commanded by Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard. Kinnard had not been a member of the Howze Board but was an ideal choice for the job. He was a paratrooper and a highly decorated war hero who had jumped into Normandy. A wax statue of him exists in a museum in Bastogne, where he had been a hero of the Battle of the Bulge as a 29-year-old colonel. Kinnard was highly intelligent, aggressive, and a real believer in air mobility. He came to the division from the 101st Airborne Division, where he had been an assistant division commander under Major General Charles Rich. Kinnard prevailed upon Rich to give him some of the 101st Division’s best officers and enlisted men to get started, including Colonel E. B. Roberts who became Kinnard’s chief of staff.

Q: Did the 11th Air Assault Division carry out the same kinds of tests you had conducted in Vietnam?

A: No, not initially. The Army’s idea was to organize and test a light division which could take its place in Germany to fight a conventional war. Having just come back from Vietnam, I was more interested in having the division organize and train
to fight counterinsurgency operations. A year later, sometime in 1964, Kinnard was instructed to include tests simulating action against the Viet Cong.

Q: Were these tests successful?

A: Yes, they were highly successful. The test division conducted simulated attacks and defense in Europe where they were pitted against the 82d Airborne Division and other regular U.S. Army units. When it branched out into counterinsurgency operations, it was also highly successful. Kinnard read the Howze Board and ACTIV test results carefully and tried to get as many officers and men as possible who had been in these tests assigned to his division.

Q: Well, to get back to your time at ACSFOR, can you tell me something about the dynamics within the Army staff?

A: General Ben Harrel, chief of ACSFOR, was very ambitious. He was a friend of General Johnson who was then DCSOPS. Harrel knew that Johnson was a protege of General Bus Wheeler, the chief of staff. Harrel was right; Johnson followed Wheeler as the chief of staff of the Army. General Ralph Haines, one of Harrel’s deputies, was also quite close to Johnson. Haines was an armor officer who came to ACSFOR under a cloud of criticism. He had been charged by the General Accounting Office [GAO] with doing a poor job when he commanded a division in Europe. However, Haines was very clever. With the help of the ACSFOR staff and with the backing of Johnson, Haines turned the report around so the GAO report was quashed. General Abrams, the other deputy to Harrel was, like Haines, an armor officer. But Abrams was a straight-shooter and much easier to work with than Haines or Harrel.

One of the difficulties of my position was that Secretary Vance wanted to keep abreast of the work being done on air mobility and sent for me often to be briefed. Even though I reported to Harrel whenever I was sent for, and always debriefed him and his two deputies, I was accused by Harrel of end-running my immediate superiors. I explained this to Secretary Vance, but he refused to believe that these officers would put obstacles in my way or accuse me of jumping channels. I asked Vance to let me brief Harrel and let him in turn brief Vance; but Vance would have none of it. He wanted his reports from the “horse’s mouth?"

Vance, in what he thought was a promotion, directed the Army to make me a third deputy to Harrel. On paper this looked like a good idea. It was supposed to give me access to the entire ACSFOR organization which was theoretically to support me. But in practice it did not work that way. My staff of about 30 officers was
broken up and scattered throughout ACSFOR, leaving me with only a deputy and two other assistants. When I called upon the other sections within ACSFOR to do something for me, they refused saying that they had jobs assigned them which were of higher priority. The net effect was that most of my work dried up. What I got done I had to do myself with the help of the three officers who worked for me directly. It was a serious blow to trying to carry out the tasks assigned me to further tactical air mobility.

Q: So then, for the next two years, you were essentially fighting a losing battle, were you not?

A: Yes. I had to fight a losing battle. It was obvious that the Secretary of the Army couldn’t get the Army staff to help me. Besides, the DCSOPS, General Johnson, and the chief of staff, General Wheeler, were not favorably disposed toward the concept of tactical air mobility. The situation only got worse when Harold K. Johnson became the chief of staff of the Army and General Earle Wheeler moved up to become the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This occurred in July of 1964.

Q: I understand that General Creighton Abrams favored creating a light division. Was this a light division in the general sense of lighter equipment, or was it in the sense of an air mobile division?

A: What Abrams was promoting was a lighter division in the traditional sense and not an air mobile division. Army units were becoming heavier and heavier, adding more tanks, more armored personnel carriers, and more vehicles in general. This was making the division harder to transport by water and much harder to transport by air. As a result, there was a concerted drive within the Army—which Abrams led—to make Army divisions lighter. But this was in a generic sense and not a move to tactical air mobility.

Q: What did the Army division look like in terms of personnel and the number of vehicles? Can you give me ballpark figures?

A: Abrams was trying to cut the standard division down from 13,000 to 10,000 people and the vehicles from 3,500 to 3,000.

Q: And what about the air mobile division? How was its formation coming along?
A: General Kinnard inherited a set of tables of organization and equipment [TOE] which were quite rough. Neither the Howze Board nor my actions in ACSFOR were very refined. As a result, Kinnard added to and trimmed men and equipment from the 11th Air Assault Division as his tests progressed. He was not able to cut the personnel because maintenance of helicopters was costly in terms of people. But he was able to cut the vehicles down drastically, from 3,500 to 1,500. Moreover, the vehicles were all light; he tried to make do with nothing larger than a 1/4-ton jeep. The number of helicopters grew as time went on. Whereas the standard Army division had about 100 helicopters, the 11th Air Assault Division wound up with about 430.

Q: What about fire support in the 11th Air Assault Division?

A: Most of the fire support was furnished by the 2.75-inch rockets and .50-caliber machine guns with which the helicopters were equipped. More fire support came from the 24 Mohawks which were equipped with 5-inch naval rockets. [The division had 30 Mohawks, but 6 were strictly for surveillance and carried no weapons.] In addition, the division had three battalions of M-102 howitzers. The M-102 was a lighter version of the 105-mm howitzer. And finally, it had a Little John Battalion which was equipped to fire conventional and atomic rounds.

Q: Wasn’t the other equipment in the 11th Air Assault Division also lighter?

A: Yes. Engineer bridging equipment, for example, was lighter. Every piece of equipment had to be carried within, or slingloaded by, a helicopter. Even small pieces of equipment were made lighter. For example, plastic water cans replaced the heavier metal ones. Ladders for descending from helicopters were made of aluminum, gas tanks were replaced by rubber bladders, and so forth. Kinnard encouraged his men to think up ideas for making equipment lighter and they responded admirably. In addition, Kinnard was given a slush fund of about $1.5 million by General Art Trudeau, the chief of research and development. Trudeau was a great believer in air mobility, and just as he had done for the Howze Board, gave the 11th Division funds with which to purchase items on the open market. There was no need to develop a lot of equipment which already existed. It was the best $1.5 million investment the Army ever made.

Q: Let me jump ahead. Later, when you took over the 24th Division in Germany, wasn’t there an opportunity for developing a better conventional army as opposed to simply relying on nuclear weapons?
There was not as much opportunity to do things in the 24th Division as there had been in Vietnam or with the 11th Air Assault Division tests. Europe was more stable and concentrated on trying to contain attacks launched by the Warsaw Pact. But wherever we could, we tried to add more mobility, and I tried to get more helicopters than the 100-odd assigned to the division. A number of us who commanded units in Europe also pushed for lighter vehicles and lighter armored personnel carriers. But the situation didn’t lend itself to a lot of free-wheeling or experimentation. Changes had to be made slowly, and then only after a great deal of study and staffing. We did, however, have a sympathetic Army commander in the person of General Andrew P. O’Meara. He believed that at some stage nuclear weapons would be used tactically, and as a result constantly pushed the idea that we had to be ready to exploit tactical nuclear weapons. And in this connection, he believed that helicopters would be highly useful on a nuclear battlefield. But there was very little sympathy in the Army staff for the notion of using tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, once we left Vietnam, the Army’s enthusiasm for helicopters began to wane.

Q: Well, let me get back to your tour in ACSFOR. How did your work and that of Kinnard with the 11th Air Assault Division progress?

A: My work in ACSFOR, despite the handicaps, continued to progress. I had a small but highly loyal staff. In addition to Frank Clay, I had an outstanding officer, Colonel William “Bill” Terrell, who worked wonders. These officers helped me get others within the Army staff to moonlight for us. We held frequent meetings to which we invited Harry Kinnard, Jack Norton, Phil Seneff, John Tolson, Bob Williams, and others. I also encouraged a number of McNamara's whiz kids like Harry Rowan and Alain Enthoven, to pay frequent visits to Kinnard’s division, especially when they were conducting exercises.

Once the Secretary of Defense decided in early 1965 that he wanted the 11th Air Assault Division to go to Vietnam, things went into high gear. Tests were accelerated and equipment designed for Europe, for example, the Little John Battalion, was dropped from the division’s TOE. To dampen criticism from the Air Force, the division was stripped of its Mohawks. Tests now concentrated on how the division would operate in the central highlands of Vietnam. However, some tests simulated operating in the Delta and I and III Corps areas.

On June 11, 1965, Secretary McNamara announced at a nationally televised press conference that the 11th Air Assault Division would be redesignated an air mobile division and deployed to Vietnam. It would become the 1st Air Cavalry Division, carrying the colors of the 1st Cavalry then in Korea. The 2d Infantry Division
would replace the 1st Cavalry in Korea and the 11th Air Assault Division colors would be retired.

Speculation grew as to who would take the 1st Air Cavalry to Vietnam. Major General Jack Chiles, who commanded the 2nd Division and had furnished most of the troops for the 11th Air Assault Division, wanted the job. But he made the mistake of making his ambitions known to a reporter and that killed his chances.

The natural choice was Harry Kinnard, and to the Army’s credit, it selected him in early July to take the 1st Air Cavalry to Vietnam. He was ordered to bring the division to Red Con 1, the highest state of readiness, by July 28th. He did so, and on that date President Johnson ordered the division to Vietnam. The bulk of the division was moved by the Military Sea Transport Service, the first ships leaving on August 15th. On September 14th, the first ships landed at Qui Nhon harbor. The 3rd Brigade kicked off the first operation in combat on October 10th. The division performed admirably, and became the pacesetter for professional military operations in Vietnam. The rest of the story, as the saying goes, is history. Kinnard had the division rolling in good style and I was free to be reassigned to another job.

Q: Before we leave the air mobility story, let me ask one last question. Steven Ailes took over from Cyrus Vance as Secretary of the Army. Was he sympathetic to your stand?

A: Yes. But Ailes was not a man who devoted his attention to Army mobility and tactics. These were not his strong suits. Ailes was a personnel specialist. He believed that his job was to recruit good soldiers, improve the standards of training, and raise the Army’s morale. So while he was not unsympathetic to air mobility, he was not as zealous a pusher of the concept as Vance had been.

Q: All right. But would you briefly sum up for me your characterization of Vance?

A: Vance was a successful Wall Street banker who had decided to move into the public sector. He took a broad view of world affairs and had been active in the Foreign Affairs Council and the Trilateral Commission. He was very dedicated to the Army, but he thought the Army was ultra-conservative and moved too slowly to adopt new concepts like air mobility. He wanted to change the Army’s doctrine and its hardware, and had a fair amount of success at it. While he was a good conceptualizer, he was poor at following through on his ideas. He thought that if he assigned an officer a mission it would be accomplished. He failed to realize
what a difficult job it was to change the Army’s old methods. As a result, I was only one of a number of officers who were not fully supported from the top but left to fight our own battles.

Family Life

Q: Now let me ask you a few personal questions. First, when you came back from Vietnam was your family still living in Washington?

A: Yes. I had put my family into a rented house in Washington because I thought it would be easier logistically for my wife. It would be simpler to get the five children to and from school and my wife would not have to take care of our big house in Virginia. But when I got back from Vietnam we moved back into our Virginia home.

Q: When you received orders to go to Germany, what did your kids say?

A: The older children did not want to leave their friends. The younger two were eager to move. The middle child was ambivalent.

Q: And your wife, what did she say?

A: My wife was a good soldier and accepted my assignments philosophically. She felt that an Army career was a mixture of good and bad and was ready to take whatever came along. She always considered herself a part of the Army team and always highly supportive of whatever I had to do. But this time she was ready to get out of Washington. She thought that I had to pay too big a price in my fight to see new ideas, like air mobility, adopted. She didn’t like the internecine warfare within the Army and thought my battles with Johnson, Harrel, and others had taken a heavy toll on my disposition and outlook on life. She didn’t like to see me constantly fighting in the bureaucratic trenches. She also wanted our children to have the benefit of a normal family life and felt I worked too hard and neglected them.

Q: I understand you sent your children to good private schools. How could you afford it on an Army officer’s salary?

A: I was very fortunate. During the early days of World War II my wife went to work as an engineer at General Electric and made more money than I. We lived
on my salary and she invested hers, buying IBM stock when it was quite cheap. As a result, we always had money to send our children to the best of schools. I could not have paid for that kind of education on my Army salary.

Q: What prep schools did they go to?
A: In the States my daughter went to Holy Trinity and in France went to Sainte Clotilde Academy. This preparation allowed her to win a scholarship to Smith College. Two of my sons went to Landon Prep School and Priory in the States. Overseas three of my sons went to Haute Savoie in France and two went to Montana Zugerberg in Switzerland. These schools were among the very best.

Q: And did they become linguistically proficient in French and German?
A: Yes, except for my youngest son. He spent the first three years of his life in France and spoke only French when we returned. But he was made fun of by his classmates and abandoned French when he was about five. Later it came back to him.

Q: Thank you, Ambassador Rowny. I consider one of the more important parts of an officer’s career the support he gets back home. Obviously you were supported and your family turned out well.
A: Yes, I was very fortunate.

Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division

Q: On June of 1965 you took command of the 24th Division in Germany and kept that job for over a year. Can you tell me something about the time you spent with the 24th?
A: In the first place, I was pleased that the new policy was that commanders overseas would serve for two years. There had been too much rotation and the new policy was designed to stabilize command tours. Second, I took command of the 24th Division when it was at its lowest point in terms of training and morale. I had nowhere to go but up. The previous commanding general, a personnel specialist, had had very little experience with troops. He believed that he could build morale by coddling and babying the troops. He gave them lots of time off and did not
train them hard. I gathered that for a short time he was very popular with the troops. But they soon became bored and unhappy.

Q: Who had been in command of the 24th Division before you? Did he serve a full two year term?

A: My predecessor was Major General William A. Cunningham III. He was relieved by General O’Meara after about a year in command. The Army commander had gone to inspect the division on a maneuver. The troops were doing poorly and referred to one another as "Cunny's Bunnies." General O’Meara, looking for Cunningham during a critical part of the maneuver, found him comfortably seated in his van. That was enough for O’Meara.

Q: When you took over the command, did things change?

A: Yes, in large part because the troops themselves were ready for a change. I instituted a hard regime of training and maintenance. They responded beautifully. Our ratings soon began to rise and we went from the bottom of all the divisions in Europe to a position after a year when we were number one or two in every category. It was a great joy to command the division.

Q: How were the officers below and above you?

A: I was given a degree of latitude to choose my brigade and battalion commanders. My three brigade commanders were outstanding officers as were six or seven of my nine battalion commanders. I had a fine deputy commander, an excellent chief of staff, and a good artillery commander. My immediate superior, the VII Corps commander, was Lieutenant General T. J. Conway, who had been my division commander when I was an ADC [assistant division commander] in the 82d Airborne Division. He was later replaced by Lieutenant General Frank Mildren who had commanded the Rock of the Marne Regiment in Korea where I had been his deputy. These were two of the best officers in the Army. Both rose to be four-star generals. It was fortunate that I had worked for both of them and knew what was expected of me. The Army commander was General A. P. O’Meara. I had not worked for him but knew of his reputation. He was a highly demanding commander. He was death on officers who could not produce results, but gave those who could a great deal of leeway and strong support.

Q: Were you getting new equipment or was it, at that point, all going to Vietnam?
We were not getting any new equipment. In fact, much of our better vehicles and weapons were taken from us and sent to Vietnam. As a result, we had to put a great deal of emphasis on maintenance. In this connection, I had one advantage over the other four divisions in Europe. My division was assigned the mission of augmenting the Berlin contingent. This amounted to sending a battalion of infantry, 25 tanks, and 25 armored personnel carriers to Berlin for a 60-day period.

The Berlin command could draw on counterpart funds. With these funds and the excellent German civilian mechanics in Berlin, we were able, in a 60-day period, to completely overhaul the battalion’s equipment, including its attached tanks and armored personnel carriers. We put all our worst weapons, vehicles, tanks, and APCs [armored personnel carriers] from the entire division into the force we sent to Berlin. Sixty days later, the unit would come back with refurbished equipment. In fact, some of it was better than new because the mechanics made a number of the parts in their machine shops, which were better than the spare parts designed and fabricated in the States.

But aside from this windfall, didn’t you need to spend a great deal of effort on maintenance?

Yes. To put more emphasis on maintaining our equipment, I designed a concept which we called TRAIN-MAIN. The idea was to devote as much time and command supervision to maintenance as was usually given to training. First, I let the commanders know that they would be rated on a dual standard, 50 percent on their ability to train their units and 50 percent on their ability to maintain their unit’s equipment. This caused the commanders to shift some of their better subordinates into maintenance jobs and to establish training courses on how to care for equipment. Each company would train for a week, with everyone training except those needed to repair or keep equipment going, and then it would maintain for a week, with everyone turning a hand to taking care of the equipment. During the train week, commanders had the opportunity of discovering better mechanics than those assigned to the job. It also forced commanders at every echelon to supervise the maintenance, something which had not been done before. The added incentives to do better at maintaining, because it would be reflected on the commander’s efficiency reports, plus the command emphasis at all levels proved to be highly effective. The maintenance scores awarded us by the USAREUR [United States Army, Europe] equipment inspectors shot up dramatically.

We did not, of course, slight our training. At least half of the time was devoted to it because we participated in maneuvers. But the increased knowledge the commanders gained about how to maintain equipment paid big dividends. They
found they could do better in the maneuvers because larger percentages of their equipment were in operable condition.

Q: What was your style of command? Did you go down to the company level to observe the troops when they trained and maintained?

A: Yes. Just as I had instructed my subordinate commanders to devote half of their time to training and half to maintenance, I followed the same pattern. When I went to inspect a company at training, I would have all the intermediate commanders as well as the division, brigade, and battalion operations officers accompany me. In this way I was assured we all saw the same thing and that my favorable comments and criticism was known to the company commander’s entire chain of command. I used the same technique when I visited a company maintaining its equipment, except that in addition to the chain of command, I had the division, brigade, and battalion supply and maintenance officers accompany me.

When I inspected training exercises I would go by helicopter, thus saving a great deal of travel time. I would usually give the chain of command two hours’ notice so they could drop what they were doing and join me. Only if there was some pressing business would I excuse the chain of command, and then I would have them send their deputies.

We also trained a great deal at night. I insisted that each unit spend half of its training time in night exercises.

I instituted one additional concept, that of giving company commanders one day a week as their own time. On that day they could stress whatever they felt was important, including taking care of personal business, such as going to the bank, the dentist, etc., and having their men do the same. Since I insisted that as close to 100 percent as possible of all the men be present at training or maintenance, I had to give them some free time to take care of these essential and, at times, menial tasks.

Q: Were you able to turn out 100 percent of the men for a training exercise or for a maintenance program?

A: No, but we tried to approach 100 percent. There were always several men per company on sick call. When the company took to the field for an exercise, we would leave the sick men back to guard the barracks. I put a high premium on getting every possible man to be with his unit, both during TRAIN and MAIN. For every missing person who was not sick or on emergency leave, I would dock
the company commander 1 percent of his grade. Since competition for scores was great, this got the people out in the field.

Q: How did you handle administration?

A: I tried to get it done on the one free day per week allowed the company commander. I also rotated administrative duties with my assistant division commander and had my subordinates rotate with their deputies. My assistant division commander was just as anxious as I was to supervise training and maintenance. Therefore, I let him get out as much as possible. But when some administrative chore required my presence at headquarters, I would alternate with him.

Q: What about your officer support? Was it good?

A: Yes. It was excellent. I was assigned very good officers. I would say that fully 90 percent of my officers were rated outstanding or excellent. Like all units, I wound up with a few duds. But after a while I learned that the better officers in USAREUR were gravitating to my unit. Officers have friends in the personnel assignment business and could often influence where they were sent. After the word got around that the 24th Division was scoring high in USAREUR tests, many of the better officers in Europe began to show up on my rosters.

A similar set of circumstances occurred in reverse. The word got around that officers who performed poorly were given poor efficiency reports. This caused a number of the poorer officers to pull strings to avoid being assigned to the 24th Division.

Q: What about Vietnam veterans? Did you have many in your outfit?

A: Very few. In 1965 and 1966 there was not a large portion of the Army in Vietnam. Those who had served in Vietnam for a year would usually be given two- or three-year tours in the States before being sent overseas again.

Q: What about the reverse? Did your division get levied to send officers to Vietnam?

A: Yes. During my time in command there was a rapid buildup in Vietnam and certain specialties were in critical supply. I was always between 35 and 40 percent short on officers.
Q: How did you manage with such a shortage of officers?

A: Every commander had his own solution. My approach was to fill every vacant command slot with a noncommissioned officer. My theory was that training and maintenance needed leadership and supervision. I would have each noncom in an officer slot display a tag on his uniform showing his brevetted rank, whether it be 2d or 1st lieutenant. Where captains were missing I would have these spots filled by lieutenants and would have them, like the noncoms, display their brevetted ranks. This was not only good training for noncoms and junior officers but was a big morale booster. I was able to get several noncoms promoted to the officer ranks, similar to battlefield commissions. Although the Army did not permit many such promotions, it was a big morale booster.

Q: By the time you gave up your command, had the 24th Division responded to your direction?

A: Yes, very much so. I was very pleased with the way the division responded to my direction. When I took over, the division was definitely on the bottom in all categories by which VII Corps and USAREUR rated its divisions. They kept score on such things as training, maintenance, administration, and discipline. By the time I left, the 24th Division was first in maintenance and first in training, including the tank gunnery competition. I was particularly proud of our tank gunnery award because we were a mechanized division, which had a relatively smaller number of tanks than the armored divisions against which we competed.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USAREUR

Q: Why did you relinquish command of the 24th Division before your two-year tour was up?

A: General O’Meara, CG of USAREUR, brought me to Heidelberg to be a member of his staff. He made me his deputy chief of staff for logistics [DCSLOG] and put me in charge of FRELOC [fast relocation from France]. Six months prior to my arrival, General de Gaulle had severed his ties with NATO and ordered the U.S. troops and equipment out of France. He gave the U.S. one year to completely evacuate from France.

General O’Meara assigned this job to my predecessor, Major General Alden K. Sibley. Sibley was a brilliant officer, but very cautious and indecisive. After six months, at which time O’Meara expected one-half of the job to be finished, Sibley
was still planning how best to do it. **O’Meara** relieved Sibley and pulled me in to completely evacuate France in the remaining six months left.

**Q:** What did this involve?

**A:** It involved moving thousands of troops and several hundred thousand tons of equipment from France. I had to start practically from scratch because Sibley had not made good plans to do the job within the allotted year. Moving the troops was relatively easy. But moving the equipment was difficult. There were huge stockpiles of equipment and supplies located all along the line of communications which ran from Germany back across France. NATO’s strategy called for stopping a Warsaw Pact attack on the Rhine, and the supplies were stockpiled not only to assist the defense but to allow NATO forces to take the offensive.

The job had several large complications. First, we had to find space in Europe to store the supplies and equipment. We wanted to put as much of the materiel as possible along the new line of communications which paralleled the Rhine on its west bank and went north to Rotterdam and Amsterdam. But there simply wasn’t enough room in western Germany to accommodate all the supplies and equipment. As a result, we decided to move much of the ammunition to England, and most of the food to Italy.

A second complication was that we discovered huge stockpiles of equipment in France which were not on any records. These were items stored in France which were part of our reparations from Germany and Japan. Most of this equipment consisted of steel beams and columns. The concept was that these steel beams and columns were to be used to rebuild bridges across the Rhine and elsewhere in Europe after NATO had repulsed a Warsaw Pact attack.

A third complication was General **O’Meara**’s desire to move everything out of France and leave nothing behind. Much of the equipment had deteriorated or was otherwise cheaper to replace than to move. But O’Meara wanted nothing left behind.

And finally, the job was complicated because the Pentagon was determined to micro-manage the job. They had ordered USAREUR to submit key-punched cards on which every item of equipment was listed, to include its description, volume, weight, and condition. In addition, the location and future destination of the equipment was to be listed. This job was only about 10 percent complete when I took over.
Finding places to relocate the stockpile of food was relatively easy. The boxed rations, powdered milk and eggs, and other food we moved to Camp Darby on the west coast of Italy. Some of the remaining stocks of food we planned to put along the lines of communication [LOC] in western Germany.

Relocating ammunition was an enormously large and complex problem. Not only is ammo bulky and heavy, but it must be stored in carefully calculated small stockpiles, separated from one another for safety purposes. Sibley’s tentative plans were to relocate this ammo along the LOC in Germany. But there was not room for more than 10 percent of it. My plan was to prevail upon the United Kingdom to allow us to store the ammo on abandoned airfields in England, which had become inoperable after World War II. Although the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom cooperated fully, the task was difficult because people in England living near the abandoned airfields did not want to accept new hazards to their safety. The deadline for getting out of France was February 15, 1967. Yet it was not until December 26, 1966, before we received the final okay from the United Kingdom.

Moving the reparations materiel was also a complicated job. We decided to sell as much as we could for scrap, move some back to the United States, and move the remainder into the highly overcrowded bases in western Germany.

Getting our plans approved in the Pentagon was a sticky problem, but we were able to solve it in an unorthodox way. Not having enough officers to draw up the plans, I struck a deal with the deputy chief of staff for personnel [DCSPER] of the U.S. Army. He had a number of young lawyers on his rolls for which he had no jobs. These were young lieutenants who had received grants from the Army to complete their legal training and were now required to pay back for their training by performing obligated tours of duty. I was assigned 30 of the brightest of these lawyers for a six-month obligated tour in Heidelberg. They did a splendid job of drawing up our FRELOC plans in a hurry. But one of them had a good idea. We invited people from the Pentagon to Heidelberg to look over our shoulders and give us day-to-day approval as we progressed.

We also convinced them that listing all the equipment on punch cards was a hopelessly long, and in fact, unnecessary task. We simply estimated the amounts of supplies and equipment in gross terms and went about moving it. One of the young lawyers assigned to me even convinced representatives of the General Accounting Office [GAO] to come to Heidelberg to witness how we planned and executed FRELOC. This paid enormous dividends. Instead of the usual critical report which all such jobs get from GAO, we managed to receive a commendation.
With this new way of business we went into high gear. We hired every ship available to move ammo to England and food to Italy. We formed provisional truck companies from all the divisions and other units in Germany. We moved as much as we could by rail. And where these assets were not sufficient, we hired commercial movers from France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland to take up the slack. Getting funds to pay for the civilian ships, rail cars, and trucks was another difficult problem which we also solved in an unorthodox way.

One of my jobs as the chief of FRELOC was to sell as much as possible of the unmovable objects, such as barracks, warehouses, and hospitals, to French businessmen. We were given certain guidelines as to pricing. Here again, one of my young lawyers had a good idea. He took a team of his fellow officers to France and put on dog and pony shows, showing French businessmen what bargains they were getting. When a deal was struck, the purchaser had to put up a deposit. We used these deposits to pay the movers, promising them full payment when we received our money from the purchasers. We were able to get more for the properties than our guidelines allowed and this made our relationship with the Pentagon and GAO smoother.

Another of our problems was complying with General O'Meara's orders that everything be moved. Rather than try to convince him that certain types of material, for example, sand and gravel, was not worth moving, we simply had dump truck companies haul the material into land fills west of the Rhine. We moved just about everything we could. For example, we even moved several expensive golf greens to German golf courses. We rolled up the turf, transported the greens to Germany, and had them laid on top of the poorer greens there.

Another difficult problem requiring solution was the central computer to handle supplies from the U.S. to the troops in Europe. There was a large first generation computer in Orleans which was simply not worth moving since second generation computers were then available. We went to the IBM headquarters in New York and learned that they were experimenting with a third generation computer. We were able to get approval from the Pentagon to purchase the third generation computer. However, there was a great deal of controversy as to where it should be located. Rather than wait for a final decision, I had the computer and its ancillary equipment installed in 10 rail cars and placed temporarily in a tunnel in western Germany. The idea looked good on paper but proved difficult to execute. The problem was that diesel fumes from the generators needed to run and cool the computers settled on the computer's storage drums and disks. As a result, all sorts of spurious errors began to occur. However, one of our ingenious planners designed a set of air filters which we placed on the diesel engines in the tunnel. Fortunately, the scheme worked.
What did you do about relocating fuel supplies? Was the pipeline across France dismantled?

No, the French pipeline remained intact. This was due to three reasons. First, it was simply impractical to build a pipeline along our dogleg line of communications on the west bank of the Rhine. It was also impractical to destroy the pipeline across France.

Second, we always believed that the French, although they pulled out of the military portion of NATO, would play an active role in support of NATO if the Warsaw Pact attacked. As a result, we took the risk that the pipeline across France would be available in time of war. We hedged our bets, of course, and established some insurance for ourselves by erecting temporary storage tanks for fuel in mid-Germany on the west bank of the Rhine. The idea was that tankers docking at Amsterdam and Rotterdam would pump fuel into barges which would float up the Rhine and pump their loads into the temporary storage tanks. But we were not overly concerned about our fuel supply; we counted on being able to use the French pipeline in the event the Warsaw Pact attacked.

The third reason was a financial one. The French government made a considerable sum of money by leasing and operating the pipeline. It did not want to sacrifice these profits and gave us assurances that the pipeline would continue to operate. For these three reasons we continued to use the French pipeline and were never too concerned about fuel supplies for the military in Western Europe.

Each part of the task seemed to have its own complications. For example, the French were willing to buy five newly erected U.S. hospitals, but did not want to use the buildings as hospitals. Instead they planned to use the buildings to house the elderly and establish rehabilitation centers. This meant that we had to move X-ray machines, dental chairs, and other hospital equipment to replace outmoded equipment in our hospitals in the remainder of Europe. It would have been far easier if the French had been willing to use the hospitals to replace their older hospitals. But they were unwilling to do this, and unwilling to pay us the price we wanted for the equipment. As a result, moving delicate and expensive hospital paraphernalia was just another part of our job.

Our officers and men worked furiously around the clock to beat the deadline. There was not much time left for contingencies and we had to make everything work as efficiently and rapidly as possible. But there were some things beyond our control. For example, a storm blew up in the Channel, sinking one of our barges loaded with ammunition. We had to delay shipping for 48 hours for fear of losing more barges or ships. Then again, a fire broke out in one of the ammo storage depots in England. The fear that persons living nearby could be hurt caused a
Engineer Memoirs

suspension of our operations to the United Kingdom. But fortunately, no one was
hurt and we were able to resume operations after only a three-day shutdown.
However, despite these obstacles, our plan was being executed smoothly.
Naysayers claimed we would be a month late. But we beat the deadline by 24
hours.

Q: What about the French? Did they put obstacles in your way?
A: No. Even though France’s policy, at the highest level, was to get the U.S. out of
their country, the bureaucracy at lower levels was surprisingly cooperative. In
most places where our troops had been stationed the townspeople were sorry to see
them go. They assisted us in every way they could. Many of the cities and towns
had goodbye parties at which the local people apologized for de Gaulle’s
anti-American policies.

Q: Was General O’Meara pleased that you met the deadline?
A: Yes. He was not only pleased but expressed profuse thanks to me and the men
who carried out the operation. He dispensed commendations freely and
recommended a number of officers, including me, for accelerated promotion.
Thinking he was doing me a favor, O’Meara submitted a special efficiency report
on me, recommending that the Army have me skip a grade and be promoted to a
four-star general. I was told that when this report hit the chief of staff’s desk he
uncharacteristically uttered several expletives and blurted out: “I said that over my
dead body will Rowny ever be promoted and I meant it.” O’Meara’s efficiency
report only aroused Johnson’s ire.

Q: That accounts for your first year as DCSLOG. What about your second year?
A: During the second year I concentrated on improving the maintenance of
USAREUR’s equipment. All of the Army’s new equipment was going to Vietnam.
Furthermore, the fact that units were operational in combat meant that more spare
parts were being used. This meant that we had to take unusual steps to keep our
equipment running. General O’Meara did not want to let our training suffer, and
this put an extra burden on keeping the equipment in operating order. General
O’Meara adopted some of the ideas I had used in the 24th Division, such as in-
sisting that commanders exercise personal supervision over maintenance. He also
transferred some of the better officers to supply and maintenance jobs. This did
not sit well with some of the officers since the way to get promoted had habitually
been to do well in the training field. But O’Meara rewarded these officers with
good efficiency reports, and this went a long way toward assuaging the fears of those who felt they would be passed over for promotions.

Q: Did you do anything else, other than involve the chain of command, to improve maintenance?

A: Yes, we looked for ways by which we could keep our equipment in good shape. For example, Hohenfels and Grafenwehr, where the tank gunnery tests were conducted, were very muddy areas. There the tanks churned up mud and it was particularly hard on the tanks. General O'Meara came up with a scheme of paving large areas of the gunnery range with concrete. He had USAREUR engineers pave hardstands the size of football fields. His theory was that teaching gunners to shoot had little to do with teaching them to operate in muddy terrain. O'Meara also provided warming tents where the soldiers could perform necessary maintenance under more comfortable conditions. “Tankers will learn soon enough how to maintain their equipment in combat. But you don’t have to train at how to be uncomfortable,” he said. As a result he separated the two functions of gunnery and maintenance. I, for one, was happy because it meant that USAREUR's tanks could be kept combat ready.

Q: How about applying training to maintenance? Was that done?

A: Yes. General O'Meara ordered commanders to establish training schools for mechanics. He also insisted that units practice doing maintenance in the field when we were on maneuvers rather than have vehicles go back to the rear for routine maintenance. This saved on the number of miles put on each tank, APC, and vehicle. I recall that O'Meara gave awards and special recognition to commanders of units who were able to perform maintenance while on the move. The units getting to their assigned place in the defensive line with the largest percentage of their vehicles would be singled out for special awards. In general, because of our unusual situation where new equipment and supplies were siphoned off to Vietnam, there was a great deal of attention and command supervision paid to maintenance.

Q: France had gone to the general depot concept in 1958. Were you still using the general depot concept after you moved out of France?

A: Yes, we continued the general depot concept. But with our new third generation computers we were able to take much of the strain off the depots. We did this in two ways. First, software had been developed which allowed commanders to record their planned training activities. This allowed for more particularized and
accurate estimates on time between overhauls DOS]. Fewer unneeded spare parts sat idle on the shelves and more spare parts were available when they were needed. The second thing we did was to tie our computer in with computers at supply sources in the United States, allowing us to bypass depots. Parts needed to put a piece of equipment back into operation would be earmarked and expedited for the unit. This permitted a large number of parts to skip the depots, thus saving administrative and storage time and effort. These things became possible as better computers and especially better software was developed. Incidentally, when I was DCSLOG I operated the largest computer complex then on the European continent.

Q: Do I take from what you said that you were able to reduce the amounts of spare equipment and spare parts in Europe?

A: Yes. Our greater reliance on computers allowed us to reduce the size of our depots. But it was also a matter of necessity. Our supply installations like Kaiserslautem and Rudesheim were stacked to overflowing and we simply had no more place to put things. This caused us to put greater reliance on the shipment of equipment and spare parts directly from the U.S. to the units. But it also pulled down our stock levels in Europe. Whereas USAREUR's logistical concept had previously called for 60- and 90-day stockpiles, we cut these down, in many instances, to a 30-day stockpile. This meant that we would have to plan on more rapid replenishment in the event of war. And it also meant that we stockpiled very few materiel, such as those which had been stored in France, to rebuild Europe in the aftermath of war.

Q: Was General O'Meara your boss during the entire time you were DCSLOG?

A: No. General O'Meara went into retirement and during the last months I was in USAREUR I worked for General James Polk.

**Deputy Commander in Chief, SACEUR**

Q: After you left USAREUR you were assigned as deputy chief of staff to the United States Command for Europe in Stuttgart. Can you tell me the circumstances under which this took place?

A: As you know, the Supreme Commander in Europe [SACEUR] wore two hats. He was commander of all NATO troops and also commanded the U.S. troops assigned to NATO. But 95 percent of the work involved with this second job was assigned to D/CINC [deputy commander in chief], General David Burchinal. This command
Edward L. Rowny

rotated among the services. When Burchinal, an Air Force officer, took command, he was assigned a Navy admiral as chief of staff and asked Polk to provide an Army deputy chief of staff. There was no love lost between Polk and Burchinal. Polk didn’t like the way Burchinal had operated in the past and was undiplomatic to the extent of telling him that he was sending me to his command because he knew that “Rowny will keep you honest.”

As a result, I was sent to Stuttgart under difficult circumstances. Although I was loyal to Burchinal and did not tell tales out of school, I was suspected by Burchinal of doing so.

Still, despite these unhappy circumstances, I would say that I got along reasonably well with Burchinal. My job, for the most part, involved overseeing the planning for contingencies. As it happened, it was an exciting time because the Soviets chose that year to invade Czechoslovakia.

Q: Did Washington know the Soviets would invade?

A: We predicted that the Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia and submitted reports along those lines to Washington. You will recall that the Soviets said they were simply on maneuvers and would not invade Czechoslovakia. Washington, unfortunately, took the Soviets at their word. Burchinal thought that the U.S. troops in NATO should go on a higher state of alert. He made the mistake, however, of asking Washington’s permission rather than doing what was necessary. Washington, not wanting to “provoke” the Soviets by making aggressive moves, turned down Burchinal’s requests. As a result, radars were not moved forward and reconnaissance flights along the border were not stepped up. If the Soviets had not stopped in Czechoslovakia but had continued to move against Germany, NATO’s forces would have been placed at a serious tactical disadvantage.

This mistake of not doing what was necessary but first seeking Washington’s approval was one that had been made once before. Burchinal should have learned a lesson from our previous experience. I refer to the time, several years earlier, when the Soviets began to erect the Berlin Wall. It is my belief that the Soviets initially were only testing our resolve. If we had moved promptly to dismantle the wall when it was started, I think the Soviets would have backed down. But instead, our U.S. commander referred the matter to Washington. Not wanting to risk a clash, the U.S. administration issued orders that the erection of the wall was not to be opposed. I pointed this out to Burchinal, but he wanted to play it safe and referred the question of putting U.S. troops on a higher state of alert to Washington. The reply he got was predictable; we did nothing.
Q: But on the whole, you got along all right with Burchinal, did you not?

A: Yes. I did what was required of me and enjoyed my job. I was greatly assisted by the friendship and help of Major General Russell Dougherty, an Air Force officer, who was Burchinal’s plans and policies officer. He knew Burchinal quite well personally and understood what he wanted to accomplish. Dougherty was subsequently promoted. He retired as a four-star officer after commanding the Strategic Air Command [SAC].

Deputy Chief of Research and Development

Q: When you finished your tour as deputy chief of staff to D/CINC, I understand you returned to the Pentagon where you became the deputy chief of research and development in the Army. Can you tell me what that involved?

A: I returned to the Pentagon in September 1969 to become deputy to Lieutenant General Cyrus Betts. Betts was a highly professional soldier who had a scientific background. He had done a good job and was due to retire within several months. I calculated that I would take over his job when Betts retired and that General Johnson, the chief of staff, would promote me into the job. I had done a good job on FRELOC and as deputy chief of staff to Burchinal. At that time I did not know that Johnson still resented my work on air mobility and would keep to his promise of not promoting me. At any rate, the question became moot because Betts asked to be extended in his job and his request was approved.

Q: What type of work did your job entail?
Most of my work had to do with the Army’s acquisition process. DCSR&D [deputy chief of staff for research and development] played a large role helping decide what new equipment the Army should buy, what old equipment warranted being scrapped and what new equipment needed extensive testing and improvement before it was produced in quantity.

I was also in charge of the 40 or so Army laboratories that did research and development for the Army’s food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, radios, tanks, and vehicles. In this job I was required to work closely with the Army Science Advisory Board [ASAB] and the Department of Defense Office of Research and Development [DOD R&D].

Q: Did your work in R&D entail continuing to develop equipment for Vietnam?
A: No. Most of the research and development on equipment for Vietnam had already been done, and in fact was winding down. We were continuing to work on equipment for a leaner, more durable and lighter Army division. Working in close coordination with the Army Science Advisory Board we were trying to follow the Soviets’ lead and stamp out rugged equipment which could be cheaply mass-produced. We made numerous studies to determine whether time between overhaul on radios, weapons, and vehicles would be shorter if we developed spare parts of higher quality or produced ones of lesser quality and simply threw them away instead of trying to repair them.

We also spent considerable effort on reducing the time required for maintenance. This applied largely to helicopters, which were notorious for a high maintenance to use ratio, but also for vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and tanks. We tried to design equipment which could be serviced by a user, rather than a mechanic. For example, we reduced the number of parts that needed to be lubricated on a vehicle by 50 percent. Our goal was to make maintenance as quick and easy as possible.

Q: What about the Army’s laboratories? What did management of them involve?
A: My work with the Army’s labs was of two types. The first type was to assure that they were working on items the Army needed, and not simply spending time and money on pet projects, some of which were not feasible, and others which were not needed. A number of labs had “hobby horse” programs which were interesting, but not very useful. Because of the ingrained habits which many scientists developed, and because pay was not as good as the better scientists could get in civilian laboratories, directing and keeping them was a difficult job.
The second type of work, closely related to the first, was the management of the labs. Most of them had been staffed with good scientists during World War II, but only a few were able to bring in new, younger scientists. My self-appointed task was to determine why some labs were able to recruit and keep innovative scientists and others were not. In some cases it was a matter of just how good the chief scientist was. In other cases it was a matter of associating the lab with a nearby university. For example, labs developing laser range finding equipment worked closely with MIT in Boston. Another, the Harry Diamond Lab, worked closely with the University of Pennsylvania.

Five or six of the labs were superior. Another five or six were very poor. The others were in between. The challenge was to find out what made the better ones good and to try to bring the poorer ones up to a higher standard.

In part, the overall performance of a lab had to do with what was, and in some cases what was not, being developed in civilian life.

Q: This sounds like a paradox. Can you explain?

A: Yes. In the late 1960s there was a great deal of emphasis in the private sector on developing smaller computers. The Harry Diamond Laboratory, one of the Army's best, had pioneered in etched circuitry. But then the lab began experimenting with printed circuitry. As a result, there was a great deal of synergism with such companies as IBM and TRW on jointly developed programs.

An example of the second type was the Army lab which developed food. The Army's Natick Laboratory pioneered in food research whereas the civilian sector spent very little money on developing food products; commercial food producers spent almost no money on R&D. The Natick Lab developed such products as powdered milk and dehydrated eggs. They were the first to develop freeze-dried coffee which became a multimillion dollar business in the United States. Natick also pioneered in radiating meat so it could be kept in storage for months without refrigeration.

All in all, the management of the Army labs was a fascinating part of my experience. I like to think I raised the performance of some of them. One technique I used was to take the chiefs of some of the poorer labs with me when I inspected the better ones. By observing how the top labs were able to perform well, the poorer ones benefitted. Another technique was to offer cash incentives to the scientists who developed the best ideas. When we received additional funds for R&D, instead of spreading the money evenly, I held out some to reward the
better scientists, and even the chief scientists of the labs which received the highest ratings.

All in all, the management of the Army’s labs was one of the most fascinating and most rewarding of my experiences.

Q: I understand you left the R&D job after about ten months. What were the circumstances of your departure?

Commanding General, 1 Corps

A: What happened was that General Harold K. Johnson retired as the Army chief of staff and was replaced by General William C. Westmoreland. One of Westmoreland’s first official acts, in fact on his first day in office, he called me in and asked if I would like to be promoted to lieutenant general and take command of I Corps in Korea. I said I would be delighted to do so and was immediately placed on orders to Korea.

Q: Had you known Westmoreland personally? Why did he act so quickly to promote you?

A: No, I did not know Westmoreland personally. I had, as do most general officers, become acquainted with other general officers and I had met him on a few official and social occasions. We got on quite well. Later, after he had promoted me, I learned that Westmoreland knew of my difficulties with Johnson and had told several people that I had been treated shabbily. He was enthusiastic about air mobility and believed that I had a hand in bringing it to fruition. I also heard that he felt my work on FRELOC deserved recognition. As a result, he apparently felt I had been treated unfairly and wanted to correct the injustice.

Q: Ambassador Rowny, you left research and development as deputy chief and went to Korea to become the commanding general of I Corps, United States Army from July of 1970 until June of 1971. What did that job entail?

A: That job entailed commanding all Korean and United States troops along the western half of the DMZ, the demilitarized zone. The eastern portion of the DMZ was under the command of the ROK First Army. I was in command of the more sensitive part of the DMZ because the two capitals-Seoul and Pyongyang—are in the west. Also, this is the area which includes the easier avenues of approach since the east was mountainous. In short, I Corps defended the more vital sector. I had
under me six Korean and two United States divisions. I was supported by U.S. atomic artillery—an Honest John battalion.

Shortly after I arrived, I was told that the U.S. Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering phasing out one of the two U.S. divisions under my command. I was to recommend whether the 2d Division or the 7th Division should be phased out. I was also to study whether we could turn the artillery mission over to the Koreans.

My recommendation was that the 2d Division should stay since it occupied the more important sector to defend.

I also said that if we were going to phase out a U.S. division that the ratio of seven Korean to one U.S. division called for a different command structure. We, of course, wanted to maintain overall control, and in fact the Koreans wanted us to continue to be in command. It was their way of assuring U.S. direct involvement in combat if the North Koreans attacked. My recommendation was that we should change I Corps from a U.S. corps to a joint corps headquarters which would still leave me in command. My deputy would be a Korean and we would have a staff which was half Korean and half U.S. The U.S. corps headquarters at Uijongbu would be replaced by an integrated US/ROK [United States/Republic of Korea] headquarters. I also recommended turning the artillery mission over to the Koreans.

The idea struck a responsive chord with the Koreans and the Americans. To work up the plans for an integrated staff, the Koreans assigned me a very fine major general, Lee Jae Jon. Subsequently Lee was promoted to lieutenant general and became deputy commander of I US/ROK Corps.

Our planning proceeded along several simultaneous avenues. The first involved phasing out one of our U.S. divisions and placing elements of the remaining one in the most strategic areas. The best Korean division would move into the next most strategic areas and the new Korean division would move into the easier sector to defend. The second avenue was to train Korean artillery to take over the Honest John battalion which would fire, if needed, the atomic weapons which we would keep under U.S. control. The third avenue was to design an integrated Korean-United States staff. The planning and execution would be done without any detriment to our mission or our state of alertness.

The phaseout of the U.S. division and its replacement by a Korean division went smoothly. So did the training of the Korean artillery. However, the transition of the corps headquarters into an integrated one went less smoothly. This was not
because there were any substantive matters between us, but because there were many administrative hurdles to overcome.

It was my thought that if we were to become a truly integrated staff we would not only have to work together but to live together. Since U.S. officers were not allowed to have their families in Korea and the Koreans of course did, the first question was whether to permit families to live with both the U.S. and Korean officers or to have families with neither side. I didn’t think we could allow Korean officers to have their families live with them and the U.S. officers not do so. The Koreans opted not to have their families join them. The second question was where to house the Korean officers. My thought was that the Korean officers would move into the same housing vacated by the U.S. officers. But I immediately ran into administrative difficulties. The United States Army said, “No,” we and the Koreans should have separate housing and not live together. I resisted this but lost out. In the end we struck a compromise. The deputy commander and principal staff officers would live among the Americans. But the other officers and enlisted men of the headquarters would live in separate buildings within our compound.

Q: Did you have general resistance to your idea or was it the resistance of only a few?

A: I had general resistance from the administrators at the Army headquarters in Korea as well as widespread resistance from Washington. They didn’t like the idea of providing jeeps and sedans for Korean officers and of allowing the Koreans to eat in our mess. I took the stand that if we were to live together and perhaps have to fight and die together, then the Korean officers should eat in our mess.

But the U.S. administrators had objections. They said our messes were subsidized and therefore the Koreans should pay full amounts for their meals, a large sum of money for the Koreans. They would have to give up almost their entire salary in order to be able to eat with us. Then there were other objections. The critics said we would have to set up two kitchens, that the Koreans wouldn’t eat our food. And our headquarters invented other arguments and imposed additional obstacles. In the end General Lee Jae Jon convinced the Korean Army that they should reimburse the U.S. for meals eaten by the Korean officers. The Koreans would provide kitchens for Korean enlisted men. A compromise was worked out.

We grew to be a very closely integrated staff after that, I think in large part because the Korean officers and enlisted men saw how hard I fought to consider them equals. They worked very hard as a staff. At our officers mess we had two mess lines, one for U.S. food and one for Korean food. Each line had one or two dishes from the other line. But we sat together at the tables. The Korean enlisted
men had their own mess which served traditional Korean food. Despite the resistance from U.S. higher headquarters things worked out.

I organized a competition for the best design for a new patch for I US/ROK Corps and then had the winning logo approved by the U.S. Army Heraldry Division. Over the next year we completed the phaseout of the 7th U.S. Division, the phase-in of a Korean division and the integration of the I US/ROK Corps staff. We also completed the training program for the Honest John battalion and set up the custodial unit and guards for the nuclear warheads.

It all worked out quite well. Actually it was a pretty exciting time. After a year the kinks had been ironed out and things were running rather smoothly.

Q: Let me ask you, while you were there, did you have any problems on the DMZ?
A: No, we had no major problems. There were always minor problems, but nothing on the order of the tree cutting incident which occurred later. We conducted periodic alerts and I must admit that the Korean units responded better than my U.S. units.

Q: Was there any rebuilding on the line? Or was the line substantial enough?
A: We worked at constantly upgrading the line. I inherited a long-range plan which included adding more lights and alert mechanisms. We also strengthened bridges and improved roads leading up to the line.

Q: Did American military engineers do this?
A: Yes, but Korean military engineers worked on the upgrade as well. I was assigned the control of a large Korean engineering unit which was quite good. When the weather was good, which was about half the year, the Korean engineers worked around the clock in two 12-hour shifts.

Q: Your mention of the integration of Korean officers into your staff brings to mind the problems athletes encountered during the Olympics. There were complaints that Americans gave the orders and the Koreans did the work. We also heard about the famous tempers of the “Irishmen of the Far East” flaring. Did you have similar problems?
Edward L. Rowny

A: No, I had no problems of that type. I found the Koreans to be well trained and disciplined soldiers. They cheerfully and loyally obeyed my orders. When I called an alert they met my standards, even though the U.S. units did not always do so. They had a great deal of pride. It was generally not recognized back home that the Korean military had come a long way since the Korean War of the early 1950s. Many of their younger officers were products of the Korean military academy which was patterned after West Point. Their officers were highly motivated and well qualified. I had full confidence in their ability.

Q: What about the Koreans in Vietnam. Did they do a good job?

A: Yes, they were good. The difference between the Korean units of 1950 and 1969 was nothing short of astounding. In 1950 there were a few good Korean units, but for the most part they were not well led, not well trained, and didn’t have much in the way of weapons and equipment. By 1969 things had developed rather rapidly. I was pleasantly surprised by the high degree of alertness and soldierly qualities of the Korean officer corps and the Korean soldiers. We constantly pitted U.S. units against Korean units in competitions. Some, like maintenance of vehicles, were won by the Americans. But others, like moving out quickly to their battle positions, were won by the Koreans. There was a healthy, lively, and friendly competition between the U.S. and Korean troops, and the Koreans won most of the prizes.

Q: I gather the country had changed quite a bit.

A: Yes, very much so.

**Deputy Chairman for the NATO Military Committee**

Q: I understand that when you left Korea you went to Europe where you became the deputy chairman for the NATO Military Committee.

A: Yes.

Q: How did they manage to ship you overseas from an overseas assignment without going back to the States for a briefing in between?

A: It was a matter of getting someone aboard in a hurry. The officer I was replacing had left early in July for a new assignment and there was no deputy on board.
Furthermore, Europeans traditionally take off the month of August for leave. They wanted me in Brussels the last several days of July so I could assume command on the first day of August. General Steinhoff was planning his leave beginning 1 August. The problem was exacerbated because the Army had reassigned my successor to another job and they didn’t want my deputy, a Korean, to be in command. However, Steinhoff wanted a deputy on board so he could take off for his vacation and his requirement had priority over the Korean one. After only several days of on-the-job training, I became the acting chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

Q: What did that job involve?

A: The job of deputy of the NATO Military Committee involved several tasks. First, as deputy I would be the alter ego of the chairman. As in any organization, I would be his principal assistant and act in his absence. The NATO Military Committee is the highest military body in Europe and is made up of military chiefs of NATO countries who meet two or three times a year. To maintain a permanent organization the military chiefs each appointed a permanent representative to meet in constant session in Brussels. The U.S., for example, had a four-star general as its permanent representative. The UK and several other countries were represented by three-star generals. The smaller countries had officers of lesser rank; Luxembourg for example, was represented by a lieutenant colonel.

The second task of the deputy was to be the custodian of “eyes only” and secret nuclear plans of the United States. Nuclear plans supporting NATO were kept strictly in the U.S. channels. The NATO committee had a small body of four or five officers, headed by a U.S. general, who acted as my staff on nuclear matters.

Q: Did you have a smooth break-in period?

A: Not really. The day after General Steinhoff left for his leave, on August 2d, a major crisis occurred. Dom Mintoff, the prime minister of Malta, decided that Malta would defect from NATO. For the month of August, until Steinhoff came back, I had my hands full with this crisis. It required that I make several trips to the island of Malta. It also entailed my calling the permanent Military Committee together for a number of meetings. This had never happened before in the month of August. Several members of the committee sent their deputies. But others came back from leave to attend the meetings. As I recall, there were six meetings of the permanent committee in the month of August whereas previously there had never been a meeting during the month of August. It was an exciting and demanding time.
When General Steinhoff came back at the end of August, I turned the Malta crisis over to him. The next major event involving me directly was that General Steinhoff appointed me to be the chairman of the mutual balanced force reductions [MBFR] planning group. Steinhoff had two ideas in mind. First, he wanted to involve NATO in conventional arms reductions. Second, he particularly wanted the U.S. to become involved at a time when the U.S. did not want to get involved in arms reductions.

The principal reason for this is that the U.S., at that time, felt it was more important to further the CSCE [conference on security and cooperation in Europe] process in Helsinki. To force the issue of getting the U.S. involved, Steinhoff appointed me to be the chairman of the working group to get conventional arms reductions started. My superiors had instructed me to follow orders from Steinhoff even if they contradicted U.S. policies. Steinhoff tested the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to NATO and won out. This job occupied at least 50 percent of my time for the next year and a half. It resulted in getting the U.S. to accept MBFR. Without U.S. participation the planning would have gotten nowhere. Steinhoff’s plan worked; we dragged the U.S., kicking and screaming, into the planning process.

So, my job as chairman of the MBFR working group meant that I had to meet several times a week with representatives from the NATO countries, all of whom sent me people to work on the substantive and administrative details of getting negotiations started on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

Q: Was this confined strictly to NATO?
A: Yes.

Q: Did this affect the Warsaw Pact? Were they the counterpart to NATO?
A: Eventually, we negotiated with the Warsaw Pact. But for the time being we had to decide among ourselves what forces and equipment we wanted to see reduced. And we also had to work out the modalities of the negotiations, for example: Where should we meet? At what level would each country be represented? How would we coordinate among ourselves? And there were many other details to be worked out.

Q: Essentially then, you were getting MBFR started?
A: Yes.

**Representative, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)**

Q: Did the MBFR negotiations get started before you left?

A: I left just before the actual negotiations in Vienna began. I had gone back to Washington to present the final plans to Admiral Thomas Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I found out that MBFR was not uppermost in his mind; the strategic arms negotiation was. I learned that a deal had been struck between Scoop Jackson and Henry Kissinger. Scoop Jackson didn’t have confidence in General Royal Allison, the JCS representative to the SALT talks. Kissinger wanted Jackson’s support for the ABM treaty. As part of the payment for Jackson’s support of the ABM treaty, Jackson would get to name the representative to the strategic arms talks. The person he named was me.

I had met Scoop Jackson 20 years earlier and we had become friends. However, I didn’t want the SALT job. I had spent a year and a half getting MBFR started and considered it more important than SALT. Besides, I felt I was back on a career track and had a good chance of being promoted to four stars as the U.S. permanent representative to NATO. In fact, it had been Scoop Jackson who was responsible for a setback in my career earlier. Jackson wanted me to introduce armed helicopters in Vietnam, something I was myself interested in. I saw a role for helicopters in a counterinsurgency operation. They seemed ideally suited for seeking out and destroying guerrilla forces. This got me into the middle of a roles and missions fight, with the result that my promotion to three stars had been held up for several years. Having been promoted to three stars late in my career, I still saw a fourth star on the horizon.

Besides, Admiral Moorer resented what he felt was interference with his prerogative. He felt he should be able to pick his own representative to SALT and had an admiral in mind to replace General Allison. I told Moorer that was fine with me because I didn’t want the job in SALT. Moorer told me he was going to talk to Jackson and Kissinger and tell them he was running the Joint Chiefs of Staff and entitled to name his own representative. “Over my dead body,” he said, "Will someone tell me who will be my representative."

The next day I went to see Admiral Moorer. He leaned back in his chair, threw out his arms and said, "I’m dead."

He told me it was a done deal. Jackson and Kissinger had taken the deal to the President who had given his approval.
“Then how do I get out of it?” I asked.

“Well,” he said, “if it will make you feel any better, you can talk to the chief of staff of the Army.”

I went to see the Army chief. The chief, General Abrams, was ill so I saw his acting chief, Fred Weyand, a close friend and contemporary of mine. He was sympathetic but said the only way out was to resign from the Army. I asked him if I could go talk to Senator Jackson. He said, "Go ahead, but I don’t think it will do any good.”

I went to see Senator Jackson. “Why are you doing this to me?” I asked. “I thought you were my friend. Moorer doesn’t want me to be his representative on strategic arms and wants me to continue to be his MBFR representative. And that’s what I want to do. Besides,” I said, "you set me back in my career twice before, first when you reported I was out in front at the Infantry School by teaching
nuclear tactics, and second when you recommended to Cyrus Vance [then Deputy Secretary of Defense] that I should introduce armed helicopters in Vietnam.” The idea of arming helicopters and using them in counterinsurgency operations was a success, but had set back my career because of a roles and missions fight among the military services.

"Now you’re setting my career back again. The job as JCS representative to SALT is a three-star billet and, as I know you’re aware, despite my set-backs I’m once again on track where I might get my fourth star.”

"You military officers are too rank conscious,” Jackson said. "You're always concerned with your own interests. What about the country’s best interests?” A hard body blow!

"I’m doing what I think is in the country’s best interests,” I said. “I’m backing Steinhoff’s idea of setting up reductions in conventional forces. And there’s nothing more important than reducing conventional forces.”

“Wrong,” said Jackson. "Reductions in nuclear arms are more important.” Then, deciding to hit me again where it hurt most, Jackson repeated a lecture on “Duty, Honor and Country” he had given me earlier in my career. “Go ahead and take the job of JCS rep to SALT II,” he said. “The Soviets have two three-star generals as their military representatives, while the U.S. has only one three-star general.” Jackson was well aware of the “double coverage” the Soviet military would give me on the negotiating team.

"Two times three equal six,” he said. “I’ll see that you get a fourth star; the U.S. will still only have two thirds of their number of stars at the negotiating table. And if I fail he said, "who will know a hundred years from now whether you ended your career as a three- or four-star general?”

It was a hard question to answer: in fact, who in a hundred years would remember MBFR or SALT? In the end it was Jackson’s "Duty Honor, Country” lecture that got to me. I knew that he was right and didn’t protest further. I knew in my heart, however, that I would never reach my ambition of becoming a four-star general. I anticipated that the United States would never risk upstaging the Soviet Union’s military representatives. We would not seat a four-star general opposite a Soviet three-star general, even if there were two of them. My assessment proved to be correct; when Jackson later proposed that I be promoted, the Secretary of State vetoed the idea.

Q: What did your job entail as the JCS representative to SALT?
As the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I was the principal military advisor to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, the head of the SALT II negotiating team. It was my job to see to it that our national security interests were not being harmed. As part of my job I kept the chairman of the JCS and the other chiefs informed as to what was going on in Geneva.

You held this position for over six years, during three presidencies did you not?

Yes. I was the person on the negotiating team with the longest tenure. U.S. team chiefs and members changed quite frequently. One of the reasons why I stayed on the team from the beginning to the end of SALT II was my personal conviction that the U.S. team should have some continuity. The Soviets kept the same people negotiating for long periods of time. Most of the Soviets who were in SALT II had been in SALT I and stayed with SALT II until the treaty was initialed. On our side, the representatives of the Secretary of State, the Arms Control Agency, and the Defense Department rotated every year or two. I was the only one who started with the team who was there at the end.

Just before the election of 1976, I thought that I had been on the SALT II team long enough and notified the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I wanted to leave. I interviewed for several jobs in the civilian sector and accepted one which I thought was challenging and one in which I could continue to serve the nation’s interests. Besides, it paid twice my salary in the military. The chairman at the time was George Brown, a West Point classmate. We had become friends over the years. George said that I should reconsider. “You will have lots of time to make money later on,” he said. “Besides, I need your expertise. The team needs continuity,” he said. “If Jimmy Carter wins,” he said, “I think I can offer you several inducements. Harold Brown will become the Secretary of Defense, and Cy Vance will become Secretary of State. Both of these persons know and respect you. You can play a larger role than you have in the past.”

Carter was elected President and, as George Brown had predicted, Harold Brown and Cyrus Vance came aboard. George Brown went to see Harold Brown and talked to him about offering me the position of representing not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well. Harold Brown agreed that there would be one representative for both agencies. Furthermore, George Brown asked Secretary Vance to take me along with him to ministerial meetings if I would come aboard with the new administration. It was a very attractive offer. I debated whether to take them up on it. I had seen Harold Brown’s plan for SALT II and liked it. It was a plan I thought I could convince the chiefs they should support. The plan had been worked up in detail by Walter Slocombe, a lawyer I had known and respected. Furthermore, Zbigniew Brzezinski...
was named Carter’s national security advisor. I had known Brzezinski when he was a professor at Columbia and felt he could be counted upon to support our national interests. In the end I decided to give up the civilian job offer and not retire from the Army.

However, the honeymoon didn’t last very long. The Secretary of Defense, Hal Brown, said that if I were the only military representative, it would unbalance things at the negotiating table. The State Department and ACDA would have two votes while the Defense Department would have only one. Moreover, he said, since I had worked rather well with Walter Slocombe, we would make a closely knit team. He withdrew the offer that I be the sole military representative and said that I would revert to my former position as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative.

However, Secretary Vance upheld his commitment that I would go with him to the ministerials. And George Brown said that I would not only be the chiefs’ representative but their principal advisor on arms control matters.

I considered quitting, but again I decided to stay on. The main reason was that I was given two hats, not only would I represent the chiefs at the negotiating table but would be their principal advisor. When I was in Washington, I would attend meetings of the National Security Council with the chairman. When I was in Geneva, I would at times simply cable my advice. At other times, when the issues were important, I would travel back to Washington and join the deliberations at National Security Council meetings. This put me in a unique position. Because I knew the background of what was happening in Washington, I was in a better position to know the ins and outs of what the White House was thinking, more so than the chief negotiator himself. Moreover, the chief negotiator, Paul Warnke, was dividing his time between being the director of the Arms Control Agency and the chief negotiator, each a full-time job. Warnke soon learned he couldn’t do both jobs and left most of the negotiating in Geneva to his deputy, Ralph Earle. In my dual-hatted position I definitely had more inside knowledge than Earle.

In my capacity as principal advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, I made annual estimates on where we were going in the SALT talks. I presented them both orally and in writing. In December of 1977 I wrote a rather pessimistic report to the chiefs saying that I did not think that the emerging treaty, if it were to continue along the lines it was then headed, would be in our national interest. The chiefs took note of my estimate and agreed with me. They said, however, that I should work hard at trying to repair the damage and to help make the treaty come out right. Nevertheless, the situation continued to deteriorate, mostly because the Carter administration, in general, and Paul Warnke, in particular, were willing to make more compromises than the chiefs thought were desirable.
I made another annual estimate of the same type in December 1978. I said that I saw no way of reversing the situation so it would result in an equitable agreement. I said that under these circumstances I could not support the emerging treaty and told the chairman of the JCS that I thought the best thing for me to do was to resign. The chairman said that he thought I should continue to stay on; to resign now would be to embarrass the administration. Besides, he said, I could continue in my task of “damage limiting,” that is, trying to make the final product better. If the treaty was not satisfactory to me when it was initialed on June 15, 1979, I could resign at that time.

I said I did not think this was a satisfactory way to proceed and asked to speak to Secretary Vance. This meeting, which took place on December 27, 1978, lasted several hours. I explained to Vance that things were not going well from my point of view and that I could not in good conscience support the treaty which was shaping up. Vance said he respected my point of view but didn’t agree with it.
He repeated in effect what the chairman had told me. Rather than embarrass the President and resign in midstream, he felt I should continue to work on the treaty and make it as good as I could. In the end, when the treaty was initialed, if I thought it was not satisfactory I should then resign.

This meeting I had with Vance was in the immediate aftermath of a week of negotiations we had just finished in which the administration thought it would wrap up the entire SALT II agreement by Christmas. As a result, our side made a number of concessions which I didn’t think we had to make. I had cabled my views on these issues to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who tried to stem the tide of concessions. On some they were successful. However, on most they were overruled by the White House. It was because I saw the way things were going that I wrote such a pessimistic assessment. It also caused me to make up my mind that I could not in clear conscience support a SALT II agreement along the lines it was headed.

Q: Can you give me some examples of these concessions?

A: One of our concessions was to permit heavy missiles on the Soviet side but not on our side. In other words, we gave them the unilateral advantage of possessing heavy missiles. A second concession was to not include the Backfire, an intercontinental bomber, in the count of Soviet weapons. The third concession had to do with a number of aspects of verification. One of these was covered by Article XV.3, which dealt with the encryption of telemetry of missile testing. In December 1978 we gave in to a “Catch 22” arrangement. In it the Soviets said they would not encrypt any information which was included in the provisions of the agreement. But then they wouldn’t include the things we wanted into the provisions of the agreement. It was a meaningless proposal. We said, “No encryption, period.” They said encryption is permitted but not of that data which would be included in the provisions of the agreement. Then they would not put any provisions into the agreement. This made it a meaningless exercise. And we made other concessions on verification provisions as well.

It had become quite obvious by the end of 1978 that we were negotiating on the wrong things. We were, for example, negotiating the number of launchers of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. But launchers don’t kill; it’s the missiles fired from the launchers that kill. More specifically, it’s the warheads on these missiles that kill. This was an important issue because the Soviets were putting more warheads on their missiles and also making them more accurate. Time was acting against us. What looked like a good deal when we started SALT II was being eroded. The Soviets were circumventing the intent of the agreement by producing more warheads.
Q: Is that what is called MIRVing?

A: Yes. Since the Soviets had a monopoly on heavy missiles and we had none, it meant that they had about 6,000 intercontinental ballistic missile warheads to our 2,000, a 3 to 1 advantage. Moreover, they had about a 3 1/2 to 1 advantage in throw-weight, a measure of the destructive power of the warheads.

In all fairness, I should mention that Secretary Brown recognized what was going on. Before the end of the Carter administration, Brown saw to it that we began modernizing our own missiles. Down the road we would overcome some of the disadvantages caused by the unrelenting Soviet modernization program. One of the main reasons why the Soviets gained such a large advantage over us was that we put a small number of warheads on our ICBMs while the Soviets put more warheads on theirs. Our largest ICBMs, the Minuteman II and Minuteman III, have one and three warheads, respectively. However, the smallest of the Soviet systems, the SS-17, had four warheads, the SS-19 had six warheads, and the SS-18 had ten warheads. Added to their 3 to 1 advantage in warheads was their 3 1/2 to 1 advantage in throw-weight. More throw-weight allowed them to get better gyros and guidance mechanisms. This translated into improved accuracy. Originally we thought that it was not important how many warheads they had because we had the qualitative advantage due to the accuracy of our missiles. But now that the Soviets had caught up to us in accuracy, the numbers of warheads became very important.

In sum, I felt SALT II was not in our best interest. As I pointed out to the chiefs and to Secretary Vance, I was breaking with SALT II not because I was against arms control. In fact, I favored arms control agreements. However, the provisions now being adopted would establish precedents from which we could not recover in the future. As I told the chiefs, a modest step is not a useful one if you are unable to take two successive steps across a chasm. You would only fall into it. Accordingly, I saw a SALT II treaty emerging which would be against our security interests.

Q: Did you get any support for your views?

A: I was supported, at least for the time being, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I also had the support of the representative of the Secretary of Defense. But the representatives of the State Department and the Arms Control Agency were very powerful opponents on the other side and generally carried the day.
Q: What were the circumstances just prior to your retirement?

A: In the closing days of the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets continued to play their eleventh-hour tactics. Up to the very end they tried to wring additional concessions from us. At 6 p.m. on the last evening, June 14, 1979, we thought the final deal had been struck. However, at 8 p.m. the Soviets reopened the negotiations and continued to argue until midnight.

To assure that there would be a deal, we gave in some more. The treaty was finally initialed by Ambassadors Earle and Karpov a few minutes after midnight. They then broke out the champagne to celebrate. I didn’t join them but went back to my office and sent a cable to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I said that I could not, in good conscience, support the agreement just initialed. I had two requests: first, that I be authorized not to go to Vienna with the group to witness the signing of the treaty; and second, that I be put on the Army retired list, effective 1 August, some six weeks hence.

Within hours, early the next morning, I received a reply. It said that both of my requests were approved. I was authorized not to go to Vienna but to report back to Washington. I was also told that I would be placed on the retired list, effective 1 July 1979. This was only two weeks away. It usually takes about six weeks to retire. This was the minimum amount of time it took to wind up one’s affairs, take the necessary physical exams, get debriefed, give up one’s security clearances and the like. I had to compress six weeks of work into two.

Up until the end, the chiefs had supported me. But they came under great pressure from the White House to go along with the agreement. The chiefs, in the end, concluded that it was a useful but modest step. There was one exception, the chief of the Marine Corps, who said that it was not a useful step. He was the only chief who backed me all the way. The other chiefs, while not entirely happy with the SALT II agreement, said they would support it.

Q: Didn’t President Carter later say that he discovered, all of a sudden, that the Soviets weren’t as honorable as he thought they were?

A: Yes, but this wasn’t until six months after the treaty had been initialed. As soon as the August congressional recess was over, the Senate confirmation hearings began.

Because I had been one of the negotiators and because I now opposed the treaty, I was one of their star witnesses. By late fall, it was clear that the Senate could
not muster the necessary 66 votes to ratify the treaty. In fact, they had about 55 votes, a majority but not the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution for ratification of a treaty. The Senate Arms Services Committee wrote a report stating that more than a dozen serious errors would have to be corrected before they would vote for the treaty.

In late December, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. President Carter withdrew the treaty from consideration by the Senate, citing the Soviet invasion as his main reason for doing so. It was at this point that President Carter said he had learned more about the Soviets in two weeks than he had up to that time. SALT II, which had been dead in the water for several months, was now sunk.

Q: What did you do after you retired? Obviously you testified before the Senate. But what else did you do?

A: In addition to testifying, I became a scholar at the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. I spent the next year writing a book about my experiences in negotiating with the Soviets.

Cochairman, Advisory Group for Governor Ronald Reagan

In late 1979 I received a call from Governor Reagan who said he had read my testimony before the Senate. I was pleasantly surprised that he was familiar with the main faults of SALT II and quite pleased that he agreed with my views. He asked me if I would talk to him when he came to Washington. I met with him in January 1980 in a downtown hotel. We talked for about three hours. At the end of our conversation Reagan asked me if I would come to work for him. I said, “Governor, I want to ask you a question point-blank. Are you in favor of arms control agreements, because you should know that I am. If you are not in favor of arms control, then I’m not your man.”

"Yes," said Reagan, “I am in favor of arms control but I’m in favor of good arms control agreements and not arms control agreements for agreements’ sake.” He said he favored only those arms control agreements which were equitable and verifiable. He added that a bad arms control agreement would be worse than no agreement at all.

I told Reagan I agreed with him completely. He also queried me quite extensively on strategic defenses. “Isn’t there a better way of deterring a would-be aggressor who had a pistol at your head than holding a pistol to his head?”
“Yes,” I said, “you could put on a helmet.”

“Then why not do so?” he asked.

“Because our scientists have not been able to design one,” I said. “There is no cost effective defense system available to protect against in-coming ballistic missiles.”

“I have more confidence in our U.S. scientists than you,” he said. “I believe that if our scientists were challenged they would design an effective system of defenses.” He added that he simply did not agree with the currently popular theory of MAD, mutual assured destruction. “It is,” he said, “just what its acronym implies, it’s mad.”

I again said I agreed with him. From this early time onwards I found myself working with candidate and later President Reagan on developing strategic defenses, something which later became known as SDI, strategic defense initiative, and which the media dubbed “Star Wars.”

Reagan also asked if I would co-chair a group to advise him on national security and arms control matters. I co-chaired a group with Richard Allen. We brought together 50 prominent scholars, journalists, and experts to study these matters.

In November 1980 Reagan was elected to be our next President. About this time I had finished my book and had sold it to a publishing company.

Q: Was the book published?

A: No, before it was published I was offered a job in the Reagan administration, and the White House thought a book by me at that time would be inappropriate. I have redone the book since then and expect to publish it in 1992. [Note: The book, *It Takes One to Tango*, was published by Brassey’s, USA, in November, 1992.]

Soon after President Reagan’s inauguration, he called and asked me if I would take the job of director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. I said I accepted with pleasure but on condition that I would not also become the chief arms control negotiator. I said I thought combining the two jobs in the past was a mistake. President Reagan said he agreed.

Two weeks later I had finished calling on the senators on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. Seven of the eight senators said they favored me for the job. One, senator, Charles Percy of Illinois, held out. He said he wanted to be certain I was
really in favor of arms control and not simply trying to slow the process. He thought I was wrong in opposing SALT II. On a Friday afternoon, two weeks after I had been nominated, Senator Percy withdrew the objections he had against me. He said he would notify the White House that the committee was now unanimous that I should become the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I was quite surprised therefore, when I picked up the *Washington Post* on Monday morning, to read that the directorship of ACDA had been offered to Eugene Rostow. It was especially surprising because I had met Gene for lunch on the preceding Friday, seeking his advice on how to proceed with my plans for taking over ACDA.

Q: And he didn’t tell you he had been offered the job?

A: No. On Monday, after I had read about the switch, I called him. Rostow said he had been approached on the job but told to keep it to himself.

He said he felt he was not at liberty to tell me that the ACDA job had been offered to him. I called the chief of staff at the White House and asked him what was going on. He said it was true that the White House had withdrawn my name and submitted Rostow’s.

I said I would like to talk to President Reagan about the matter. He said, “Come over and let’s talk.”

The next day I went to the White House and talked to the chief of staff and several members of the California Mafia: Raker, Darman, and Deaver. Their explanation was that General Haig was named the Secretary of State and that it would not be well to have too many military men in the administration. Furthermore, they said, the administration had the Republicans on board and they needed support from the Democrats. Rostow was a prominent Democrat and could serve this purpose. I made no bones about being unhappy with their explanation and the stealth-like way in which the switch had been carried out. I said I wanted to talk to President Reagan about it.

**Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)**

They hemmed and hawed. It was obvious to me that President Reagan had not been consulted on the switch. The following day they said they felt that I was highly qualified to head the negotiating team, saying I could do more good in that job than being the director of ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency].
They added that I knew the Soviet negotiators, knew the issues, and could speak Russian. Therefore, they were prepared to offer me the job of chief negotiator of the strategic arms reduction talks [START]. While I didn’t like the way in which my nomination had been withdrawn, the thought of becoming the chief negotiator of START sounded appealing. I accepted their offer.

Q: To go back a bit, what did you do while you were out of government and at the Wilson Center?

A: As I mentioned earlier, I spent most of my time writing a book on my negotiating experience. I also gave lectures around the country and attended various seminars and working groups sponsored by the Wilson Center.

One fascinating experience was to participate in a debate with George Kennan. This was, on the one hand, an interesting experience and, on the other hand, a painful one. I had been a great admirer of George Kennan back in the late 1940s when he was sending back from Helsinki his brilliant analyses of the Soviet scene. I also followed closely the reception that his famous article on containment, signed "Mr. X" received in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine. Later, in the mid-1950s, Kennan did an about-face. I thought that from this time on Kennan had become an apologist for the Soviet leaders. I also learned about the little-known "death pill" incident. Kennan thought he might have to commit suicide if drugged to reveal secrets. A West Point classmate, Peer de Silva, wrote about this in his book on the CIA. At any rate I entered the debate with George Kennan in New York City with mixed emotions.

While at the Wilson Center I also got to know Bronislav Geremek. Geremek, a Polish historian, was writing a book about the migration of Gypsies in 15th Century Europe. I tried to get Geremek interested in Solidarity, which was just getting underway. Geremek at first said he was not interested in anything that has happened in the last century. But he later became highly involved in Solidarity and subsequently one of Lech Walesa’s chief advisors. He is now head of the Polish Senate.

Q: Tell me something about your job as chief U.S. negotiator of the strategic arms reduction talks. For whom did you work and what did you do?

A: As chief U.S. negotiator of START, I worked directly for the President. However, I took my instructions from General Haig, the Secretary of State. I had known Haig since 1950 when he was a lieutenant and I was a lieutenant colonel and we both worked for General Almond, the chief of staff for General MacArthur.
Therefore I had a good rapport—an easy relationship—with Haig. When he became the Secretary of State and I the chief negotiator of START, we developed the plans for deep reductions of strategic arms to meet President Reagan’s desires. We also worked at trying to reduce the right things. Let me explain.

SALT II had limited launchers of ballistic missiles but not the warheads on them. This was like limiting rifle tubes but not the bullets fired from the rifles. If you don’t limit the number of bullets, then you can shoot an unlimited number of them from the rifle tubes. In SALT II we were determined to limit warheads as well as missiles and launchers.

The process of developing our plan for START was going rather slowly, and for this we were subjected to a great deal of criticism. One reason for going slow was that we first wanted to determine the direction in which our strategic modernization
program would proceed. We had to turn things around and get the right forces back into the programs. It didn’t make much sense to reduce forces if we didn’t know which ones we needed and needed building up.

A second reason why things went slowly in START was because most of the emphasis was placed on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In December 1979 at the Rome session of NATO, the United States was called upon to embark on a two-track approach. On one track we were called upon to deploy Pershing II [PII] ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] in Europe. The second track was to begin negotiations for the reduction of our PII and GLCMs and the Soviets’ SS-20s. The Soviets had large numbers of SS-20 ballistic missiles covering targets throughout Europe.

Ambassador Paul Nitze was named U.S. negotiator for the intermediate-range forces. Since there was a lot of pressure to get these INF [intermediate nuclear forces] talks started, it pushed the START talks into the background.

Q: Tell me something about Alexander Haig and his abilities.

A: I thought Secretary Haig was highly capable. He knew international issues and how to deal with them. He was a positive person; he felt, as he put it, that the United States should move out smartly. It was unfortunate that he got off on the wrong foot in the Reagan administration. Let me explain.

In the military, when an officer is assigned a new job he usually comes in with a prospectus of what he thinks should be done. He draws up a plan and submits it to the boss to show him the direction in which things should go. If the boss approves, the officer knows what to do. If he doesn’t approve, he then gets guidance as to how to proceed.

Shortly after the inauguration Secretary Haig presented President Reagan with his plan of action. This was immediately interpreted by the White House hierarchy as an end run and a threat to their authority. I remain firmly convinced it was not an end run but the normal way in which we, as military officers, had been trained to approach a new job.

Secretary Haig got off to a bad start and things continued to deteriorate. The California Mafia surrounding Reagan felt threatened by Haig and proceeded to harass him. I recall being in Haig’s office when Haig was called by persons in the White House who insisted upon micromanaging minor issues. Instead of rolling with the punches, Haig insisted on taking these persons on.
I was in the White House on the day the President was shot and was able to observe at first hand what happened. The initial word from the hospital was that the President was not hurt badly. Nevertheless, the entire cabinet was assembled. Reassuring messages kept coming from the hospital, but it made one wonder if it was true that the President’s wound was really a minor one. Only Mrs. Reagan and the President’s close California friends like Deaver and Raker were allowed to go to the hospital. This made us more suspicious that something was awry. Jim Brady, the President’s spokesman, had been seriously wounded.

Brady’s assistant briefed the press but didn’t sound very assuring. The impression he was creating was that there was no one in control of the U.S. government. I was not present at the cabinet meeting but I learned that there was a sharp exchange between Weinberger and Haig about the order of succession. At any rate, Haig felt that the world was not getting a reassuring picture that someone was in charge. He came to the press room and made his famous “I’m in charge” speech, obviously upset and not very assuring himself. He probably suspected that the President was seriously hurt and also upset because he was being kept away from the hospital. The “I’m in charge” speech did Haig an inestimable amount of harm; the 30-second bite was played again and again on TV. His talk was played up by the California Mafia as another attempt by Haig to overstep his authority. It was the beginning of the end; only a matter of time before the White House decided to let Haig go.

I was in with Secretary Haig the night before he was fired. If he knew he was going to be dismissed, he didn’t give any indication of it. The next day I attended the cabinet luncheon where several arms control issues were discussed. Haig presented the recommendation I had made to him well, and I was pleased that no one seriously opposed him.

After the luncheon Haig and several others were called into the Oval Office by the President. I went home to finish packing, since I was leaving for Geneva that evening. I received a phone call from my office saying that I should turn on my TV. I was surprised. Haig had just resigned. I knew things had not been going well, but I didn’t think things had gone that far. It was Haig’s swan song.

Q: I gather you consider Haig was competent and made a good Secretary of State.

A: Yes, I consider him a competent official and think he was an excellent Secretary of State. He’s a positive, take-charge person, the kind we needed as secretary at that time. I believe he felt that he had the confidence of President Reagan and wanted to be his “vicar”-as he put it-in foreign affairs. But as I have said earlier, I saw something others didn’t see. I saw a President in the hands of a
close coterie of trusted lieutenants who not only determined Reagan’s policies but decided who would be on his team. They felt threatened by Haig and decided to move him out.

Q: In Reagan’s first couple of years there were changes in Soviet leadership. Did this have any influence on how your meetings were going?

A: Yes. Brezhnev died and was replaced by Yuri Andropov who didn’t have very long to live and was replaced by Konstantin Chemenko. We would no sooner get started on negotiations than a new Soviet leader appeared on the scene. Still, there was a great deal of continuity because all the negotiations were in the Brezhnev mold and Gromyko remained Soviet Foreign Minister. The policies didn’t change.

The Soviet negotiators continued to be obstinate, entirely one-sided. They were not very forthcoming on any of the major issues. It was a difficult time to try to make progress on arms control.

Q: Let’s continue to talk about personalities. You’ve been dealing with the Russians for almost 20 years now, haven’t you?

A: Not quite; only since 1973.

Q: That’s 17 years. During that time did you become close friends with any of the Soviets?

A: Close friends would be too strong a way to put it. You certainly get to know your counterparts quite well and you do develop a rapport with them. You learn how far you can go and can, after a while, predict what they’re going to do. But Soviet officials do not make friends with foreigners. They’re dedicated to their work and are loyal to their superiors. One of the great disappointments of working with the Soviets is that at best you can develop a working relationship with them. But even then, this often changes overnight and the Soviets reverts to type. On the whole I have a high respect for Soviet negotiators; they are professionals in their business. But in terms of making any close or lasting friends, it just doesn’t happen.

Q: Can you tell me something about where and how you conducted your negotiations?
A: As I mentioned earlier, I spent most of my time writing a book on my negotiating experience. I also gave lectures around the country and attended various seminars and working groups sponsored by the Wilson Center.

Q: To go back a bit, what did you do while you were out of government and at the Wilson Center?

A: Yes. Let me first address where we negotiated. In SALT I, the negotiations rotated among three capitals: Geneva, Vienna, and Helsinki. However, it became such a logistic headache that the two sides settled on one meeting place: Geneva. And in SALT II and START we continued to meet in Geneva.

As for the negotiating teams, we were roughly parallel. During SALT II the Soviets had a chief and six negotiators on their side and we had a chief and five on our side. As military representative to SALT II, I had two three-star Soviet generals opposite me. I thought this was unfair. While one Soviet general was...
talking the other was thinking of what to say next. Moreover, the Soviets insisted on equal time to speak and to them this meant equal time for each person. As a result, the Soviets had twice as much time as I had to present a case. Later, before we commenced START, I asked the Secretary of State to arrange through diplomatic channels for us to have an equal number of negotiators on both sides. The Soviets agreed.

However, when we arrived in Geneva for our first meeting there was one and five on our side but one and six on their side as there always had been. Instead of beginning to negotiate I called a recess and spoke to my opposite number, Viktor Karpov. I told him the U.S. and USSR had agreed through diplomatic channels that there would be an equal number of negotiators on both sides. He disclaimed any knowledge about the agreement and said that his instructions were that there be one and six on the Soviet side.

I continued the recess and sent a note to our headquarters asking that the senior U.S. advisor be sent to the meeting. When he arrived I appointed him, on the spot, to be a negotiator. We then resumed the meeting with one and six on each side.

Karpov smiled ruefully, and said, “The U.S. never worried about such things before and you can’t blame me for trying. To us,” he said, “form is as important as substance. As a matter of fact, to us form is substance.” As time passed I found this to be true; the Soviets always placed a great deal of emphasis on form.

We generally met twice a week, every Tuesday and Thursday. On Tuesdays the Soviets came to our location on the top floor of the Botanic Building and on Thursdays we met behind the fenced-in compound which was reinforced by barbed wire. Whoever was the host would allow the guest to make the first statement. These statements, which we called plenary statements, were carefully worded positions on some issue, they usually lasted about 30 to 40 minutes. After that, we would break up into one-on-one pairings for informal discussions. These informal sessions would last two or three, sometimes four hours. Whenever the plenary statements were binding on our respective governments, the informal sessions were not.

After we broke up we would come home and hold a debriefing session among ourselves. I would then dictate a short summary of highlights which we cabled to Washington. Karpov told me the Soviets did the same thing, and like us, followed the cable with a longer memorandum for record which we airgrammed back home. As Dean Acheson once said, “no person puts himself in a bad light in his own
memorandum for record,” and we were no exceptions. Karpov confided to me that he too reported that he had done brilliantly and “slaughtered” us.

This twice-a-week schedule might sound like a relaxed pace, but considering the preparation time and follow-up reporting, it was a demanding schedule.

Q: Can you tell me something about the substance of your START negotiations?

A: The first thing that President Reagan decided to do was to determine what U.S. forces needed before we began negotiating with the Soviets. Fifteen years of neglect of our military forces had left us in a weakened posture which put our security in jeopardy. It also undermined any leverage we might have at the negotiating table. While President Reagan was determined to improve our military posture, he realized that our resources were not unlimited. The first step in developing the five-year modernization plan was to figure out where to put our priority efforts and how to allocate scarce resources to areas that needed them most.

I was fortunate in being a player in this exercise. It gave me a better understanding of what our weaknesses were and how we were going to correct them. It also gave me the opportunity of evaluating which parts of the modernization program would later give us strength at the negotiating table. This process took place for the most part in the Pentagon, although there were some cabinet meetings on it to which I was privileged to attend.

We learned early in the game that our command, control, communications and intelligence systems, what is known in the military jargon as C3I, were in pretty bad shape. Even the forces we had could not have readily been put into action because we didn’t have the command structure and communications hardware to control our forces. A high priority was assigned to the littleknown and unglamorous-but highly important task-of improving C3I.

Once C3I improvement was started it was decided to modernize strategic forces across-the-board. We wanted simultaneously to bring the land-based leg of the triad up to higher degree of effectiveness, to push forward the sea-based leg of the triad, and improve our airborne forces. One of the first actions that President Reagan took was to put the B1 program back on track which President Carter had derailed earlier. As the five-year plan evolved, it got into important systems beyond the three legs of the triad, such as developing sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. This was important because U.S. cruise missile technology had moved ahead of the Soviets’ technology by an estimated five to eight years.
There was a great deal of criticism that President Reagan was slow in getting back to the negotiating table. But President Reagan was unperturbed. He was determined not to rush into negotiations before he knew where we were going with our force structures and what our baseline would be.

Another reason why we didn’t move rapidly into negotiations was because priority was given to INF negotiations. You will recall that earlier I said that NATO ministers, meeting in Rome, called for a two-track approach to meet the Soviet SS-20 threat. This two-track approach to INF meant that our departmental bureaucracies were devoting a great deal of attention to INF. This delayed preparations for getting the strategic arms negotiations going.

At the beginning of the Reagan administration, President Reagan made several speeches which were to form the shape of future policies. One speech he gave early on said it was not enough simply to contain communism but that we needed to supersede communism.
Reagan's next important speech, given at his alma mater, Eureka College, was an outline of what he planned to do in strategic arms negotiations. He said it was not sufficient to limit arms but necessary to reduce them.

To give emphasis to reductions over limitations, he changed the acronym from SALT to START [strategic arms reductions talks]. Significantly, Reagan pointed out that it is not sufficient to limit launchers of weapons as SALT had done, but that we needed to limit the warheads on missiles to be fired from the launchers. He made limiting warheads the main object of reductions. He also proposed that there be a reduction of throw-weight, that is, the total amount of nuclear power. This was highly important because the Soviets had roughly four times as much nuclear power as the United States. If total nuclear power were not brought back into line, not much would be accomplished in the field of arms control.

Two other important items to which attention was paid were equitability and verifiability. The Soviets were willing to take percentage cuts, but not to lower equal levels. President Reagan stressed that equality be the watchword.

Reagan also stated that the U.S. would enter into no agreement that was not verifiable. This was very difficult to achieve because the Soviets had always resisted intrusive verification measures. The Soviets habitually ruled out any type of on-site inspection. We also encountered difficulties with verification in SALT II over such items as encryption of telemetry.

In summary, President Reagan wanted to negotiate with the Soviets on reducing substantially the numbers of strategic offensive arms. He also wanted to reduce the right things and do it in a verifiable way.

Q: When you spoke about establishing priorities for modernizing arms after our 15 years of neglect, are you taking the neglect as far back as the Nixon administration?

A: Our neglect of strategic arms predates the Nixon administration. It began with McNamara's unilateral cuts in the early 1960s. McNamara thought that if we limited our forces, the Soviets would follow our example and limit theirs. You will recall that he said we would not deploy more than 1,000 ICBMs because there was no need to go beyond that number. He said the Soviets had neither the capability nor the intention of ever surpassing us.
Briefing former President Richard M. Nixon.

He was wrong on both counts. By the time SALT I was signed in 1972, the Soviets had not only caught up to us but were ahead by 50 percent in ICBMs and 50 percent in nuclear armed submarines as well. Whereas we stopped building at 1,000, they went up to 1,600 ICBMs. Whereas we stayed at 40 submarines, they went up to 62. As Harold Brown, President Carter’s Secretary of Defense said, “When we built, they built. When we cut, they built even more.”

Q: Did President Reagan’s five-year plan envision our catching up or surpassing the Soviets?

A: Our five-year plan envisaged moving up towards the Soviet levels, but we had no plans to surpass them. We felt that if we moved towards them, it would give us leverage and they would start moving down. We believed that if we modernized our forces it would do two things. First, it would take care of our own security.
Second, it would give us leverage at the negotiating table and help drive the Soviets down.

Q: What about our NATO allies? Did we have their full support or were they opposed to our modernization?

A: In general, we had the support of our allies. But this was not easily achieved because many of them were worried that our force modernization plan would act against arms control. They hoped that somehow the Soviets would reduce their weapons without our having to increase ours. But we saw no way of accomplishing this. We consulted extensively with our allies to convince them that we were serious about arms control. At the same time we had great difficulties with our allies in getting them to accept U.S. cruise missiles and Pershing intermediate-range ballistic missiles on European soil. This was so even though the NATO ministers had asked for such deployments. Once we decided to comply with their request, it sparked a lot of debate in NATO capitals over whether they should really accept our weapons on their soil.

Q: You mentioned that our command and control—C3I—was in bad shape. Would you elaborate?

A: Yes. Our means for communicating with our strategic forces left much to be desired. We did not have a national command authority which was secure and also redundant and had tenuous means of communicating with the forces. This was particularly true with our naval forces. We had to push new concepts of propagating low-frequency waves from certain locations in the U. S. to the submarines at sea. The entire structure of our command, control and communications required overhaul; it had been neglected too long. Our intelligence capability also left a great deal to be desired, particularly in the number of satellites we were putting up and the amount of information we were collecting from them. While these matters were not publicly debated and were not very glamorous, they were recognized by the professionals as being at the heart of the problem.

If you can't communicate with your strategic forces, you can't control them. And if the enemy knows you can't—and our intelligence sources told us they knew of our difficulties—the threat of retaliation is a hollow threat.
You have spoken about the importance of U.S. negotiators being able to speak Russian. Where did you learn to speak Russian?

A: I went to the Yale graduate school in 1947. I really wanted to study international relations, but the Army said they didn’t have any programs in this field. They said I could, however, study engineering. As a result, I moonlighted. I earned two master’s degrees simultaneously—one in engineering and the other in international relations. To get a master’s degree you needed to be proficient in two foreign languages. I had studied French and decided to pursue it as one of my languages. And since I decided to deal with nuclear weapons and that meant dealing with the only other superpower, I decided to study Russian. I’m not at the translator level but understand and speak Russian fairly well.
Q: Have you been able to improve your Russian language capability over the years?

A: Yes. Once I was assigned the job of negotiating with the Soviets, I took an intense course of instruction at Berlitz, known as their total immersion course. That helped considerably. Then I continued to devote an hour a day to studying Russian. Moreover, I tried to exercise it whenever I could when I met Russians. As a result my fluency improved over time.

Q: What happened in Geneva between the time you began negotiating and when the Soviets broke off negotiations in 1984?

A: Our original plan to proceed in two steps was not well received by the Soviets. We said it was important to first reduce the ballistic threat and only after this was agreed would we talk about reducing bombers and cruise missiles. To us, this seemed a logical way to proceed. But from the outset the Soviets resisted our plan. They felt we were trying to limit them since they had the advantage in the ballistic missiles field and not limit ourselves in bomber and cruise missile fields where we had the advantage. All our talk about how this was an orderly way to proceed fell on deaf ears.

I want to digress to talk about an interesting milestone that occurred during these negotiations. That was the famous speech in March 1983 in which the President laid out his guidelines for what is now known as the strategic defense initiative.

You recall that from my earliest talks with the President he felt we should build up our strategic defenses so there would be a balance between defensive and offensive forces.

There was not much prior information about what the President was about to do and it came as a surprise when he made his SDI speech. Secretary Haig told me later he felt that the matter had not been discussed sufficiently with the principals involved. I sided with the President’s decision that he should outline his vision and call for strategic defense without a lot of
prior discussion. Had he done so, I think the Congress would have killed the program before it was born.

We were in Geneva when the President made his speech on the strategic defense initiative. As a matter of fact, I headed the five-year review of the ABM treaty, which was then in progress. The treaty review was divided into two parts. The first part was a philosophical discussion which I carried on with Karpov at my level. The second part dealt with details and was carried out by the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC].

I was in the act of discussing the philosophical underpinnings of offense and defense when the President made his speech. The speech created a firestorm in Geneva. Ambassador Karpov, my opposite number, became agitated and accused the United States of having violated the ABM treaty by proposing the SDI [strategic defense initiative] program. I told him right off that we were not violating the ABM treaty. Karpov criticized me for making such a statement without having
Edward L. Rowny

first checked with Washington. I told him I knew enough about SDI that I didn’t have to check with Washington.

The next day Karpov called on me and apologized for having accused the President of violating the ABM treaty. However, he said it violated the spirit of that treaty. I bring this up to highlight the extreme sensitivity with which the Soviets regard SDI.

But let me return to the negotiations. In the spring of 1984 I recommended to President Reagan that we collapse the two phases of our plan and talk about simultaneously reducing ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles. The President approved my recommendation.

With that big obstacle overcome, we began to make progress through the spring and summer towards a START agreement. We were quite optimistic. This was in sharp contrast to what was happening in INF, where the Soviets were making ominous noises about breaking off negotiations if the U.S. insisted on deploying its missiles in Europe.

We were also making a fair amount of progress on the verification provisions, the definitions, and other aspects of the START agreement. But one rather large obstacle remained. The Soviets insisted that every weapon deployed on a bomber count the same as a ballistic missile warhead. We said that this was unacceptable because we needed the bomber weapons to penetrate Soviet formidable air defenses. We simply could not equate a bomb on a bomber with a missile warhead on an ICBM.

There were other obstacles, such as how to treat air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles. Ground-launched cruise missiles, not being strategic, were not in my court; they were handled in INF.

It was during this time that Paul Nitze and Youli Kvitsinsky had their famous walk in the woods. Nitze tried out a personal idea to try to break the logjam. He did not believe the Kohl government could carry the day and deploy U.S. PIIs and GLCMs on German soil. Knowing that the Soviets were more concerned with PIIs which could strike targets in Germany and Poland against which there were no air defenses, Nitze proposed to Kvitsinsky that the Soviets should reduce their SS-20s to a number equal to GLCMs, and that we would give up deploying PIIs. Nitze's team heard rumors of his proposal, but Nitze would not discuss it with them. Knowing that I was opposed to Nitze's plan, they asked that I intervene. I tried, but Nitze wouldn’t talk to me about it.
Fortunately, even before the U.S. turned down Nitze’s plan, the Soviets turned it down in Moscow. I was greatly relieved. If Nitze had been successful in giving up our Pershing IIs, we would never have achieved a satisfactory INF agreement.

Nitze was wrong. The Germans courageously deployed PIIIs and GLCMs on their soil. As they had threatened if deployments went ahead, the Soviets walked out of the INF treaty negotiations. We continued our START negotiations for several additional meetings. But then Karpov told me that until the INF problem was resolved the Soviets would not come back to the START negotiations. In December of 1983, when we went home for the Christmas break, we had no return date in mind.

The talks remained suspended for a year. Meanwhile, Brezhnev had died and so had Andropov and Chemenko who succeeded him. Gorbachev had now emerged as the new Soviet leader.

In January of 1985 Secretary Schultz met with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva. The Soviets said they would come back to the table but only if we discussed the ABM treaty and space. We opposed this and wanted to negotiate only START and INF. We said we were willing to talk about strategic defenses but not about space. A compromise was worked out whereby there would be three sets of negotiations, START, INF, and a new forum to deal with D&S [defense and space].

The Soviets suggested, informally, that both sides start fresh with new negotiators. Knowing how much stock they put in continuity, I didn’t take this seriously and recommended to the White House that they offer the job of negotiating D&S to Max Kampelman. I had known Kampelman from my days in the Wilson Center in 1979 when he was a member of the center’s board of directors. Kampelman had negotiated the Helsinki accords and had done a good job. When President Reagan was elected, I recommended that Kampelman, although a Democrat, be kept on the job. Nitze’s wife was ill and he let it be known that he did not plan to go back to
Geneva to negotiate INF. Nitze’s deputy, Mike Glitman, seemed a natural for the job. I also heard rumors that Senator Tower was looking for a job in Geneva but thought he might become the D&S negotiator.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I was summoned to Secretary Schultz’s office and told the President had decided to put in a new team of negotiators. I told him I was shocked that we had fallen for the Soviet ploy of putting in new negotiators. I was certain they would not do so.

Schultz said it was beside the point. The President would name Kampelman the overall negotiator who would also negotiate D&S. Senator Tower would take my place as START negotiator and Glitman would take Nitze’s place in INF.

“Well,” I said, “I think the President is making a mistake but he’s the boss.”

Special Advisor to the President, Arms Control Matters

Schultz said the President wanted Nitze and me to stay on and become special advisors to him on arms control. “He wants to take more interest in arms control and thought he would like to have you stay in Washington, close at hand, to advise him.” I told Schultz I was a big boy and he didn’t have to sugar-coat the pill. If they didn’t want me, I was ready to leave. “No, no,” Schultz insisted, “the President wants you.” I said I would like to hear it from the President himself. Schultz called up the President and got me an immediate appointment to see him.

On the way to the White House, Schultz said he hoped I wouldn’t turn the President down when he made his request for me to stay on. I said, “Well, I want to hear it from him.”

Schultz did not go into the Oval Office with me when I met with the President. The President asked me what I thought about the new team. I said it was his call, but I always considered continuity to be important and was certain the Soviets wouldn’t change their team. He said that his idea was not to change the team but to have me in Washington where I could concentrate on advising him. I said, “Mr. President, you don’t have to let me down easy. It was an honor to have served you, and I think I should leave and do something else.”

“No,” he insisted, “I want you to stay.”

I said I didn’t know how it would work. “I won’t have a portfolio; I won’t have a real job.”
“Yes, you will,- he said. “You’ll have a staff and will advise me on a regular basis. You’ll have access to me and will sit in on Cabinet meetings that deal with arms control.” I said I had difficulty seeing how my job would sit with other agencies, the established bureaucracy. "It will sit well with them because it is what I want,” he said.

I said I would need to be assured that I would have access to the National Security Council and attend their meetings. He pushed a buzzer and soon Jim Baker, his chief of staff, walked in. “Jim,” he said, “I’ve offered Rowny the job of being a special advisor to me on arms control matters. I would also like him to advise the Secretary of State. Rowny wants assurances that he is going to get into the act and be a player?

Baker said, “Okay, we’ll give Rowny support and guarantee him access.”

I said that under the circumstances I’d take the job and see how it worked out. In February 1985 I was officially designated special advisor to the President and Secretary of State for arms control matters.

After I went to the first several meetings of the National Security Council, I could see that the White House was true to its word. I was able to present my advice and had a fairly high success rate at having it followed. Paul Nitze, who had been given the same title, moved into an office close to the Secretary of State on the seventh floor. Nitze became Schultz’s right hand man on arms control as far as the State Department was concerned. I stayed in my original office on the fourth floor of the State Department. While I went to the more important meetings Schultz called on arms control, I did not interact with Schultz on a day-to-day basis.

There was a minus and a plus side to my working arrangement with the secretary. Nitze was an integral part of Schultz’s staff; I was not. When Nitze made a recommendation and it was turned down, Nitze accepted the decision and closed ranks with the State Department. When one of my recommendations was turned down, I would reevaluate the issue. If on further analysis I thought the State position was correct, I would support it. If my analysis convinced me they were wrong, I would write up my views and forward them to the President through the National Security Advisor. I would always send a copy to the Secretary of State. On some issues the President decided in State’s favor, on others he sided with me. In those instances where my views differed from State’s, the decisions were about 50-50 in my favor.

I was able, therefore, to play an independent role, one which suited me better than Nitze’s role. As time went on I felt I had a stronger hand at influencing decisions at the top than I had enjoyed as the START negotiator. While I missed the
excitement and day-to-day involvement in Geneva, it was a satisfying job. Even though Nitze worked more closely with the State Department, I preferred my situation over Nitze's.

A different relationship developed between Schultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, the new Soviet foreign minister who had replaced Gromyko. Whereas President Reagan had formerly put down a number of good positions, they didn't get very far with the old Brezhnev-Gromyko team. But the foundation had been laid and the U.S. had generated sufficient strength to give us leverage at the negotiating table. Now there was a new set of players at the top. However, the negotiating team in Geneva was just as obstinate and wedded to its old positions as it always had been. It took decisions at the Schultz-Shevardnadze level to override the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. Even so, the Soviet negotiators remained true to type. Even when they had been overruled and some compromise had been struck at the foreign minister level, they would try to walk the decisions back, or at least get us to pay a price for Soviet movement.

Nevertheless, the new Soviet leadership paved the way for four summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev. The first took place in Geneva—it was a get-to-know-you meeting, which included the famous fireside chat. The second was not to have been a summit meeting at all but simply a weekend get-together session at Reykjavik. However, it turned out to be a very important meeting. The third summit meeting took place in Washington in December 1987. At this summit meeting there was some progress made on START, but the main accomplishment was an agreement on the terms of the INF treaty. The fourth summit took place in Moscow in late May 1988. At this meeting the instruments of ratification of the INF treaty were exchanged.

As I mentioned earlier, the first summit was a get-to-know-you meeting. Gorbachev, although less dogmatic than Brezhnev, lectured Reagan on the evils of capitalism. He admitted some hints that the socialist economy was not working, yet revealed his ideological indoctrination. He seemed thoroughly convinced that Soviet-style socialism, with some changes, would make the grade. He talked about greed and dishonesty which he felt were inherent in Western capitalism. Reagan reminded him, gently yet firmly, that greed and corruption were more rampant, and less controllable, in the Soviet Union. Raisa Gorbachev, perhaps even a stronger ideologue than her husband, gave Nancy Reagan similar lectures.

At a postmortem after the summit, Secretary Schultz told Reagan he was going to Brussels to debrief the NATO allies on what had transpired. He mentioned that Gorbachev was going to Prague to debrief the Warsaw Pact ministers. Reagan asked if anyone thought the Warsaw Pact ministers would be interested in our
version of what occurred. None of his principal advisors thought so. But Reagan noticed I had nodded affirmatively.

"Ed seems to think they would be interested," he said. "Why don’t we call Prague and find out?"

I called our ambassador in Prague, Jay Niemczyk, an old friend. He said he thought it was a good idea and would check with the Jakes government. In an hour he called back with a favorable reply. I then called Warsaw, and in similar fashion received an invitation to debrief them. My response from Budapest was the same.

Armed with these three invitations, I called our ambassador in East Berlin, Rozalind Ridgeway. She personally thought it was a good idea but said she would have to check. She called back to say that the East German officials were originally cool to the idea, but since Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Hungarian officials were being briefed the East Germans did not want to be odd-man-out.

I was well received at the four capitals behind what was then the Iron Curtain. The Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians told me that the facts I presented were identical to those Gorbachev had given them, although the interpretations and policy implications were far apart. Only in East Germany did the officials contest me and argue with our interpretations.

This started a pattern which I repeated three more times during Reagan’s second term. I also traveled to Rome, where I debriefed the Pope. These discussions in Rome were as fascinating as they were personally satisfying.

Following my trips to Europe, President Reagan sent me on similar missions to Asia. I had consultations with our allies: Japan, Korea and Australia, and discussions with our friends: China. The distinction between consultations and discussions was an important one—we only consulted with allies. This pattern continued into the first year of the Bush administration. I made four trips to Europe and nine trips to the Far East during Reagan’s time and two trips to each area during Bush’s time. In addition, I made two trips to Latin American capitals for discussions there during the first year of the Bush administration.

The consultations proved to be especially worthwhile in Asia, and particularly useful in connection with the INF treaty.

Following the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting, there were several meetings between the nine arms control experts on each side, of which I was one. There was a hint at the second of these experts’ meetings that the Soviets would reduce their INF forces in Asia from 572 to 100. They had previously said they
would reduce to zero their intermediate forces to zero in Europe but that they would not reduce them at all in Asia. I advised President Reagan that the Soviets be required to reduce in Asia as well as in Europe, and he backed up my recommendation.

When I returned from Japan I debriefed Secretary Schultz and President Reagan on the hard line the Japanese had taken. I learned that the Japanese prime minister had already cabled the President saying that the INF treaty should provide for zero intermediate force warheads globally. To my pleasant surprise the President agreed and said, “Then that’s what we’ll do.” Secretary Schultz argued that a global zero position would jeopardize our getting agreement to an INF treaty and that the negotiations were, in fact, going quite well. But President Reagan issued instructions to inform the Japanese that the U.S. position would call for global zero.
It was interesting that the Japanese and the Chinese both put pressure on the Soviets through diplomatic channels to accept the global zero position.

This was done very cleverly. They did not, of course, stress that they had their interests at heart and did not want to be targeted by Soviet SS-20s. Instead, they pointed to the difficulties we in the U.S. would have during the ratification process with verification, since zero was easier to verify than some finite number. Furthermore, they pointed out, these missiles were mobile and could be moved so as to target Europe. Therefore the U.S. could not claim there would be no warheads targeted against Europe.

I experienced some of this diplomatic pressure applied against the Soviets. In June 1987 I attended an East-West meeting under the auspices of the United Nations at Dagomys on the Black Sea. The Soviets had high-level representatives at this conference. Bessmertnykh, who became the Soviet ambassador to the United States and was then a deputy foreign minister, attended, as well as General Chervov. Chervov, a colonel general, was in the Soviet Defense Ministry and was reportedly
a close friend and advisor to Marshal Akhromeyev, the head of the Soviet armed forces.

The Chinese representative at the Dagomys conference made quite a strong case for a global zero solution to INF. Bessmertnykh and Chervov talked to me about it and asked how strongly the U.S. felt about global zero. I told them the U.S. felt quite strongly and told them that the Japanese were adamant. They said they knew about the Japanese view because they had heard from them directly. While Bessmertnykh and Chervov made no commitments, I could see that wheels were turning. I became more convinced than ever that the Soviets wanted an agreement on INF and wanted it badly.

I also had an opportunity at Dagomys to work out with Chervov and Bessmertnykh some ideas I had about how we might treat air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in START. Chervov was quite receptive to my idea that we count all air-launched cruise missiles on a bomber as one warhead and a bomber as one missile system. We also discussed that we might simply declare how many sea-launched cruise missiles we had rather than include them in the count.

On my way home I stopped off in Moscow and talked to Karpov. He was surprised at what I told him about my discussions with Bessmertnykh and Chervov, but listened very carefully. As it turned out later in Reykjavik, these proposals were the very ones that were put forth by Akhromeyev and eventually included in START.

Q: Could you discuss some of the details of the meeting at Reykjavik?

A: Reykjavik was not planned to be a summit meeting. It came about largely because of Soviet pressure for a meeting between the get-to-know-you session in Geneva and the next summit meeting which was scheduled for the fall. But the Soviets kept making overtures about the desirability of a meeting and it became difficult for Reagan to say that he was too busy with domestic issues. As a result, Reagan decided that he and Gorbachev would meet briefly over a weekend at some place halfway between Washington and Moscow. The halfway point was chosen as Reykjavik in Iceland.

Q: Can you tell me something about the preliminaries to Reykjavik?

A: Early in 1986, Gorbachev seized the initiative in arms control. He called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The proposal was obviously designed for its propaganda effect, made obvious by the fact that Gorbachev made
his proposal public. Clearly, the Soviets were making an offer only for its effect on world opinion. Gorbachev also proposed that only U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe be reduced and not also British or French missiles. This, if it came to pass, would be a monumental breakthrough.

The dilemma facing Reagan was how to deal with Gorbachev’s proposal. Should it be dismissed simply as a propaganda ploy? Or would it be better to counter it with a concrete, detailed U.S. proposal? The President chose the second approach. As a result, we developed with great care a reply designed to smoke out whether the Soviets were indeed serious about eliminating all nuclear weapons. We also welcomed the prospect of eliminating intermediate-range missiles.

Q: What happened at Reykjavik?

A: In Reykjavik, true to form, Gorbachev tried to brush aside subjects related to the East-West relationship and to deal only with arms control. Once again, Reagan insisted that his broad agenda, including regional issues and human rights, be discussed. Despite repeated attempts by Reagan to engage Gorbachev on the broad agenda, Reagan did not succeed.

When the two leaders got around to arms control, Gorbachev repeated the proposal he had made in January that all strategic nuclear weapons be eliminated. He also said that the Soviets were prepared to talk in detail about START and INF. Reagan suggested that arms control experts get together that evening.

When we sat down in Hofdi House at 8 p.m. Saturday night, October 10, 1986, there were several surprises. The first was the composition of the Soviet team. Whereas our team consisted of the same members who had attended the previous experts’ sessions, the Soviets showed up with almost an entirely new team. The one exception was Karpov. This time their team was headed by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff of the Soviet armed forces. Two others were well-known Soviet officials heavily involved in Soviet public relations and propaganda: Georgi Arbatov and Feydor N. Fallin. Their top expert on space systems, Feydor Velikov, was at the table, as was their ambassador to the U.S., Yuli Dubinin. It was obvious from the outset that the Soviets would use the Reykjavik meetings as grist for their public relations and propaganda mills.

When I saw Marshal Akhromeyev at the table, I knew at once that the Soviets had come to Reykjavik prepared to deal. I had been involved in a similar situation once before, in Moscow in March 1977. When the Soviets were ready to move ahead in the SALT negotiations, they brought in Marshal Nikolai Ogarkhov. It
seems that whenever the Soviets were ready to strike a deal, they appointed a top military man to head their team.

Marshal Akhromeyev, a spare, bespectacled man in his 60s, was obviously in charge. When Karpov tried to intervene, Akhromeyev simply ignored him. The marshal proposed that we begin with START, proceed to INF, and then to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Akhromeyev further suggested that we build on the progress made by the experts and reduce strategic weapons to 6,000 "charges," a reduction of 50 percent. We said we could agree, but only if the aggregate number of weapons did not include individual bomber weapons. To my pleasant surprise, Akhromeyev suggested a solution along the lines Chervov, Bessmertnykh, and I had discussed in September: that is, to count bombers carrying only bombs as a single weapon in the 6,000 aggregate. This was entirely satisfactory to us. Next, Akhromeyev turned to SLCMs [sea-launched cruise missiles], and again, as Chervov, Bessmertnykh, and I had discussed, proposed that we establish separate limits for these weapons outside the aggregate. This triggered a prolonged and inconclusive discussion lasting several hours on how a SLCM limit could be verified.

During the all-night marathon session, I spoke several times to Akhromeyev. He was the only person on the Soviet side who spoke no English, and I was the only person on our side who spoke some Russian. Our one-on-one informal sessions revealed Akhromeyev’s sense of humor. When I asked him if he was one of the few remaining military men on active duty who had seen combat in World War II, he said, ‘What do you mean by world War II? Do you mean the Great Patriotic War?’

“Okay, have it your way,” I said.

He replied: "Da, ya posledneye iz Mahikan" [Yes, I’m the last of the Mahicans]. When I asked him where he had picked up that expression, he said with a wry smile, “It’s an old Russian saying.”

Some six hours after we had started, about 2 a.m., Akhromeyev offered us conditions we could accept on strategic forces and shifted to intermediate-range forces. We said we were willing to reduce globally to 200 warheads on each side, of which 100 would be in Europe. Akhromeyev said he would go us one better and proposed that we reduce to zero in Europe. We said we wanted the Soviets to reduce their forces "proportionately and concurrently" in Asia and therefore reduce them to zero as well.

"No," Akhromeyev said, "no reductions in Asia." When we pressed him to reduce in Asia, Akhromeyev replied with a typically western expression: "That
decision can only be made by someone above my pay grade.” It was clear he had no authority on this issue—it was up to Gorbachev to make that decision.

By the time the session broke up at 6 a.m., we had agreed on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms in five years—a major step forward. On INF, we agreed to reduce to zero in Europe but the Soviets would not budge on reducing any missiles in Asia. The Soviets had not brought up the thorniest issue, the reduction of all nuclear weapons.

On Sunday morning, during what was to have been the final session, Reagan and Gorbachev quickly agreed to reduce strategic forces by 50 percent. In a long session on INF, Gorbachev repeated his acceptance of zero in Europe but would not budge on reducing SS-20s in Asia. Reagan would not agree. Much to my disappointment, since I thought Reagan would get on a slippery slope, the President proposed that the sides eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles in a 10-year period. Gorbachev countered by repeating his earlier proposal that all nuclear weapons be eliminated by the year 2000.

I became nervous, hoping that Reagan would not get trapped. However, Reagan carefully began to extricate himself. He said that he too wished to see the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. However, he wanted an “insurance policy” which held on to air- and sea-launched cruise missiles until the conventional imbalance was redressed. Reagan said he wanted to assure there was "coupling of nuclear and conventional forces." He said that he did not want "to make the world safe for conventional warfare." It was a clever rejoinder, but I was still nervous. Could Reagan pull it off with Gorbachev? And if so, could he explain it to the American people?

This exchange was at the core of the controversy which the Soviets have kept alive since Reykjavik. Gorbachev subsequently repeated the assertion that Reagan assented to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This, unfortunately, was true. But Gorbachev added that Reagan agreed to eliminate all weapons by 1996 which Reagan did not do. Reagan had proposed to eliminate all weapons eventually and only the ballistic missiles by 1996. Reagan made it clear that his proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons was an eventual goal. But Gorbachev attempted to use the ambiguity to embarrass Reagan.

At this stage of the discussion, time was running out. The Reykjavik meeting was scheduled to end at 12:30 p.m., and it was already noon. Gorbachev showed himself to be a skillful debater and a clever tactician. He had Reagan over a barrel by proposing to eliminate all nuclear weapons and knew it. Reagan did not want to admit to Gorbachev, or to the world, that he opposed eliminating all nuclear weapons. In fact he had telegraphed to us that he would have liked to do so, but
respected our opinion and took our advice. He said that it was impractical to reduce all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, that it must be an eventual goal. Reagan, to our surprise, proved he could hold his own in a debate with Gorbachev. He amazed us with his dexterity and his firmness. Reagan might just pull it off.

The discussion shifted to the unresolved issue of what to do about the ABM treaty. Reagan tried to get Gorbachev to be precise on what he meant by “strengthening the ABM treaty.” Gorbachev said he meant that research on strategic defenses should be confined to ground laboratories. Since the ABM treaty has nothing in it concerning research, it confirmed our belief that Gorbachev wanted to make the ABM treaty more restrictive than the treaty specified. Reagan, annoyed by Gorbachev’s stand on the ABM treaty, saw a way of diverting the argument away from the main issue of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Reagan proposed that there be an additional session that afternoon. It was now 1:30 p.m., one hour after the meeting was to have concluded. They agreed to meet again at 3 p.m.

During lunch, President Reagan reviewed the situation with us, saying that two main issues needed clearing up. First, had he made it clear to the Soviets that we were willing to reduce ballistic missiles, but not all nuclear weapons, by 2000? We said that he had made it clear to Gorbachev, but did not trust him. It was too great an opportunity for Gorbachev not to exploit. He could appeal to world opinion that Reagan had turned down his offer to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Reagan’s counter offer of eliminating only ballistic missiles might be lost on the public. We discussed the second issue, whether or not the Soviets were serious about insisting that our SDI research program be restricted to ground laboratories? We convinced the President that Gorbachev was not seeking a reasonable solution but simply trying to kill the U.S. SDI program.

When the two leaders resumed that afternoon, they held to their respective positions. Gorbachev proposed that all nuclear weapons be reduced by the year 2000 and Reagan again made it clear that we proposed that only ballistic missiles be reduced by 1996. Reagan reiterated that we must hold out some nuclear weapons until the conventional imbalance had been redressed. Reagan went to great lengths to make his position clear. But Gorbachev would not acknowledge that he understood. The possibility remained that Gorbachev would try to embarrass Reagan publicly.

On the issue of “strengthening the ABM treaty,” Gorbachev repeated that he wanted to restrict strategic defense research to ground laboratories. Reagan called a recess and once again reviewed the situation with us. The President asked us what questions he should put to Gorbachev to smoke out whether he was seeking a reasonable solution or simply trying to kill our SDI program. Reagan asked each of us in turn whether he could safeguard U.S. interests by accepting Gorbachev’s
proposal. He did not get a unanimous opinion; most of his advisors said that he could live with Gorbachev’s proposal. But several of us told the President he was doing the right thing by not accepting limits on our SDI program. He accepted our recommendation. By late afternoon, it became obvious to Reagan that Gorbachev was intent on killing our SDI program. Accordingly, Reagan proposed that they adjourn and announce that substantial progress had been made in the START and INF areas, but none on the ABM treaty.

Immediately after the meeting, Secretary Schultz held a press conference. Tired and frustrated that no agreement had been reached on the ABM treaty and SDI issue, and worried that Gorbachev might exploit the "elimination of all nuclear weapons" issue, Schultz painted a dark picture. Only belatedly did he say that substantial progress had been made on INF and START. The press honed in on the negative aspects of the meeting and neglected its positive aspects.

Gorbachev, in his press conference, tried to exploit the "elimination of all weapons" issue. But whereas he had been skillful in debating Reagan, he was less clear in answering press queries. He appeared tired and confused. As a result he failed to capitalize on the propaganda advantage we thought was his. The Western press, used to short, crisp answers, got lost when Gorbachev went into long-winded explanations. We felt that Gorbachev had saved us, but were still not quite certain. We advised the President to report to the American people on nationwide TV the following evening.

Following the President’s address, during which Reagan did a masterful job of emphasizing the positive aspects of Reykjavik, the press stories in the United States turned around. By the end of the week, a nationwide poll indicated that 70 percent of the American people approved of the way President Reagan had handled himself at Reykjavik.

Q: What did you do after the Reykjavik meeting?

A: I left at once for Tokyo and then on to Seoul and Beijing to report on what had happened. The original foreign press accounts of Reykjavik repeated the negative stories filed the night before. However, the Japanese government took the unprecedented step of running President Reagan’s TV address live throughout all of Japan. The great communicator had succeeded again. A Japanese poll expressed a vote of confidence in the way the President had conducted himself at Reykjavik. In Seoul, I met with President Chun. He told me he strongly supported the way President Reagan had dealt with Gorbachev. In Beijing, there was a distinct shift away from their previous criticism of the positions the United States had taken at Reykjavik.
With the conclusion of Reykjavik “non-summit,” we had crossed a watershed. Reagan had extricated himself from the quagmire of eliminating all nuclear weapons and had narrowly avoided a disaster. We were pleased and somewhat surprised that Gorbachev did not return to the issue. Perhaps he would wait until he developed a greater skill in dealing with the Western press.

As for Reagan’s main objective of pursuing a broad agenda, the results were still meager. There was not much progress on regional and bilateral issues and human rights, but there had been a discussion of these issues. Still, there was some hope that arms control could be moved away from the center of our foreign policy.

Six years of firmness and patience were beginning to pay off. The Soviets had not only proposed the virtual elimination of intermediate-range forces, but indicated a willingness to reduce strategic offensive forces by 50 percent in a manner entirely acceptable to us. Only the Soviet artificial linkage of SDI to reductions stood in the way of agreement.

All in all, Reykjavik proved a success for President Reagan. He was on the right track in pursuing the objective.

Q: Can you tell me about the Washington summit?

A: The Washington summit of November 1987, the third summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, is, for the most part, remembered because the two leaders initialed the INF treaty. And it is right that it should be remembered, because the INF treaty marked a watershed in arms control. It eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles and specified that the missiles would be destroyed under the eyes of inspectors.

The final treaty, which had been “agreed in principle” at Reykjavik more than a year earlier was not achieved easily. The Soviets employed the same delaying tactics they had used earlier. They employed the eleventh-hour negotiating tactics of introducing a new item to split us from our allies. In short, they used every stratagem they had used in the past to make things difficult for us and to extract the maximum advantages for themselves.

Early in 1987, Secretary Schultz traveled to Moscow to try to get things moving. This meeting went nowhere because we discovered that our new embassy, which was nearing completion, had hundreds of bugging devices implanted into the building’s walls and beams. Soviet contractors erecting the building had not permitted us to inspect it as it was going up. Now, as the building was nearing completion some of the devices had not been completely covered up and were
discovered by our inspectors. I climbed into the attic with Secretary Schultz and saw hundreds of devices which had been blatantly placed in the building. To meet on classified matters we had to squeeze into aluminum house trailers we had shipped to Moscow. These trailers, placed in the basement of the new embassy, were shielded with antibugging material. To get classified messages to Washington we had to write them out in long hand, then have them taken by courier to Helsinki where they were typed and dispatched over secure circuits. Even our typewriters in Moscow were bugged.

In October we traveled to Moscow for one of our many sessions to try to advance START. As was our habit, we flew to Helsinki where we caught up on our jet lag and did our final internal coordination. This time a fog had settled over the area. To save a day we decided to take an overnight train to Moscow. Soviet officials said, “Sorry, no cars are available.” Undaunted, we asked-and received-cars from the Finnish government. Not only were the cars nicer than Soviet cars, but we were provided with a diner as well. Even so, the Soviets insisted on a car for their "escorts". We surmised they wanted their KGB [Soviet Committee of State Security] agents along.

As I often did to pass the time away, I took out my harmonica and played American and Russian tunes. Our people joined in on the singing and had a good time. When we arrived in Moscow the next day, news stories accused: “Rowny, the right wing hawk, of playing 'prerevolutionary tunes.'” I did not realize that my repertoire included “prerevolutionary or that the older Russian tunes were frowned upon.

Later that day I ran into Gernadi Gerosimov, an acquaintance of some years who had been editor of Pravda. “Gorbachev has decided that it is more important to influence the American public than inform his own people.” He said. “I’m now writing for Americans, and not for Soviets.” Signs of changing times.

Throughout the fall of 1987, we continued to grind away on the details of the INF treaty. The Soviets introduced new demands, such as insisting that the Pershing missiles we had built and stored in the U.S. for the Germans, be destroyed. We dug in our heels and reminded the Soviets that bilateral agreements with other nations would not be affected by U.S.-Soviet agreements.

Failing to split us from our allies, the Soviets tried to link progress in INF to concessions they wanted us to make on the ABM treaty, especially as it affected our SDI program.

In late October, just five weeks before the scheduled Washington summit, there were still 36 issues to be resolved. Unfortunately, we had reached an “agreement in principle” with the Soviets and had set a date for the signing of the treaty. As they had always done, the Soviets tried to exploit the situation and benefit by employing eleven-hour negotiating tactics. They even resorted to making new demands. Two weeks later, with three weeks left, there were 41 outstanding issues, the Soviets had added five more.

Our INF negotiator, Mike Glitman, was working night and day in Geneva to get the treaty ready. On their last Saturday in Geneva, the day before the team was scheduled to leave Geneva, there were still four unresolved issues. That morning, when Glitman went to the Soviet compound to try to resolve the remaining issues, he was told that Alexi Obukhov, his opposite number, was not available. A frustrated Glitman later learned that Obukhov had gone skiing. Not to be put off, Glitman went back to the Soviet compound Saturday evening. He was told that Obukhov was back, but was tired and would see Glitman Sunday morning.

On Sunday Glitman was able to hammer out three of the four remaining issues. The last holdout concerned a photo of the SS-20 missile the Soviets had promised us. Obukhov said there were no photos of the missile; that it was never displayed outside its canister. He produced a photo of the canister but Glitman said it would not do. The U.S. and Soviet teams nevertheless flew to Washington, the Soviets promising that when they arrived in Washington they would turn over a photo of the SS-20. When they arrived, the Soviets produced the same photo of the canister.

That night an emergency session of our team and policy makers debated what to do. The State Department considered it a trivial issue, one that should not hold up the signing ceremony scheduled to take place on Tuesday. The Defense Department thought otherwise—a promise was a promise. They argued that the Senate would not readily ratify a treaty if promises had been broken. Secretary Schultz decided to pass the issue up to Reagan for decision. Reagan made the decision readily. He said, "No tickee, no laundry; no photo, no treaty?"
On Tuesday morning Ambassador Dubinin arrived at the State Department with a photo of a SS-20. It was a poor image, obviously sent by fax to Washington overnight. The CIA looked it over and said that while it was a poor photo, it would do.

True to form, the Soviets tried one more delaying tactic at the eleventh hour. On Tuesday morning, just hours before the two o’clock signing ceremony, the Soviets reopened the question of German missiles in the United States. There was some thought of postponing the ceremony, but the President turned down that idea. We later learned that Nancy Reagan’s astrologer had picked the time for the signing of the treaty.

At 11:10 a.m., Kampelman, Nitze and I joined the President and the “core group” in the cabinet room. Gorbachev did most of the talking. He was animated and spoke in rough and blunt terms. There was some question over whether Gorbachev’s use of the word *boltat*, which he used to describe Reagan, was a slur. Reagan let it pass. Having seen Gorbachev’s smile in public, we were now seeing his “iron teeth.”

The President found it hard to get a word in edgewise. Feeling it was time for a story to break the ice, Reagan attempted to bring Gorbachev around by telling him the tale about two cab drivers. A Soviet cab driver immigrated to the United States and was asked what he would do. “I don’t know,” said the Soviet cabbie, “I haven’t decided yet.” An American cabbie emigrating to the Soviet Union was asked what he would do. “I don’t know,” said the American, “the Politburo has not yet decided.” Gorbachev was not amused. It was 1:30; the visitors and reporters were beginning to assemble in the Rose Garden.

At the last minute it was Frank Carlucci, the National Security Advisor, who came forward with a solution. He had talked to the Germans earlier. They agreed that if the Soviets made it a sticking point, rather than hold up the signing, the Germans would permit Soviet inspectors to visit the sites in the U.S. where the Germans’ missiles were stored. Although we did not like to use this solution, feeling we should stand on principle, it proved a face-saving device for Gorbachev. The signing ceremony went ahead, only a few minutes late.

That evening, at the state dinner in the White House, one would never have guessed, watching an affable and smiling Gorbachev, that he had almost derailed the signing of the INF treaty. As he sang along in Russian to Van Clibum’s playing of “Moscow Nights,* I wondered what would have happened if Carlucci had not produced a solution at the last minute. Would Gorbachev have signed? I just didn’t know. Teeth of iron? He certainly had intestines of steel.
Q: Can you tell me about the run-up to the fourth Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, the Moscow summit?

A: There were less than six months after the Washington summit left to prepare for the Moscow summit in mid-1988. It would be Reagan’s fourth and last meeting with Gorbachev.

The time was spent on three tasks: first, getting INF ratified in the Senate; second, trying to complete an agreement on START; and third, advancing Reagan’s broad agenda on human rights.

Despite the obvious advantages to the U.S. of the INF treaty, it did not enjoy smooth sailing during the Senate ratification process. There were two reasons. First, a coalition of senators led by Biden and Nunn used the ratification process of INF as a vehicle for advancing their view of the narrow versus broad interpretation of the ABM treaty. This was a red herring and only served to delay things. The second reason was that a group of other senators, led by Senator Quayle, wanted to eliminate-or at least tighten up-loopholes in the verification provisions of the INF treaty. They believed it important that INF not serve as a bad precedent for START.

Several senators and a few newspaper commentators were surprised by my strong support for INF during the Senate’s deliberations of the treaty. They had branded me as an “inflexible hawk” because of my opposition to SALT II. They believed that I was against any agreement with the Soviets. Not so. I had always maintained that I favored agreements, but only if they were equal and verifiable. The INF treaty met these criteria, and accordingly, I enthusiastically endorsed it. There had been, of course, the usual Soviet attempts to exploit loopholes and capitalize upon certain of its aspects; but, by and large, the INF treaty was a good one. It eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles from Europe and from Asia as well; and it promised to do so in a verifiable manner which included on-site inspection.

At the time I began working for the INF treaty’s ratification, there were more than 20, perhaps as many as 25, senators who expressed reservations about the treaty. President Reagan did not want to see that many votes registered against a treaty he too felt was a good one. The White House charged me with getting the negative vote down to 10.

I worked hard at this task. In some instances I was able to convince senators that such things as the lack of provisions for destroying warheads did not make for a bad treaty. In other instances I helped senators and their staffs draft proposals to the administration which they in turn negotiated with the Soviets in Geneva. These
helped close loopholes and strengthen the verification of the treaty. In the end, I surpassed the goal assigned me—only five senators voted against the treaty.

The second part of our preparation for the Moscow summit, advancing START, went less smoothly. Although we concluded that many of the remaining obstacles to START had been resolved at Reykjavik, the Soviets would not agree to the fine print. During the experts’ meetings we held with the Soviets in the spring of 1988, two things became clear. First, that the Soviets wanted to link progress in START to an advancement of their own ideas in the defense arena. They wanted to preserve the ABM treaty and the narrow interpretation they gave it. They still wanted to kill our U.S. SDI programs.

The Soviets were in no hurry to conclude a START agreement and were determined to do so only on their terms. Informal discussions I had with Marshal Akhromeyev and General Chervov convinced me that the Soviets were intent on remaining a superpower. And to remain a superpower in the face of their declining economic power and their internal political difficulties convinced them that they should retain their nuclear strength. The Soviets were willing to reduce their conventional forces because the geographic location made them confident their security would not be endangered. Besides, they needed the resources to be saved by conventional force reductions. Since strategic forces cost only one-seventh as much as conventional forces, the Soviets decided they could afford the strategic expenditures.

Faced with evidence of Soviet intransigence on START, President Reagan told Lou Cannon, in an interview, not to expect a START agreement to come out of the Moscow summit.

Our third task during the run up to the Moscow summit was to advance President Reagan’s broad agenda. In a series of ministerial meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Secretary Schultz hammered away at President Reagan’s desire to get some agreement on human rights and regional issues. Constant pressure on the Soviets’ performance in human rights was beginning to pay small but discernible dividends. However, there was little if any progress on regional affairs. The two ministers continued to talk past one another. Still, each side was able to explain its positions and elaborate on it; at the very least each side clearly understood where the other side stood.

In the preparations for the Moscow summit, I was once again struck by the important role speech writers played in gaining support for the President’s policies. Some of the fiercest interagency battles were fought—usually behind the scenes—over what went into these speeches. Several days before we left for Moscow, a speech Reagan was to give in Helsinki came across my desk. I thought it was an
excellent speech. It was full of imagery and reinforced our basic values. I sent Tony Dolan an “attaboy” note congratulating him on the speech.

On the plane to Helsinki, Tony was crestfallen. “Look what they’ve done to the speech,” he said. The State Department edited out passages about the church bells which could still ring in Helsinki. Their reasoning was that it made odious comparisons between the Finns and Soviets over the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. That was, of course, what the speech was intended to do. Moreover, they struck out the word “totalitarian,” saying it put Gorbachev in the same class as Hitler. Although Dolan was familiar with Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s “authoritarian” vs “totalitarian” arguments, he felt he was using the right word. But Dolan had written the famous “evil empire” speech, and the State Department action officers knew they had him in a vulnerable position.

I decided to weigh in. Not able to get to see Secretary Schultz, I wrote him a note. I said he obviously hadn’t seen the original speech. If he had, I added, I thought he would have left it intact. To my pleasant surprise, either because of my intervention or for some other reasons, the President gave the speech as Dolan had drafted it. It was a great speech.

I was pleased to see James Billington on the plane ride to Helsinki. Billington, an eminent Russian scholar, had written The Icon and the Axe a seminal work which explained the czars’ dual use of religion and force. Reagan was availing himself of some of the best minds in the U.S. to help him use the best arguments—and the right words—in appealing to the basic cultural and historical wellsprings of the Russians.

When the summit opened, Reagan led off, as we expected, with human rights. Although Shevardnadze had been rather passive when Schultz raised human rights at their meetings, Gorbachev now took the offensive. When Reagan spoke about political prisoners, Gorbachev talked about the "inhumanity" of capital punishment. When Reagan spoke about the inability of Soviets freely to leave the Soviet Union, Gorbachev brought up the Mexicans’ inability to freely enter the United States. Gorbachev suggested that Reagan give him a catalog of "humanitarian problems" in the United States and he would in return provide a similar catalog to Reagan. They could then, he said, work together on the combined list. Reagan was for once speechless. He was outraged at this blatant attempt to establish moral equivalence.

Reagan shifted to regional matters. He brought up the entire range of issues, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Ethiopia, Angola, and Central America. Gorbachev’s response amounted to a great deal of circumlocution and double talk.
During some of the sessions which I attended, I noted a desire by Gorbachev to emulate Reagan’s use of wit and humor to break the ice. He was not very good at telling stories—but at least he tried.

At one point Gorbachev told a self-deprecating story about *perestroika*. A man went into a bar and ordered a vodka. ‘That will be one ruble,” the bartender said. “But it was only 50 kopeks yesterday.”* “One ruble,” the bartender insisted. Given a ruble the bartender gave the customer 50 kopeks change. “We’re out of vodka,” he said, “that’s perestroika at work.

Sensing that even though Reagan laughed, the joke had fallen flat, Gorbachev tried again.

A raven saw a fox running down a path in the forest. “Why not try perestroika?” the raven asked. “When I fly backwards, you should run backwards.” The fox did so and ran into the open jaws of a wolf. As the fox was being devoured he complained to the raven. “Oh, I forgot to tell you,” the raven said, “perestroika is for high flyers only.” This time Gorbachev was pleased as Reagan laughed heartily.

Much has been written about Nancy Reagan’s behavior toward Raisa, and in my opinion unfairly. Although I had heard that Mrs. Reagan didn’t like me because I allegedly egged her husband on to expound conservative views, I must say that what I observed of her in Moscow was exemplary. I was present at the famous Moscow museum incident. Nancy Reagan had arrived at the appointed hour and was kept waiting for almost half an hour for Raisa Gorbachev to appear. When she did arrive, Raisa did so with a crowd of reporters who had been following her. After perfunctorily greeting Nancy, Raisa launched into a diatribe on the “obvious superiority” of Russian art over America’s. Although Mrs. Reagan’s knuckles went white, to her credit she restrained herself and did not answer Mrs. Gorbachev in kind. I was disappointed that the reporters—at least the American ones—did not praise Nancy Reagan for the restraint she showed under such difficult and provocative circumstances.

President Reagan gave a memorable speech during the Moscow summit at the Moscow university. It was a tour de force. A thousand students, undoubtedly hand-picked by Soviet authorities, were assembled to hear the President. They were prepared to be polite, but also prepared not to be persuaded. Reagan cut his 40 minute speech to 20 minutes, giving only the topic sentences and conclusion of his prepared speech. It was a soft but polished sales pitch on the virtues of the capitalist system. Reagan’s simple eloquence, his sincerity, and his conviction got through to the audience.
But it was during the question and answer period, which lasted an hour, that Reagan won them over. The students were taking part in something they had obviously never experienced before. Here was the head of a superpower, the most powerful nation on earth and one they had been taught was their enemy, answering questions candidly, clearly, and logically. In an hour’s time Reagan gave them a basic course in civics, the likes of which they had never heard before and would not soon forget. I must confess that I was transfixed by the way Reagan simply and convincingly answered their toughest questions. When he finished they gave him a standing ovation. He had even gotten to me, even though I had heard much of this before. I applauded too, unabashedly proud of our President.

On the previous evening, I had been at the state dinner hosted by the Gorbachevs. It was standard fare—a heavy meal, boring dinner conversation, and long toasts.

The Reagans' return dinner was different; a replica of the ‘beautiful people’ state dinners which had become the Reagans’ trademark. When the guests began to arrive, I was amazed at who had been invited: Soviet ballet stars, athletes, priests, rabbis, and dissidents. Raisa Gorbachev appeared startled also, at times seeming to hold back rather than shake hands with the guests, most of whom she had never met and didn’t want to meet.

At my table Gromyko sat on my right and Sakharov on my left. Other seats were filled by a ballerina, a wrestler, and a priest. I sat next to the famous Soviet mass production cataract surgeon. He said he would operate on me and charge nothing. I declined.

Our meal included New England clam chowder, grilled Kansas City steaks, green asparagus and Idaho baked potatoes. All of this was accompanied by delicious California wines. For dessert we had deep-dish apple pie and ice cream.

After dinner there were no speeches. Reagan simply delivered a short toast and before Gorbachev could respond the music struck up at Reagan’s signal. He asked Raisa to dance. An embarrassed Gorbachev shuffled around the floor with Nancy. The Gorbachevs had been to a dinner like this in Washington, but I’m certain never expected to attend one like it in Moscow. Unlike the 10 p.m. curfew at Soviet dinners, the guests stayed long after the Gorbachevs’ and Reagans’ departure.

We had one more half-day’s work in Moscow. This was reserved for beating out the final communique. It contained nice words, of course, about the ratification of the INF treaty. But then there was a great deal of sparring to see which side could get in its own wording to influence the outcome of START. For the most part, this portion of the communique was devoted to papering over the differences;
neither side wanted to be blamed for the lack of progress on START. But the most difficult part had to do with the words “peaceful coexistence” which Gorbachev wanted in the communique. He wanted to be able to tell the important CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] conference that the Soviet Union had not only achieved superpower status but that the U.S. had adopted the Soviet approach to foreign policy.

The problem was compounded because Reagan, in an earlier meeting with Gorbachev, said he agreed that “peaceful coexistence* was important. Gorbachev accordingly insisted that the words be included in the communique, stating that Reagan had agreed. However, a startled set of U.S. advisors told Reagan he couldn’t agree to such wording. Reagan was uncomfortable, but did not want to disagree with his staff. The impasse went right down to the wire. The final ceremony at which the instruments of the INF ratification were to be exchanged was delayed 30 minutes. Gorbachev was adamant that “peaceful coexistence” be included; and Reagan, flanked by his advisors, was determined that it not appear. In the end, Reagan won out. An angry Gorbachev, red-faced and muttering to himself, initialed the communique.

Reagan’s final summit meeting with Gorbachev was a success. He had succeeded in getting the Soviets to agree to, and the Senate to ratify, the INF treaty. And Gorbachev finally admitted that the Soviets would get out of Afghanistan. But the greatest achievement was Reagan’s success at getting the Soviets to address his broad agenda of human rights and foreign policy issues. Reagan had kept his eye on the objective which was now being accomplished. It was a fitting legacy to leave to his successor.

Q: We finished then with the fourth and last of the summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev in May of 1988, almost in time for the elections to come about. Were you involved in those elections?

A: Yes, I checked and found out that the terms of my appointment did not put me under the Hatch Act. Accordingly, I campaigned for candidate, then Vice President, Bush. I made my usual rounds of talking to audiences that were interested in arms control. I also spoke to audiences which had an interest in defense. I spoke, for example, to the National War College graduates because I was then the president of their alumni association. I also talked to ethnic groups, primarily to Poles but also to Hungarians and Czechs. In other words, I campaigned on several levels simultaneously. I also wrote several op-ed pieces in favor of Bush, saying that his views on foreign policy were diametrically opposed to those of Governor Dukakis. I was delighted that Bush won by a handsome margin.
As is customary after an election, I submitted my resignation. But I was told that President-elect Bush wanted me to stay on until further notice. Accordingly, I continued to operate in the same capacity as formerly as special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for arms control matters.

It was heartwarming to me that two days before he left office, President Reagan presented me with the Citizen’s Medal of Freedom.

Q: Regarding the groups that you talked to during the period of time of Bush’s election campaign, were they pro-Bush or were they people that you were trying to convince to keep the Reagan-Bush stand on arms control?

A: The people I talked to were generally well disposed toward the Reagan-Bush philosophy. I was, for the most part, trying to convince them that it was important to get out and vote, and vote the right way. The groups I talked to were not hostile audiences and generally the questions were benign. I was trying to ensure that people who felt disposed toward Reagan would in fact vote for Bush. It was more an insurance policy of holding onto our friends than trying to convert our enemies.

Q: I gather you felt that your speeches were rather well received?

A: Yes. I felt I helped bring along the people who were pro-defense and interested in arms control. Eight years earlier a large number of people were skeptical over whether Reagan was or was not in favor of arms control. They now saw the evidence; he brought home a very satisfactory INF treaty. One of the questions I was asked quite often was whether I, in fact, favored the INF treaty. I said I did mainly because it eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and had good verification provisions. I thought good verification provisions would stand us in good stead for later treaties like a strategic arms treaty [START].
I was quick to point out that signing the INF treaty did not mean that peace was about to break out all over. I emphasized that I continued to favor a START treaty, provided it would be equitable and effectively verifiable.

Q: After President Bush was elected, what did you learn about your permanent status?

A: I heard sometime in April that Paul Nitze, who had also been asked to stay on until further notice, was asked by Secretary Baker to become an “advisor emeritus.” Nitze would not remain in government, but would be called upon from time to time to give advice. He turned this down and submitted his resignation. I wondered what they had in store for me. Several weeks later I got a call asking if I would stay on indefinitely in my current position. I talked this offer over with several White House officials. I also spoke to Larry Eagleburger, Baker’s deputy, and with Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security advisor. I learned that President Bush and Secretary Baker wanted me to stay on. I didn’t answer them right away because I had lined up a job to teach at George Washington University. I was reluctant to stay on because President Bush let it be known that he would deal with an overall set of advisors, and that my views would be transmitted to him not personally, but in writing. But I decided I would have a role to play, although limited, in giving the negotiations some continuity. I knew the issues, knew the Soviets, and knew the players on our side. Since I thought I could make a contribution, I decided to stay on.

Because of the long clearance process, it was not until Friday, June 16, 1989, that the White House made its official announcement that the President had appointed me to remain as special advisor to the Secretary of States and the President for arms control matters.

In the meantime, I had attended the first substantive meeting that Secretary Baker had with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. Following that meeting I traveled once again to debrief our Asian allies and friends on the talks. Actually, I was the last U.S. official in Beijing at the time the students were demonstrating. I left China the day that Gorbachev arrived for his official visit. Several days later the shooting occurred in Tianinen Square.

In early June, after the NATO summit, President Bush sent me to Mexico and Brazil to debrief officials there. I had an hour-long meeting with the President of Mexico and another hour with his foreign minister. I also met with congressional groups and people from other walks of life. I repeated the same pattern in Brazil. On this first trip to Brazil I didn’t see the president—the highest man I saw there was the foreign minister. As in Mexico they were grateful to learn about what
happened at the summit. I made similar visits later, extending them to Argentina and Chile.

Q: The next landmark was the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta, December 1989. Can you tell me something about the preliminaries leading up to Malta and about the meeting itself?

A: President Bush, after he was elected, started out carefully and deliberately in arms control. He said he wanted his to be a Bush I and not a Reagan III administration. He would wait until his administration sorted out its policies before proceeding further on arms control.

Q: What kinds of things needed sorting out?
A: The Bush administration was not certain where it wanted to go with a number of its strategic programs. The biggest unanswered question was what to do about land-based mobile systems. The Soviets had developed a rail-mobile system, the SS-24s, about the size of our M-X which also carried 10 warheads on each missile. The Soviets had several dozen SS-24s deployed, some on rail cars and some in fixed silos. The Soviets had also developed and deployed several hundred SS-25s. These were single warhead road mobile systems. The United States, on the other hand, was still trying to decide how to deploy its M-X missile; whether to place it on rail cars or deploy it in fixed silos. Secretary of Defense Cheney favored the M-X on rail cars. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, however, favored developing and deploying the Midgetman, our version of the Soviet’s single warhead road mobile system.

The Congress was also split. Some legislators favored a rail-mobile M-X; others preferred the rail-mobile Midgetman. President Bush, always the great compromiser and wishing to be “prudent,” asked the Congress for funds to develop both systems.

Another undecided question was the extent to which the U.S. should produce B-2 bombers. The B-2 was becoming more and more expensive. President Bush asked the Congress for money for the 132 B-2s the Air Force said it required to cover our SIOP [strategic integrated operational plan] targets. Congressional leaders said they would back no more than 50. The difficulty with this was that 132 B-2s was the number needed by the Air Force to cover the targets after we reduced the specified number of missiles under the impending START agreement.

Thus, the United States was faced with a split within the administration and also a split between the administration and the Congress.

About this time there was a week-long visit to the United States by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, had invited Akhromeyev to the United States for a series of briefings and conversations. He also offered him visits to Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps installations. I did not tour the states with Akhromeyev but talked to the marshal before he left the United States. On his last day, shortly before he left, I had an hour-long private conversation with Akhromeyev.

Akhromeyev was highly impressed by what he saw at our Army training camps, and especially by the razzle-dazzle of our special forces. He was also quite impressed by the sophistication of our tanks and other equipment, and by the caliber, state of training, and morale of our soldiers. He was given a ride in a B-2 and flew by computer at high speeds at 300 feet.
During his visits to Air Force installations, he was struck by the number of women the U.S. had in its armed services. The Soviet Union had less than 1/2 of 1 percent females whereas the U.S. had about 10 percent. On one occasion he went down the line of an Air Force crew, starting with the most junior member. When he got to the next to the last in line, he asked him what his job was. "I'm the deputy crew chief," he said.

"And who do you work for?" asked the marshal.

"For her, the crew chief," he said.

An astonished Akhromeyev gallantly kissed the fingertips of the female crew chief.

But Akhromeyev was most impressed by our Navy. He was taken aboard an aircraft carrier and astonished to see planes taking off and landing at night. He was shown two Navy fighters taking off simultaneously, at night, from a carrier. He told me he had witnessed "the impossible."

Akhromeyev told me that the Soviet army was badly in need of sophisticated equipment; it could not begin to match that of the United States. He also said he was impressed by our noncommissioned officers. Enlisted men were commanded by officers in the Soviet Union with no in-between set of experienced, career enlisted men. He said that one of the reforms he would undertake was the development of a noncommissioned officer corps. He said he was impressed by the honesty and frankness of the soldiers he met. "They think for themselves and are not taught by rote like our brainwashed soldiers. They will undoubtedly show initiative on the battlefield," he added, "something we can't even count on our officers to do."

Akhromeyev told me he was a true believer in the Communist system. "But the system will need to reform," he said, "so the economy can afford a first-class military establishment. One of the ways to save money," he added, "is to reduce our oversized conventional forces."

He said he was a believer in conventional arms control, but said that the U.S. should expect only token reductions in the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

"The Soviet Union wants to be perceived as a superpower," Akhromeyev said, "and the only way to be acknowledged as having that status is to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The Soviets understand that the U.S. public wants arms agreements across-the-board," he added, "and, therefore, the USSR will press for naval arms control; since we are a land power, we would benefit from such agreements."

He said that the Soviets recognize that strategic defenses are necessary and inevitable. The Soviet Union will continue to develop and deploy
strategic defenses but will exploit our ambivalence by fanning anti-SD1 sentiment in the United States.

My net impression of Akhromeyev was that he was a professional military man who would strive to reform the Soviet armed forces. But at the same time, he was a true believer in Communism who believed, like his patron Gorbachev, that the system could, in time, be reformed.

Q: To get back to the pre-Malta preparations, I understand that Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Wyoming in the fall of 1989. Can you tell me something about that meeting?

A: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev apparently decided that it would be a good idea if their foreign ministers had preliminary discussions prior to the principal getting together. Accordingly, Baker invited Shevardnadze to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. He thought that in such relaxed surroundings, away from their respective capitals, they could have more extensive and more leisurely talks.

The weather cooperated, and in the late Indian summer, many of the meetings were conducted out of doors. The Soviets were able to ride horseback, fish, and hike on the trails of the great Western countryside. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves. One of the Soviet experts commented on what a great country America was. “Here in your Siberia,” he said, “one can go to a supermarket and buy fresh meat and vegetables and even frozen fish.”

Another one of their experts wanted to take home some souvenirs. Approaching a saleslady, he said, "Do you speak any Russian?" “No,” she said. "I know only one word: vodka.” “Don’t you know what perestroika is?” he asked. “No,” she said, “I’m a teetotaler.”

The meetings on arms control, while not overly productive, were nevertheless reported in an upbeat tone. Shevardnadze dropped his insistence that there be a separate treaty on defense and space, which he had previously linked to a START treaty. However, he built in one of the Soviets’ typical loopholes. Linkage would be dropped, he said, if “both sides would continue to comply with the ABM treaty as signed in 1972.” The Soviets, in other words, were harking back to their insistence on the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty. It was their way of putting us on notice that they had no intention of abandoning their policy of stifling the United States strategic defense developments.

Shevardnadze also said that the Soviets were willing to conclude an agreement on sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCMs] separate from the actual START treaty.
Here again, however, there was a catch. Shevardnadze said SLCMs could be dealt with in the same manner that the Backfire bomber had been handled in SALT II. He should have realized that this was a nonstarter; the U.S. had no intention of getting sucked into another “backfire solution” in which the Soviets simply excluded a class of international strategic systems from the SALT II treaty.

Despite these paltry moves, laden with conditions favorable to the Soviets, Baker praised what he called “positive developments. It was the standard language diplomats use when they want to put a good face on a poor state of affairs. Their hope is that progress will be made if they describe negotiations in a favorable light. Raker even went further. He said, "We have, in my view, moved from confrontation to dialogue and now to cooperation.”

Shevardnadze, not to be outdone, responded: "I will say without any exaggeration, these talks have placed Soviet-American dialogue at a new stage.” Their disclaimers notwithstanding, both Baker and Shevardnadze had indulged in serious exaggerations.

Baker threw a lavish barbecue party at the conclusion of the talks, at which each of the Soviets was given a red bandanna and a Texas-style hat. Baker did even better by Shevardnadze, presenting him with a custom-made pair of cowboy boots. Shevardnadze, impressed that Baker had gone to the trouble to learn his measurements, reciprocated with a highly unusual gift. He gave Raker an antique icon, saying that he knew Baker was deeply religious. It was an ironic situation; the avowed atheist Shevardnadze gave Christian Baker a gift with religious overtones. An embarrassed Baker sheepishly accepted the gift.

Q: Why was Malta picked as the meeting place for the summit?

A: When I heard where the meeting was to take place, I raised an objection because of the connotation that a meeting in the seaport of Malta would involve naval arms control. But it was too late; preparations were already in motion. The location had been suggested to the President by his younger brother, an international businessman who thought the island provided a “charming setting” for a summit.

President Bush’s idea of meeting in Malta was similar to President Reagan’s idea of meeting at Reykjavik. The two leaders would meet at some out-of-the-way place where hotel space and communications facilities were limited, thus theoretically reducing the amount of attention the world media would devote to the meeting. But just as it had in Reykjavik, the plan boomeranged; reporters and TV commentators turned out in full force.
The meeting, Bush said, would be devoted to general discussions and no specific arms control matters would be taken up. Because of the general nature of the discussions and the limited facilities at Malta, it was decided that no arms control experts would travel with the President. Rather, we were to stand by our telephones to answer questions that might come up.

It was just as well that we didn’t travel to Malta. A severe storm blew up which disrupted the meetings. Malta suffered a storm, the likes of which had not been seen in the Mediterranean in a decade. The high seas and 60-mile per hour winds kept Bush from leaving the cruiser Belnap for his scheduled meeting with Gorbachev on the Soviet warship Slava. On the second day, an impatient Bush took off for a meeting with Gorbachev on the Soviet pleasure boat Maxim Gorky. By deciding to brave the elements, Bush’s critics said he was trying to live down his “wimp image.” The admiral’s barge in which he made the trip was described as bouncing around like a cork in a bathtub. After five attempts to board the Maxim Gorky in the high seas and howling wind, Bush made it on the sixth try. He could have saved himself the trouble; Gorbachev did not risk leaving the Slava.

When the two leaders finally got together, Bush immediately moved to bolster Gorbachev’s position in the Soviet Union and internationally. Making certain that the reporters were within earshot, Bush told Gorbachev, “You are dealing with an administration that wants to see the success of what you are doing. The world would be a better place if perestroika succeeds.”

I was surprised that Gorbachev did not reply personally. His spokesman, Gennadi Gerasamov, said that the talks were “excellent” and that “the Cold War is over.” This was the first official statement on either side announcing the end of the Cold War. However, to Bush’s advisors, such a statement appeared premature and overly optimistic. Alarmed that the rhetoric overstated the case, Bush’s aides acted quickly to dampen the euphoria. America’s offers to help perestroika would evaporate, they said, if the Soviets did not clean up their act in Central America.

Q: Was arms control discussed at Malta?

A: Yes. Despite Bush’s intention to stay away from substantive discussions on arms control, Gorbachev brought up START and CFE. The desultory discussions in an acknowledgement from both leaders that START had a number of issues yet to be resolved and that little progress had been made. As for CFE, Bush accepted Gorbachev’s suggestion that a 23-nation conference be scheduled in Berlin to clear up the remaining obstacles.
Toward the end of the Malta meeting, Baker and Shevardnadze worked for three hours trying to hammer out a joint communique on START that would show that some progress had been made. But they got nowhere because, in fact, there had been no progress.

In an otherwise gloomy atmosphere, there was one glimmer of hope. Some movement had taken place on one of President Bush’s pet issues: chemical weapons. The two leaders pledged to end all production and to destroy almost all existing stocks of chemical weapons within ten years. As insurance, Bush insisted that the U.S. keep 500 tons of chemical weapons until all other countries capable of producing such munitions signed an agreement banning them. This idea of maintaining a stockpile did not sit well with critics, both abroad and at home. Later, in May 1991, President Bush succumbed to media pressure and dropped his insistence that the U.S. keep a stock of chemical munitions. In its place, he adopted a policy that had a good ring to it as a public relations ploy but was still quite safe. The United States would destroy all chemical stocks if the other chemical-producing nations signed a verifiable treaty banning chemical weapons.

It was a safe proposal because no one would hold his breath until a treaty with verifiable provisions could be worked out.

The two leaders did agree at Malta that Baker and Shevardnadze would meet in January 1990 to tackle the three largest stumbling blocks in START: air-launched cruise missile [ALCM] ranges and counting rules; non-deployed missiles; and telemetry encryption.

When President Bush returned from Malta, I found that he had a new assignment for me. This time, in addition to debriefing the three Asian countries—that is, Japan, Korea and Australia (I did not go to China because Tiananmen Square was still fresh in our minds)—the President sent me to Mexico and Brazil. His thought was that the Latin America leaders felt that too much attention was being put on European affairs and not enough on affairs in our own hemisphere.

My visits to Mexico and Brazil proved very profitable. I was especially impressed by the youth and vigor of President Salinas of Mexico. In our preliminary conversation, I told Salinas I had heard a rumor that his three young children were attending Japanese schools in Mexico City. Salinas said it wasn’t a rumor, that the story was correct. When I asked him why he would send his children to a Japanese school, his answer was, “Where else will they learn a good work ethic except in a Japanese school?” To me it was a clear indication of Salinas’ attitude toward hard work and his determination to turn around the Mexican economy.
In Brazil I was received by the earetaker government. The president of Brazil had died after he was elected and before he was to have taken office, and an unpopular leader took over the government. Nevertheless, the Brazilian officials were cordial and quite flattered that President Bush would send a personal envoy to meet with them.

After the Malta meeting, it was obvious that Gorbachev and Bush were both anxious to move ahead on CFE and START. As planned, Baker and Shevardnadze met in Geneva in January 1990. However, no progress was made on arms control. President Bush, observing the collapse of communism in Europe, made the mistake of thinking that Gorbachev would rush to conclude a strategic arms agreement. He made the further mistake of announcing that START would be initialed at a June summit in 1990. He did not listen to the advice of those of us who had been through the experience of SALT II. In the past, external events had put no pressure on the Soviets to move towards arms agreements. There was little evidence that the Soviets would change their habits. As in the past, setting a deadline would only put U.S. negotiators under pressure to make concessions in order to meet a deadline.

Despite my misgivings, the Washington summit was held from May 30 to June 3, 1990. As I had predicted in January, the meetings yielded no breakthroughs on arms control. Determined to make it a significant public relations event, Bush pulled a surprise by bringing up the issue of trade. The President, anxious to bolster Gorbachev, gave him a concrete bonus to take home to the Soviet Union, which was hemorrhaging economically. Bush modified his stand that he would not sign a trade agreement until Gorbachev made concessions on other issues. Before the summit, Bush had wisely announced that there would be no trade agreement until the Soviet Union passed legislation codifying the right of the Soviet peoples to emigrate freely and until there was a let-up of pressure on the Baltic states seeking independence. Now, in his desire to prop up Gorbachev, the President was retreating from his earlier conditions.

Gorbachev was grateful for Bush’s help with his domestic problems. But this did not cause him to be more forthcoming on arms control. The usual situation was now reversed. Instead of the Soviets raising arms control, it was now the United States that tried to get the Soviets to discuss it. Hoping to make some progress, Bush attempted to engage Gorbachev in informal discussions on arms control.

Either because Gorbachev felt he stood to lose out in such encounters at this time, or perhaps because his advisors were nervous about letting him act on his own, Gorbachev shunned Bush’s invitation for informal get-togethers. Gorbachev flatly refused to go to Kennebunkport, Bush’s Maine vacation home. Bush then tried to get Gorbachev to spend several days with him at Camp David. Gorbachev would
agree to only a ten-hour session, insisting that he had to get back to the Soviet Embassy in Washington to attend to “other business.” It was not clear what “other business” was more important than meeting with Bush. It may have been that Gorbachev was at that time having difficulty with the politburo and army officials. But for whatever reason, Gorbachev was now playing hard to get when it came to one-on-one informal sessions.

Retirement

Q: Didn’t you decide to retire in June 1990 after the Washington summit?

A: Yes. After the Washington summit, I felt that my usefulness to the President as an arms control advisor was coming to an end. There had been no clear-cut differences between the President and myself on major issues, yet the general trend of events was not to my liking. The way in which I was required to give my advice was tolerable, but only barely so. I felt that I was no longer a major player on the President’s team and that my views were not being taken sufficiently into account. I went to see John Sununu, the President’s chief of staff, and asked his advice. He told me he was not surprised at how I felt, adding that he marvelled I had continued to function under such difficult conditions for so long. He said that Secretary Baker was Bush’s principal, and at times only, advisor on arms control and that Baker overshadowed the other three principal advisors: National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Colin Powell. When I asked Sununu if there was some way I could improve my situation, he said he thought not.

I said that under the circumstances I would submit my resignation, effective June 30, 1990. I told Sununu that I would not make a big issue of my resignation, or take it to the press. He said he thought this was best; if I were to indicate that I was resigning in protest over the way I was being treated, the administration would simply paper things over. But in the long-run, he said, nothing would change. On my last day in office, Marlin Fitzwater made a simple announcement that I had resigned. The reporters asked him several questions, but he referred them to me. I was asked if I was resigning in protest or because of major policy differences with the Bush administration. Since I agreed with Sununu that airing my unhappiness about how I was being used would serve no useful purpose, I said only that I thought it was time for me to leave. President Bush’s action was predictable. He sent me a nice letter, thanking me for "the contribution I had made to U.S. arms control policies."

Q: What happened to START after you resigned?
In the fall of 1990 and early months of 1991, Bush was preoccupied with Operation Desert Storm, resulting in the remaining START issues taking a back seat. Shevardnadze had resigned abruptly on December 15, 1990, and was replaced as foreign minister by Alexander Bessmertnykh, the able Soviet ambassador to the United States. All of Baker’s careful nurturing of his relationship with Shevardnadze went to naught. Baker should have known better; our relationship with the Soviet Union does not depend on the personal rapport between high-level officials. Still, it continues to be a misperception on the part of Americans that Soviets will repay our acts of kindness by changing their positions on policy issues.

President Bush had scheduled a meeting with Gorbachev for early January 1991. Although I was no longer a part of the administration, I let several of my friends close to the President know that I thought a meeting at this time was not a good idea. The reasoning behind my advice was that the Soviet Union had used force to crush the independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia, and that Bush should show his displeasure by not meeting with Gorbachev. The President did, in fact, cancel the meeting. However, the reason he gave for doing so was that he was too involved with the Gulf war. While I was pleased that Bush did not meet with Gorbachev, I would have preferred his using my reason for not doing so.

Several days later, the Soviet Union tried to get into the act during the Gulf war. Although the Soviets had committed no forces, they tried to convene a meeting between Iraq and the coalition in which the Soviets would play a major role. President Bush, having read their intentions correctly, politely and firmly outmaneuvered them. What is more, the Soviet Union had backed the U.S. in its proposal that the UN apply sanctions against Iraq. It was a rare display of how to deal with the Soviet Union and a pair of diplomatic triumphs for President Bush.

After Iraq was defeated, didn’t President Bush call for a summit meeting?

Yes. Following the cessation of hostilities, the administration floated a trial balloon. It said that Bush would be willing to meet with Gorbachev at a summit, whether or not a START treaty would be ready for signature. This idea of attending summits as a routine event, separate from progress on arms control, was a policy I had been recommending ever since Bush became President. Summit meetings, in my opinion, should be held on a routine basis and not tied to the successful outcome of negotiations on a treaty. Predicting progress always works against us; the Soviets invariably use rising expectations that there will be an agreement as a way of extracting concessions from us.
However, there was an immediate outcry from the leaders of the inside-the-beltway arms control community. They said that Bush should make the completion of START a precondition for the summit meeting. That same day, within hours after his original statement, Fitzwater said that the President preferred to go to a summit when START was ready for signature. The next morning, reporters asked Bush which of his spokesman’s statements they should believe. "Both of Fitzwater's statements are correct." Bush said. It was a typical Bush fence-straddling response.

Later in the spring of 1991 the President made several statements assuring the public that the unresolved START issues were "merely technical." These statements raised questions as to whether or not the President was being adequately briefed on the critical differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the very least, it betrayed a significant contradiction. If the remaining problems were strictly "technical" in nature, why didn’t Bush accept the Soviet positions and sign the agreement? The obvious answer was that the remaining issues were actually of critical importance and not as easily resolvable as the President would have us believe.

By mid-June of 1991, Washington was rife with rumors of an impending U.S.-Soviet summit. Nevertheless, acting chief START negotiator, Lynton Brooks, reported that there were approximately 100 issues still awaiting resolution. Of these, four were major obstacles that struck at the very heart of the treaty.

Perhaps the most important was the long-standing dispute over the Soviets’ heavy missiles. The original intent of the START negotiations was to cut in half the number of highly destabilizing, heavy land-based Soviet ICBMs. It would be accompanied by a prohibition on the testing and modernization of the remaining force. This would pave the way for the eventual technological obsolescence-and hence retirement-of all heavy missiles. The Soviets have, however, continued to improve the accuracy of their heavy missiles. Even a 50 percent reduction in their current force of SS-18 Mod-5s would provide them with the same destructive capability as their entire original heavy missile force.

A second major stumbling block concerned the “downloading* of missile warheads. In an effort to appear less threatening, the Soviets offered to place only three warheads on their SS-N-18, submarine-launched ballistic missiles which were capable of carrying seven warheads. Although this was an encouraging sign and in keeping with the U.S. desire to reduce the number of MIRVed missiles, it soon became evident that the Soviets did not intend to destroy the extra four warheads per missile. The Soviets wanted to have the SS-N-18 counted as a three-warhead missile. But they also wanted to maintain their ability to more than double that force in a crisis by holding on to their excess warheads. Since there is no sure-fire
method of verifying the number of MIRV [multiple independent reentry vehicle] warheads a missile can carry, the Soviets were asking us to trust them. To make matters worse, the Soviets tried the same ploy with their SS-24 rail-mobile ICBMs, “downloading” them from 10 to 5 warheads, while holding on to the extra weapons.

The third major issue concerned the Soviets’ refusal to exchange missile telemetry data that the U.S. consider critical for monitoring compliance with the treaty.

Finally, there was a dispute over how to define a “new type” missile. The Soviets refused to agree that throw-weight, the best measure of a weapon’s potential capability, be taken into account. All of these problems were complex and difficult to resolve. For President Bush to refer to them as merely technical was misleading.

Q: Didn’t the preparations for a summit begin in July 1991?

A: Yes. Several days prior to the opening of the opening of the G-7 economic summit in London in July, President Bush wrote Gorbachev, asking him to send a high-level representative to Washington who would be empowered to make decisions on the remaining issues of START. To the utter dismay of our negotiating team in Geneva, Bush provided Gorbachev with the U.S. “bottom line” on each of the major issues. He told Gorbachev that he wanted to wrap up START in a hurry. He also indicated the concessions he was ready to make to get an agreement. Gorbachev was, of course, delighted with Bush’s moves. He sent Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh to meet with Secretary Baker. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that when Bush left for London all but one of the issues had been resolved.

The remaining issue concerned how to define a new type missile. The Soviets were obviously playing to the public galleries. They wanted to build suspense to highlight the upcoming summit meeting. At the last minute, during a luncheon following the G-7 meetings, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to a “new type” definition. The Soviets agreed to include throw-weight as a criterion, even though the throw-weight could be increased by 21 percent before it would make the missile a "new type." The two leaders declared that the last obstacle to START had been overcome and that the treaty would be initialed at a Moscow summit July 29-31, 1991.

Q: Was START signed in late July?
Yes. The START treaty was signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991. It received relatively little attention in the public media because most of the attention was paid to Gorbachev’s attempts to build support for his economic goals. In their press conference following the signing of the START treaty, President Bush hailed it as the first agreement to call for the actual reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev also praised the treaty but predicted—accurately I believe—that the treaty would encounter difficulties in the ratification process.

Public sentiment in the United States was mixed. In a McNeil-Lehrer broadcast on July 31, 1991, the commentator accurately expressed the views of three groups. The first group was represented by Paul Warnke, President Carter’s chief negotiator of SALT II, who hailed START as a significant beginning to the reduction of additional weapons. Max Kampelman, who had taken over the START negotiations after Senator Tower’s resignation, also praised the agreement. However, he saw its value in political rather than military terms. I represented a third and more skeptical group. I said that President Reagan had charged me with achieving a 50 percent reduction of weapons, and that while I welcomed any reduction of nuclear weapons, the treaty only accomplished half of Reagan’s goals. It would reduce weapons by only 30 percent. Moreover, it was not verifiable in many of its most important aspects. I said that in view of the Soviets’ having violated every agreement it entered into: the ABM treaty, the INF agreement, the CFE agreement, and the chemical/biological convention, the Senate had its work cut out for it and would have to make the treaty more watertight. I added that the Senate also had a great deal of work to do to assure that we had an insurance policy by developing our strategic defenses.

A week before the START treaty was signed, Senators Nunn and Warner reached an agreement which was approved by a vote of 14-4 in the Senate Armed Services Committee. They proposed that the administration deploy 100 ground-based defensive missiles, as permitted by the ABM treaty. They also called upon the administration to attempt to renegotiate the ABM treaty, as called for in its provisions. Importantly, they proposed the continuation of research on space-based sensors. On the McNeil-Lehrer program I praised the Nunn-Warner proposal as a positive step in the right direction and was pleased that Max Kampelman agreed. Warnke was predictably against the Senate action; he called strategic defenses “pie in the sky.”

Within 24 hours after its signing, the START story dropped off the front pages of the newspapers. Most editorial writers praised the agreement for reducing weapons, but several said that so many nuclear weapons would still remain in the arsenals of both sides that the treaty had little military significance. We shall have to wait and see how the Senate approaches the treaty during the ratification process.
Q: Let me go back to the time you resigned in late June 1990. Didn’t you then take a trip to Czechoslovakia and Poland?

A: Yes. I went to Czechoslovakia on June 30, 1990, shortly after I left the government, and then on July 1st on to Poland. My trip to Prague was at the invitation of the Czechoslovakian government to take part in a week-long symposium on how to bring democracy to Czechoslovakia and how to further its economic development. The interesting thing to me was that while I was no longer an official representative of the United States, I was treated very cordially, even royally. I had numerous meetings with high-level officials, for example: Mr. Diensbier, Father Maly, and Vaclav Havel.

You will recall that I had gone to Czechoslovakia in 1985 after the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit. I went again in 1986 at the invitation of the Czechoslovakian government.

Before my second trip I put down a proviso that I would go only if I were allowed to talk to the dissidents [the signers of Charter 77] if they wanted to talk to me. To my pleasant surprise, the Jakes government said I should come and that they would tender an invitation to the dissidents to meet with me. At that 1986 meeting I met with about 12 dissidents in a three-hour meeting. The group included Havel, Diensbier, Father Maly, Rita Klimova, and several others who have since come to power. It was very encouraging to me to see in 1990 that the people who had been imprisoned in the 1980s were now on top. As a matter of fact, I was there during the inauguration of Vaclav Ravel as the new president of Czechoslovakia. Rita Klimova, in the meantime, had been named to be the Czech ambassador to the United States.

Q: Was Rita Klimova one of the dissidents you met in 1986?

A: Yes, I met with her again in the spring of 1990 before going to Czechoslovakia and was distressed to learn that she had leukemia. In Czechoslovakia, I talked to Diensbier about her condition. He said that it was a serious illness and they felt that they had to consider replacing her. But Rita Klimova’s illness went into a state of remission and she remained in Washington as the Czechoslovakian ambassador to the United States.

The 1986 trip to Czechoslovakia was a very satisfactory and satisfying one. I then went to Poland. As in Czechoslovakia, I was treated very well and invited to speak to Polish officials at several levels. I not only talked to the members of Parliament, but to Prime Minister Mazowiecki, President Jaruzelski, and Lech
Q: What did you talk about with these Polish officials?

A: In addition to talking about their general political and economic situation, I talked to them about a pet project of mine, returning the remains of Paderewski to Poland. I left with Mazowiecki a draft letter which I said I hoped he would send to President Bush. It requested that Paderewski’s body be returned to Poland. I specified in the draft that the body be returned on June 29, 1991, the 50th anniversary of the death of Paderewski. You will recall that Paderewski died on June 29, 1941, in New York. President Roosevelt ordered the War Department to bury Paderewski at Arlington National Cemetery. But the Secretary of War said this could not be done, since only U.S. nationals can be buried at Arlington. Roosevelt then ordered Paderewski’s remains to stay in Arlington until the end of the war. In 1963, President Kennedy went to Arlington Cemetery and dedicated a brass plaque which said that Paderewski should continue to rest in Arlington Cemetery and be returned to his native country “when Poland is free.” The letter that I left with Mazowiecki said that in my contacts with Paderewski’s family and with members of the Polish-American community, they felt that Poland would be free by June of 1991. Therefore, we began making plans to return the body on June 29, 1991.

During these meetings in Poland, I had several conversations with the head of the Polish Parliament, Bronislaw Geremek. Geremek and I had been scholars at the Wilson Center in 1979 and 1980. In addition to being head of the Parliament, Geremek was one of Walesa’s principal advisors. It was interesting to me that Geremek was one of those persons who believed that the presidency should not necessarily go to Walesa. He felt that there should be free elections and that the people should decide who should be their next president. There was a split within Solidarity about this issue. Some members felt that Walesa was moving too fast politically and too radically economically. Others thought that he was too ambitious. They wanted to be sure that other candidates would be given a chance to run for the office of the presidency.

Q: What did you plan to do after you retired?

A: I planned to do five things. First, I planned to become a distinguished scholar at CSIS, the Center for Strategic International Studies. Under their auspices, I intended to write a book on the lessons learned while negotiating with the Soviets.
Second, I planned to teach a course in negotiating styles and techniques at the graduate level at George Washington University.

Third, I planned to join the Board of Visitors for the University of Maryland College Program. I planned to inject some of the negotiating styles and techniques I learned into their business and commercial courses.

Fourth, I planned to work at getting the remains of Ignacy Paderewski back to Poland in June 1991. This would entail having President Bush name the honorary pallbearers who would accompany the body back to Poland. It was planned that Paderewski would be returned with full military honors in *Air Force One*.

Fifth, I planned to become a consultant for the Department of Defense, especially on matters relating to the Soviet Union.

Q: Now, a year later in August 1991, how have your plans worked out?

A: The first plan has worked out reasonably well. I became associated with CSIS and began writing my book. However, with everything else I wanted to accomplish and with the rapid evolvement of events in the Soviet Union, writing the book has progressed very slowly. At this time I’m still trying to finish it. In large part the delay occurred because in January 1991 I changed the focus of my book. Having practically finished it, I decided that the public was no longer highly interested in arms control. The events in Eastern Europe after the Berlin Wall was torn down and the increasing deterioration of the Communist system caused me to shift direction. I decided to compare how the five Presidents I worked for: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, negotiated with the Soviet Union. I also decided to put more emphasis on negotiating at the international level in the commercial field.

The second plan turned out quite well. I taught a course in the fall semester at the Elliot School of George Washington University. Although I found the preparation time for teaching to be quite demanding, I enjoyed teaching the course and plan to repeat it in the spring of 1992.

The third plan also worked out quite well. I gave several seminars at the University of Maryland on negotiating at the international level. I also participated in several of their Board of Visitors meetings.

The fourth plan, returning Paderewski’s body to Poland, went awry. Prime Minister Mazowiecki sent the letter I had drafted for him to President Bush in the fall of 1990. In December, President Bush replied, stating his intention to return
Paderewski’s remains with full military honors. Lech Walesa was subsequently elected president of Poland and paid a state visit to Washington in April 1991. I thought he would put the finishing touches on the plan to return Paderewski’s body on June 29, 1991. However, Walesa stunned us by telling reporters that he did not feel Poland was ready to receive Paderewski. He wanted to wait until after the parliamentary elections, scheduled for the fall of 1991. After those elections, he said, the last vestiges of the Communist Party would be out of the Polish government. I had to abandon my plans to return the body on June 29, 1991, and instead planned and executed a memorial service at Arlington Cemetery on that date. I am now [August 1991] planning to have the body returned on June 29, 1992.

The fifth plan, to do consulting work, turned out quite well. In fact, in view of the rapid events in Eastern Europe, then the Gulf War, and subsequently the coup in August 1991, I have been quite busy. I continued to give advice to Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, on how to privatize and improve their economy. During the Gulf War I opposed the idea that sanctions alone could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I also opposed the idea, held by many in the U.S., that air strikes could do the job alone. I predicted that the Gulf War would be a short one with moderate casualties, lasting only a month. In retrospect, I was too conservative, since the war lasted only 100 hours. I did, however, advise against stopping the war so soon. I felt that we should have completely destroyed, or caused the surrender of, the Iraqi forces.

With respect to the Soviet Union, I predicted that a crisis would occur before the end of 1991. I did not, however, anticipate the coup by the “Gang of Eight” on August 19, 1991. Nor did I think Gorbachev would resign from the Communist Party. While I was shocked, I was not surprised when Marshal Akhromeyev committed suicide. Although he was a military professional who wanted to reform the Soviet military, he was-as he told me on several occasions-a believer in the Communist system. He felt, like his patron Gorbachev, that the system could be reformed. Nor was I surprised that Gorbachev would relieve his foreign minister, Alexander Bessmertnykh. It was predictable that Gorbachev, badly shaken by the perfidy of his former colleagues, would not like to keep anyone on who did not openly and immediately denounce the plotters of the coup.

Q: What do you think will be the future of arms control?

A: Arms control will, of course, be affected by what happens in the former Soviet Union. I have always thought that the Soviet Union would be replaced by a loose confederation of the center with six or more republics, including Russia, Kazakhstan Byelorussia, and Ukraine. I believe, as Akhromeyev told me in 1989,
that the Soviets would be interested in conventional arms control. They do not need, nor do they want, large conventional forces. But, as Akhromeyev told me, the Soviets will make only token cuts in their strategic forces. Without a stockpile of nuclear weapons, Russia cannot remain a superpower. I believe, therefore, that arms control will continue in both the conventional and strategic fields. But we would be well advised, however, to continue to negotiate in several other important fields. We should try to limit nuclear proliferation and we should try to reduce, and if possible eliminate, biological and chemical weapons.

The Communist Party, as I predicted it would, has disintegrated. The Communist system, still trying to revive itself, may continue to exist on life support machines. But the system is brain dead. I, for one, am not overly worried about the breakup of the Soviet Union. While we need to treat the question of control of nuclear weapons carefully, I do not think it is a major problem. Yeltsin, who has over 90 percent of the Soviet Union’s nuclear missiles in the Russian republic, is smart enough to keep strict controls on them. I believe, therefore, that this problem is manageable.

We should, therefore, adopt a wait-and-see attitude about what happens within the Soviet Union. I believe that we should not give massive economic aid to the Soviets. I disagree with President Bush that the fragmentation of the Soviet Union will be a disaster. I also feel that he waited entirely too long to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltics. But for the most part, I believe that President Bush’s inclination to be cautious and prudent is not the right solution for our dealing with the republics of the former Soviet Union. We should work with President Yeltsin to see that he brings about democracy and a free market economy to Russia.
Epilogue

Events moved at a rapid pace between the last interview for this oral history, August 1991, and the time this epilogue was written in June 1993. In the interim I finished writing my book, *It Takes One to Tango*, on May 15, 1992. The book is an anecdotal account of how five presidents I served: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, approached the problem of dealing with the former Soviet Union. The book recounts, in summary form, some of the biography dealt with in greater detail in this oral history. Rather than repeat the material covered in the book, which should be read as a companion piece to this oral history, I will deal here only with some of the events which led to the writing and publication of the book.

The title was suggested by Georgie Anne Geyer. I recounted to her that on one occasion I became frustrated with General Ivan Beletsky’s stalling tactics during SALT II. I told him that I had been taking all the initiatives while he had done nothing to reciprocate. “It takes two to tango,” I said. “No,” he countered, “you’re thinking like an American.” He then told me how young Soviet officers met dancing partners. “At Saturday night dances, rather than ask a young woman to dance, an officer would pick up a chair and dance with it. When one of the women smiled approvingly, the officer knew he had her hooked. So, you see, it takes only one to tango.”

I was encouraged during the arduous process of writing my book by Bert Brown, Tom Clancy Peggy Noonan, Bill Safire, and Larry Ring. For research and advice I called upon Susan Munro, Patricia Barwinczak, and Richard Smith. I was fortunate in getting Al Sanoff, a senior writer for *U.S. News and World Report*, to edit my book. Sanoff read the draft chapters carefully and made major suggestions on the contents and style of writing. Virginia McGuire patiently and faithfully typed the numerous drafts. My good friend Betty Ladd kept my nose to the grindstone when I became discouraged.

By a stroke of luck, I met Frank Margiotta at a National War College reception. A former Air Force colonel, Margiotta had founded the U.S. branch of Brassey’s, a publisher of military and political books in England. Margiotta was enthusiastic.
about publishing the book, and after agreeing to do so, gave me many good suggestions.

The book was originally scheduled for publication on November 15, 1992. But when Margiotta saw that a draft chapter was critical of President Bush, he advanced the publication date to October 1. He wanted the book to be in the bookstores during the final weeks of the presidential campaign. When I submitted my manuscript on May 15, I had no idea who the Democratic candidate would be. The chapter on President Bush was written more in sorrow than in anger. I was disappointed that he had not taken a more forthright stand on foreign policy, did not stress fixing the domestic economy, and was conducting a poor campaign. The net result, of course, was that William Clinton was elected.

Before the election I tried to get President Bush and candidate Clinton to pay more attention to foreign policy, and in particular to the deteriorating state of affairs in Russia. After the election, I talked to several persons close to President Clinton to try to get him to pay more attention to the coming crisis in Russia. I was worried that without support of the United States Yeltsin would be further rebuffed by the Soviet Parliament and Congress of Deputies. I feared that Yeltsin might lose out at the meeting of the Congress of Peoples Deputies on December 5, 1992. In order to placate his opponents, Yeltsin dismissed his acting premier, Yegor Gaidar, who had been his principal advisor on economic matters. In an effort to be conciliatory, Yeltsin took the extraordinary step of giving the parliament the right of veto over his selection of principal cabinet officers. Yeltsin barely survived the parliamentary crisis in early December.

I continued to talk to several persons—Note: they have asked me to protect their anonymity—who later became officials in the Clinton administration, urging them to persuade the President to show support for Yeltsin. In March Yeltsin, sensing that he was losing control of the situation, called for a referendum on April 25, 1993, at which Russian citizens could vote him in or out.

The parliament, however, trumped his ace. They added three more questions to the referendum ballot. One question was whether the people had confidence in Yeltsin’s economic policies. A second question was whether new presidential elections should be held. The final question was whether there should be elections for a new parliament. The parliament cleverly protected itself on the last two questions. To be valid, the parliament ruled, there would have to be a majority of not only those who voted, but of all persons eligible to vote. The parliament was safe because this was not, of course, even a remote possibility.

Fortunately, President Clinton, who had up to this point remained passive, now sprang into action. During a meeting with Yeltsin in Vancouver in early April,
Edward L. Rowny shortly before the referendum, Clinton announced that the United States backed Yeltsin. The President also offered $8 billion in U.S. aid and promised to work for a $30-billion commitment to Russia from the world’s industrial nations.

Yeltsin did better than predicted in the April 25th referendum, receiving more than a 60-percent vote of confidence. He also won surprisingly large numbers of votes on the other questions. The votes were not large enough, however, to amount to a majority of all eligible voters, and no new elections were called for. Yeltsin now moved quickly and announced that he would soon submit a new constitution for approval. The constitution, modeled on the French, would give the president of Russia greater powers.

During the last three months of 1992 and the first several months of 1993, I appeared on a number of radio and TV talk shows to promote my book Larry King was the master of ceremonies at my book party in early October 1992, and shortly thereafter had me on his radio show. William Safire wrote a generous endorsement of my book in one of his "On Language" columns in the Sunday New York Times. The Washingtonian magazine also wrote about my book, highlighting the story about Amy Carter. I was pleased to learn that the book is being used as a textbook in several colleges and universities. Although not a best seller, it has done moderately well. When I asked the publisher if it was selling "like hot cakes," he said, "No, like warm cakes."

My book has been reviewed or mentioned in about 40 publications. Of these, 39 were moderately to highly favorable, only one was lukewarm. The critical review was written by a long time friend of Leslie Gelb, who did not fare well in the book. On the whole, the reception of my book has been gratifying.

Teaching at George Washington University

One of the things I decided to do after retiring from the government was to teach. One of my reasons for doing so was that I felt it important that the tactics and techniques of international negotiating were important and should be taught at the graduate level in our colleges and universities. Another reason was that I felt the contact with younger persons would be stimulating and force me to stay current on foreign affairs.

After meeting with Maurice "Mickey" Fast, dean of the Elliott Graduate School at George Washington University, I agreed to conduct a seminar on international negotiating in the fall of 1990. I wanted to restrict the attendance to about 15, but over 20 students applied for the course. I held the attendance to 16, a number I felt would be most conducive to student participation. Most of the course covered
my experience in SALT II and START, but there were three sessions devoted to negotiating with other countries: Germany, Japan, and China.

I enjoyed preparing for and conducting the classes, but was disappointed in the caliber of the students. I found that most had poor backgrounds in history and in recent international events and most had poor analytical and writing skills. I put major emphasis on term papers and found that I had to return more than half of them for rewriting before I could give them passing scores.

Despite my disappointment, I decided to teach again in the fall of 1991. I cut the attendance down to 12 and changed the time of the classes from early evening to afternoon sessions. I found that this change brought in more full-time and fewer part-time students. I originally thought that part-time students-most of whom worked in various government agencies-would be better students. However, either because they were not as well motivated or because the standards for acceptance were lower, or perhaps because they were simply too tired at the end of the day, I found that full-time students made for a better class. The students seemed somewhat better grounded in history and current events, but their analytical and writing skills were still poor.

Once again, I had to return over half of the papers for more work and rewriting. There were, however, several notable exceptions. One was a paper by a naval officer who worked in the Pentagon on international affairs. He wrote a paper on the disposition of the Black Sea fleet. Another outstanding paper was written by a young woman who did an original, in-depth study of Henry Kissinger’s difficult early childhood. She did a brilliant job of explaining why Kissinger’s early years caused him to think and act the way he did in later years.

After two disappointing years I was not certain I wanted to teach a course in the fall of 1992. However, after having lunch with Dean East, I decided to teach the course for a third time. East’s reasoning was that members of the older generation had an obligation to train the younger generation. He pointed out that almost all of the students, in their confidential final evaluations, said that they were forced to work hard and had learned a great deal.

I decided to repeat the course. I again scheduled the course for afternoon sessions where I could attract more full-time students. I also cut the number of sessions devoted to arms control and devoted about half of the course to negotiating with other cultures. As before, I found the quality of analysis and writing poor. But, having placed a great deal of emphasis throughout the early part of the course on the need for good research, careful analyses, and good writing, I found that the students produced better term papers.
I employed the technique of having students submit a précis for approval. From the précis I could gauge whether the students were doing enough original research and devoting sufficient attention to the caliber of their writing. The two most difficult term papers to grade were those written by a young woman from Egypt and a young man from Ethiopia. They had both worked hard, but their papers were not up to an acceptable standard of writing. I prevailed upon them to seek outside tutoring and assistance at writing good English. They both did so and in the end, after several reiterations, submitted acceptable papers. As in the preceding year, there were several outstanding papers. The best was by a young woman who wrote about how American women could be trained to negotiate with Japanese.

At this writing I am undecided as to whether to teach for a fourth time. However, I will probably do so for several reasons. First, because I feel a continuing obligation to bring along the younger generation. And second, because I find it does keep me on my toes and forces me to stay abreast of current events. Finally, several of my better former students have been accepted for jobs where they can make valuable contributions. It is this last reason, perhaps more than the others, which will cause me to teach again in the fall of 1993.

Return of Paderewski’s Remains to Poland

In the fall of 1991 I resumed my efforts to see to it that the remains of Paderewski would be returned to Poland. I had worked out all the details to return Paderewski’s remains to Poland on June 29, 1991, the 50th anniversary of his death. However, in April 1991, on a state visit to the United States, President Lech Walesa threw a monkey wrench into the works. He told several reporters that Poland was not ready to receive Paderewski’s remains. He said that Poland would not be completely free until a new parliament was elected in the fall of 1991. I had no choice but to scrap the elaborate arrangements and plan to return the remains in 1992. Since I was no longer in the government, the White House put Edward Derwinski, the secretary of Veterans Affairs, in charge of the arrangements.

It became immediately obvious that Derwinski and I had opposing views concerning the type of ceremony to be held in the United States prior to the return of the remains. I thought the ceremony should be a large one and held in the amphitheater at Arlington Cemetery. Derwinski thought the ceremony should be small, and held in the chapel. I felt there should be a maximum of publicity. Derwinski thought that the publicity should be held to a minimum. I thought that the pallbearers should be high ranking Polish-Americans, like Brzezinski, Senator Muskie, and Congressman Rostenkowski. Derwinski thought the pallbearers should
be representatives of various Polish-American societies and veterans groups. I felt that Clarence Paderewski, the next of kin, should be offered a major role. Derwinski thought he should be in the background.

Because Derwinski was in charge and since he excluded me from most of the planning, the ceremony was conducted according to his wishes. Held in the Arlington Chapel on June 27, 1992, the ceremony, although small, was a dignified affair at which Vice President Quayle spoke.

After the ceremony, the body was transported on a horse-drawn caisson to the main gate of the cemetery. Several thousand soldiers, airmen, and sailors lined the route. We flew to Shannon, Ireland, on Sunday, June 28th spent the night there, and flew to Warsaw the next morning. We arrived at 10 A.M. June 29, 1992, the 51st anniversary of Paderewski’s death. An official delegation of the Polish government met us and together we followed the casket in a motorcade to the Warsaw Castle, where the body lay in state for two days. Following that it was then taken to Poznan for two days and then returned to Warsaw.

On Sunday, July 5th, President Bush stopped off in Warsaw for a three-hour visit. He and Lech Walesa attended a high mass at noon at the Warsaw Cathedral, after which the body was put into a side altar until the crypt in the cathedral would be completed.

For a week after our arrival with the remains, there were a number of ceremonies in Warsaw and other cities honoring Paderewski. The gala concert, however, was to me a great disappointment. The music chosen for the ceremony was not by Paderewski, but the Requiem Mass by Bach.

The official U. S. party was given a number of briefings by various Polish officials. At one of these briefings, Professor Edward Rozek, of the University of Colorado in Boulder, spoke out in criticism of Walesa's choice for prime minister, Waldermar Pawlak. Rozek said that the leader of the Peasant Party was a dedicated communist and, being in his early forties, inexperienced. Asked by Lech Walesa's representative who he would pick, Rozek said that Poland should emulate Great Britain and choose a woman. Pressed as to who that should be, he said, “Hanna Suchocka.” Rozek’s bold and outspoken criticisms made a number of the official party nervous. I was greatly surprised when watching CNN several days later in my Warsaw hotel that Walesa had named Hanna Suchocka to be the new prime minister. Whether this was pure coincidence or because Rozek knew something we didn’t, I have never been able to determine. When I asked him about it later, he simply smiled.
U. S. Poland Action Commission

Early in 1992 Zbigniew Brzezinski asked me to join a group called the U. S. Poland Action Commission. He wanted me to undertake the military aspects of political-military advice which the commission would give to the Polish government. I agreed and chaired a panel of government and private experts which drew up three recommendations for the Polish military to follow. The first was that the Polish Minister of Defense should transform his entirely military staff into a predominantly civilian one. The second was that the Polish military should offer to contribute forces to U.N. peacekeeping efforts, such as in the former Yugoslavia. The third was that the Polish military should increase its contacts and improve its relationship with NATO.

When we presented the report to the Polish government in mid-November, 1992, the Polish officials accepted the first two of our recommendations. But instead of accepting our recommendation that the Poles increase their contacts with NATO, they said that they would like Poland to be granted early membership into NATO. I tried to explain as diplomatically as I could that full membership of Poland into NATO was simply not in the cards for some time to come.

Receiving a Polish Flag from the Polish Government

At a banquet following the U. S. Poland Action Commission meetings, I received a pleasant surprise. President Walesa's personal representative presented me with the Polish flag that had draped Paderewski’s coffin. I said that I was honored and flattered, but that the flag should go to Paderewski’s next of kin. His reply was: "The Polish government wishes to give the flag to you, but what you do with it is your affair." Accordingly, I presented the flag to Clarence Paderewski, Ignacy’s second cousin, at a ceremony in St Stanislaus Kostka church in Chicago on May 23, 1993. He in turn presented the flag to the Polish American Museum in Chicago.

Project for the Atlantic Council on Ukraine

In January 1993 General Goodpaster, cochairman of the Atlantic Council, invited me to lunch to discuss United States’ relations with Ukraine. He said he was impressed by my work on the U.S. Poland Action Commission and felt that a similar effort should be undertaken on Ukraine. He said, and I agreed, that it was in the United States’ interest to improve its relations with the new independent state of Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials had signed the Lisbon Protocols in early 1992, agreeing to transfer their strategic weapons to Russia for dismantling and destruction, and expressing their intention to sign the Non-Proliferation treaty [NPT]. However, soon afterwards the Ukraine parliament had second thoughts about turning over Ukraine’s weapons to Russia. On the one hand, they feared that Russia might one day use the weapons against them. On the other hand, they wanted to use the possession of nuclear weapons as leverage to get some badly needed hard currency.

President Bush had set back U.S./Ukraine relations when he made his “Chicken Kiev” speech in 1991, several weeks before the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev. The President urged the Ukrainians to put off their desires for independence and throw their support behind Gorbachev. It was an ill-conceived appeal which was resented by the Ukrainians. Soon after the USSR was dissolved, the Ukrainians went to the polls and by a 90-percent vote opted to become independent.

I told Goodpaster that I was highly interested in seeing Ukraine work out a satisfactory arrangement with Russia over the weapons, especially since Russian officials said they would not implement START until Ukraine signed the NPT. Goodpaster asked me to arrange for a grant from a foundation to fund a joint U.S./Ukrainian study effort on Ukraine. I called six or seven of my friends in various foundations, but all, for one reason or another, said that they were not interested. Nevertheless, Goodpaster said that one of the foundations, PEW, would fund the study group.

At this writing [June 1993] I am waiting for further word from General Goodpaster about the project. Meanwhile, I have met with some prominent Ukrainian Americans, among them Vitalij Garber, Michael Yarymovych and Bo Denysyk. I also met with Oleh Bilorus, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. In March 1993 I hosted a lunch for Anatoly Zlemko, Foreign Minister of the Ukraine, at which I introduced him to General Goodpaster and others. Meanwhile, I am gathering more information about Ukraine on how we can strengthen U.S./Ukrainian relations.

Consulting Activities

In 1992 and 1993 I undertook several consulting efforts. One project was with Science Applications International Corporation [SAIC] on the adequacy of the verification provisions of the START treaty. In another project I joined a panel at Rockwell International on a similar study. This led to work on a panel with
Rockwell on a study on how the Clinton administration could improve the productivity of the United States.

In March 1993 I suddenly found myself acting as an expert on base closures. Barbara Rohde, who had interned for me at the Wilson Center, is now the Washington representative for the State of Minnesota. Some friends of hers from North Dakota wanted to know what I thought about the Air Force’s plan to close Grand Forks Air Force base. I said it would have undesirable consequences on START and the ABM treaty. Accordingly, I wrote letters to Secretary of Defense Aspin and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General McPeak, chief of staff of the Air Force; and General Sullivan, chief of staff of the Army. I later talked briefly to General Powell and at length to General McPeak. As a result, General McPeak dropped Grand Forks from its closure list. However, in late May 1993 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission put Grand Forks back on the list of bases which should be further examined. I went to Grand Forks on June 1st and 2d to testify on the spot to the commission about the inadvisability of closing the base. At this writing [June 1993] the outcome is uncertain.

My activities with respect to Grand Forks led Congressman Jim Courter, chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, to invite me to testify on the Army’s plan to close Fort McClellan in Alabama. During my testimony, on April 5, 1993, I said that I thought the closure of the Chemical Warfare School was not in the U.S. interest. Tom Graham [acting director of ACDA], and Victor Rostow [Department of Defense] testified that the closure of Fort McClellan and the transfer of the Chemical Warfare Training Center to Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri would not harm our chemical warfare training program. At this writing I do not know how the proposed closure of Fort McClellan will be resolved.

Word then spread to Monterey, California, where the Army planned to close the Defense Language Institute [DLI]. I wrote a letter to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission saying I thought this would hurt our country’s language training. I do not know how this case will come out.

I have also occupied myself with such projects as being interviewed and writing articles about the importance of good negotiations to our economic well-being. An interview with the editors of the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute was published in May 1993. An article will be printed in The American Legion magazine in the Fall of 1993.

Otherwise, I have continued to follow events in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, China, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other hot spots. On the situation in the Balkans, I spoke
out in favor of arming the Muslims, but not in favor of putting ground troops in
the area or conducting air strikes except to protect enclaves for refugees.

Distinguished Graduate Award, West Point

I was pleasantly surprised to learn in March 1993 that West Point would honor me
on May 25, 1993, with a Distinguished Graduate Award, West Point’s version of
an honorary degree. The award was established in 1992, at which time it was
awarded to Generals Ridgeway, Van Fleet, and Goodpaster. In 1993 two awards,
other than mine, went to General Roscoe Robinson and Robert McDermott.

In my acceptance speech I told the cadets that there were three principles other than
Duty, Honor and Country instilled in me at West Point. One was the primacy of
peace over war. “Never be afraid of going to war to defend U. S. vital interests,”
I said, “but never fear to exhaust all other options before going to war.” A second
principle instilled in me was not to fight future wars with the weapons and tactics
of the last war. This principle impelled me to help develop the air mobility
concept and to introduce armed helicopters into Vietnam. The third principle was
the importance of moral courage. This lesson stood me in good stead when
President Carter signed the fatally flawed SALT II treaty in 1979. Not being able
to support the treaty in good conscience, I resigned my post and retired from the
Army. In retrospect, it turned out to be the correct decision; a fair and equitable
agreement on strategic arms was signed in 1991.

Postscript

In June 1995 I find myself in good health and active at teaching, writing, and
consulting. I miss the busy schedule I previously followed, but find it satisfying
to be able to pick and choose those things I want to work on. I have established
three criteria for the rest of my productive life. First, to undertake projects which
serve the country’s interest. Second, to work on those projects where I have
something significant to contribute. And third, to work only on those projects that
interest me. I hope I can continue to work until the year 2000 observing these
three criteria.
### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>antiballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSFOR</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTIV</td>
<td>Army Concept Team in Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>assistant division commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGCT</td>
<td>Army general classification test</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>air-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAB</td>
<td>Army Science Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>C²I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>conventional forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>commanding general</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>commander in chief, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>conference on security and cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>D/CINC</td>
<td>deputy commander in chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;S</td>
<td>defense and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSLOG</td>
<td>deputy chief of staff for logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOPS</td>
<td>deputy chief of staff for operations and plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>‘deputy chief of staff for personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSR&amp;D</td>
<td>deputy chief of staff for research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD R&amp;D</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European theater of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FECOM</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELOC</td>
<td>fast relocation from France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>ground-launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INF</strong></td>
<td>intermediate nuclear forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean augmentation to the United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Russ Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, Soviet Committee of State Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>landing ship, tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>lieutenant general</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Advisory Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>mutual assured destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>mutual and balanced force reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NC0</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>operations division</td>
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<tr>
<td>PI1</td>
<td>Pershing II</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROFIT</strong></td>
<td>professional improvement time</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Science Applications International Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>strategic arms limitation talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Powers</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>standing consultative commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>strategic defense initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>strategic integrated operational plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>strategic arms reduction talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBO</td>
<td>time between overhauls</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialists Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/ROK</td>
<td>United States/Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Victory in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJ</td>
<td>Victory in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDGS</td>
<td>War Department General Staff</td>
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