The Engineer Replacement Training Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

by Larry Roberts

Shortly before Thanksgiving 1940 two automobiles carrying constructing quartermasters (CQMs) arrived in the Ozarks. These individuals were the first echelon of a military and civilian force that would carve a new training center out of the rugged terrain of southern Missouri.

The purpose of the new post was two fold. It would serve as a divisional training center and would also be the site of an Engineer Replacement Training Center (ERTC). Although there were other division training camps across the country, Fort Leonard Wood's ERTC would initially be one of only two such activities, the other located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

The challenge facing those first to arrive in the area, and the thousands who would come in the following weeks, was formidable. Personnel for both the ERTC and the 6th Infantry Division would begin arriving in a matter of weeks. Engineers, planners, and construction workers had to have the new post ready in five months. Then the military trainers and administrative personnel had to prepare thousands of men for the war that was rapidly closing in on the nation.

Little prior work had been done when the CQMs arrived in November. Initially the War Department wanted to build a Seventh Corps Area Training Center near Leon, Iowa, but the Seventh Corps commander preferred the Missouri location. In the fall of 1940, the War Department learned that there were problems with the Iowa location. The water table had dropped 60 feet since 1918 and the projected cost of impounding sufficient water for the post was prohibitive. The major disadvantage of the Missouri location was its distance from the nearest railroad. The sense of urgency which permeated the War Department in 1940 prompted the decision for the Ozark cantonment. The architect–engineer firm of Alvord, Burdick, and Howson of Chicago, Illinois, was told to stop work on the Iowa site and proceed to Missouri.

Company representatives arrived in nearby Rolla, Missouri, in mid-November.

The task was to build a training center for 37,800 division soldiers and engineer recruits on a broad ridge south of the community of Waynesville. The area was broken by numerous ravines leading to the Roubidoux and Big Piney creeks, tributaries of the Gasconade River. The dominant vegetation was second-growth timber, mostly pine and oak, with some walnut, hickory, and other trees. The soil was a thin clay loam mixed with small flint stones, underlaid by both limestone and sandstone. The only substantial topsoil of agricultural value was in the numerous creek and river bottoms. The topography of the future fort proved both a blessing and a curse. The rugged landscape offered excellent training potential, especially for the engineers. However the same ground posed significant challenges for the planner and builder. The summers were hot and humid, but the winters were mild. The Ozark Mountains shielded the region from the harsh winters of the plains, and snowfall—at times abundant—melted quickly.

The population of the region was small; the nearest community had less than 500 inhabitants. Most of the people lived on small farms with rural hamlets dotting the cantonment area. These settlements, sometimes comprising only a grocery store, a filling station, and a few houses, soon disappeared. The construction of the training center dispossessed approximately 800 people.

The U.S. Forest Service had begun the process of acquiring substantial tracts of land in the region, and that proved a major consideration in selecting the Missouri site. The Corps could more easily obtain land from another government agency than from private owners. But a problem still existed. The Forest Service had purchased only untillable lands, leaving the tillable lands to the farmers. Consequently, CQMs and architect–engineers discovered that they needed a major real estate acquisition program. Planners needed land for the cantonment and training areas, and also for rights-of-way for the railroad and utility lines, construction material storage, and borrow pits for road material. Some of this ground had to be taken from farms which had been worked for generations.

The acquisition process began two weeks after the Army and civilian engineers arrived. Every effort was made to secure the land through voluntary purchase rather than condemnation. The first petition for condemnation was issued on 3 December; the first purchase option was offered three weeks later. Generally the petition to condemn was sufficient to prompt owners to vacate the land. The local Rural Rehabilitation supervisor assisted where possible with loans and grants to assist families in getting other homes. Sometimes humanitarian considerations justified special action by the CQM. In two instances the Army moved occupants from land urgently needed for initial building into buildings already vacated by their prior owners to allow them more time to resettle.

Of the 67,757 acres of land turned over to the Army by July 1941, almost 16,000 came from the Forest Service. The Army gained approximately 20,000 acres through direct purchase. The remaining land was acquired through the condemnation process via the federal courts. The Army generally paid from $2 to $5 an acre for the land whether through purchase or condemnation. In some instances the Army got a bargain; in other instances the landowner benefitted.

Finding no administrative space near the cantonment, CQM and architect–engineer personnel set up offices at Newburg and in the nearby Alhambra Grotto resort. Newburg became the terminus of the railroad and also the logical storage area for the construction materials destined for the fort. The administrative staff and the building inspectors moved to the cantonment when sufficient structures had been completed. Space requirements were significant and the architect–engineer firm ultimately employed more than 2,000 workers.

In addition to land acquisition and space problems, the shift to the Missouri site prompted a change in the scope of the project and complicated the contractor organization. Planners called for the Leon, Iowa, camp to be a 23,000-man installation with a price tag of $8 million. In Missouri, the new cantonment housed more than 35,000 men, with an ultimate cost of more than $35 million. Either project was too large for a single contractor.

Consequently an organization comprising four firms: W.A. Klinger and Sons of Sioux City, Iowa; Arthur H. Neumann Brothers, Inc, Des Moines, Iowa; Western Contracting Corporation; and C.F. Lytle Company, also of Sioux City, was established. For the purposes of the project, this organization was called the K.N.W.L. Company. Although the Lytle Company and the Western Contracting Corporation provided 90 percent of the working capital, all decisions came from an executive committee composed of one representative from each firm. Constant arbitration of issues and many disagreements between company representatives caused numerous delays. Ultimately the joint company hired one supervising engineer as the project manager.

In large part, the contractor's initial disagreements were due to the demand for speed. With troops anticipated to arrive in early January, requirements for buildings, roads, utilities,



Construction of one of the 600 barracks built at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 1941.

and railroad lines competed with each other. Construction of barracks, along with associated structures, became the dominant consideration. Excavation and form work for barracks began on 11 December; workers poured the first concrete for the foundations the following day. By 3 January workmen had the first barracks ready for occupancy. Contractors constantly diverted heavy equipment needed for road

and railroad construction to the building effort. Heavy rains in December often meant that bulldozers had to be used to tow material-laden trucks through the axle-deep mud.

The first units to arrive on post found conditions slightly better than field bivouacs. Although generally completed, the buildings lacked plumbing. Soldiers had to chop firewood for stoves and used those same stoves to heat river water for shaving. Once or twice a week, units sent their men to the nearby communities of Lebanon or Rolla for showers.

Soldiers found moving around the post a challenge. Many units built wooden sidewalks to keep the soldiers from sinking into the same morass that consumed the vehicles. At road crossings, soldiers lowered wooden drawbridges to gain access across the mud streets. Once on the other side, they raised these structures to preclude their destruction by vehicles. At one point, Colonel Frank Reed, the post engineer, purchased 75 horses so that supervisory personnel could make their rounds of construction activities. One of the first engineer units to arrive at Fort Leonard Wood spent its first weeks working on the barracks, grading and draining the battalion area, and constructing service roads.

The need for serviceable roads became so great that some construction was suspended so that heavy equipment could work on the road system. Initially, engineers sought to stabilize the roads by dumping river gravel on the thoroughfares. However this material, much like washed rock, had no binding agent and the gravel slowly disappeared into the ooze. Midway in the construction effort, engineers found that local limestone deposits could produce sufficient crushed stone for the base coat. By the end of construction, the Myron–Baker Company had produced more than 78,000 cubic yards of crushed limestone for the post roads.

With this material available, workers removed the mud and gravel down to the clay hard pan and filled the void with 8 to 12 inches of the crushed limestone rock. This was an extremely time-consuming process. When building began, no street plan had been developed for the post. As a result, buildings got the best sites, leaving the poorer areas for the roads and utilities. Consequently, the production of all-weather roads, a total of more than 50 miles, took almost one year to complete.

Post engineers and contractors also had to contend with the service roads leading to the post. The major transportation route to the post was U.S. Highway 66. However, the traffic count over this route sometimes reached more than 7,000 vehicles a day. The steep grades on U.S. 66 meant that trucks took considerable time between the cantonment and the supply point at Newburg, creating traffic jams on the highway as administrative vehicles, workers' cars, and general traffic piled up behind the heavy transports. To solve this problem engineers worked on secondary access roads and on some state and country roads. In one instance it took more than 60 days to complete a service road to the post because of a lack of heavy machinery. This included building high truss bridges across the Big Piney and Mill creeks, and numerous low-level stream crossings. When completed, more than 200 vehicles used this secondary artery each day.

Construction engineers experienced some of the same problems with building the vital rail link to the Newburg station. Work on the rail connection to the Frisco railhead at Newburg began in early December, but by mid-February only one-half mile of track had been laid. Once again, lack of heavy equipment was the dominant obstacle in completing the almost 20 miles of required track. In January, a reorganization of the work staff, additional machinery and manpower, and a move to three work shifts brought dramatic results. On 7 March only 4 percent of the route had been graded; by the end of the month the contractor had completed 90 percent of the grading requirement, moving earth totalling more than 1.5 million cubic yards.

As with the construction of the installation, the rugged terrain inhibited activities. Of the almost 20 miles of track laid from the post to Newburg, there was only 1½ miles of level track. The route had 70 curves, 68 cuts and fills, and major steel truss bridges over the Big and Little Piney creeks. The first train rolled into Fort Leonard Wood on 19 April. On 8 May the first trainload of supplies arrived on the post. Within a year the post was receiving approximately 1,500 tons of supplies each day from the 20 to 25 rail cars of each train. The engineers used the rail line to provide weekend excursions for 700 to 1,000 soldiers each week.

Bringing power and water service to the post was as much a challenge as building barracks, storage buildings, or roads. The architect–engineer and CQMs decided that buying power from a local utility company was cheaper and easier than power production on post. This necessitated securing rights-of-way for transmission lines and substations, as well as their physical construction. In February, engineers completed temporary lines to a Missouri Electric Power Company substation that provided sufficient energy for construction purposes. At the same time, workers from the post and from the Rural Electrification Administration labored on 20 miles of permanent line to the Union Electric Company's substation.

Construction of the power distribution system on the post fell victim to similar problems. Location stakes for power poles disappeared as a result of building and road construction. The rain softened the earth, causing the holes for power poles to fill in before the poles could be set. Poles already set in place suffered damage from heavy equipment. In some instances completed pole line work had to be changed to permit relocation of buildings to fit topography or to provide for water and sewer construction. Engineers finally decided to suspend all work on the distribution system until other work was generally completed. This delay was offset by the rapid progress workers made without impediments from other construction. Utilizing more than 2,500 utility poles and almost 2 million feet of wire, workers finished the distribution system in mid-April. The permanent substations and power connections were not completed until June.

Bringing water and sewer service to the post was only slightly less difficult than securing electrical service. Water for the cantonment came from the Big Piney River located near the installation. From the river pumping station, engineers had to construct more than 8,000 feet of service line to the purification station in the southeast part of the cantonment area. In the course of construction, the 16-inch main broke several times because of closed valves or from the absence or failure of pressure valves. In the construction area, water lines had to take "somewhat devious routes" to certain areas due to the rough terrain. Engineers wisely decided to bury the water line 3 feet deep as a precaution against cold weather. However, the inclement weather of the winter and

spring months meant that many trenches collapsed or filled in before pipe was laid.

Generally the water lines were in place and ready for use by the time troops arrived at major areas of the post. By the end of May, workers had installed more than 62 miles of main and service water lines, placed 353 fire hydrants, and used more than 1 million bricks on 900 manholes to support the system. As with the electrical system, the water supply was actually designed for more than the authorized strength of the post. Sewer and water systems could handle 40,000 individuals at maximum loads. More than 52 miles of sewer lines drained the cantonment area into the treatment plant. Pumping stations, filtration plants, and sewage treatment facilities were the only structures designed specifically for Fort Leonard Wood. The barracks, storage, and administrative buildings all conformed to standard quartermaster specifications.

By early June, the army of engineers, construction foremen, and workers had completed almost 1,600 buildings on the new post and the associated utilities. They used more than 75 million board feet of lumber, 80,000 cubic yards of concrete, and almost 4,000 pieces of machinery. Workers completed more than 5.3 million square feet of building space at a cost to the government of slightly more than $37 million. The Seventh Corps Area Training Center at Fort Leonard Wood was ready for its wartime mission.

Physical conditioning at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Even while construction workers were raising barracks, administration, and other buildings, units began arriving at Fort Leonard Wood. The first units belonged to the 6th Infantry Division. This division, as well as the four which followed it, used the post to complete much of the needed unit training prior to deployment overseas. It was not until mid-spring that elements of the ERTC moved to the Missouri training post.

The prewar training plan for engineers included two engineer replacement centers that would provide basic and engineer-related training for Selective Service inductees. The Army logically placed one of these centers at the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It placed the other at Fort Leonard Wood. From December 1940 to April 1941, a provisional headquarters for the Leonard Wood center began to take shape at Fort Belvoir. A number of the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) scheduled to conduct and supervise training at Leonard Wood trained in one of several instructor training courses at Belvoir. The idea was to have officers and NCOs observe and, if possible, teach some of the classes in Virginia before establishing the ERTC in Missouri. This would provide some uniformity of training between the two centers.

In March, the Army activated Headquarters, Engineer Replacement Training Center, Fort Leonard Wood (Provisional) at Fort Belvoir. At the same time, Companies A–D of nine engineer training (ET) battalions also came into existence. On 2 April, the Army activated the headquarters and headquarters detachments of the 6th and 7th Engineer Training Groups at Belvoir. In the segregated environment of the 1940s, the 6th trained white soldiers and the 7th instructed black soldiers. In the latter days of April, these units gathered their personnel and as much of the training literature from the Engineer School as they could carry, and went to Missouri. Of the initial complement of 163 officers, only 32 came from Regular Army units. Some 128 reserve officers came from the Engineer School where they had taken instructors courses. The remaining men came from either the adjutant general or the supply schools. Of the original 386 enlisted men, all but 4 came from the NCO School at Belvoir. Later an additional 127 officers and 1,032 enlisted men joined

Black soldiers on the firing range at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 1942.

the Leonard Wood ERTC as administrative or cadre staff. All of the officers were from the reserves and the enlisted men were from active duty units.

The training program that these officer and NCO instructors worked with was based on the Army's Mobilization Training Program (MTP) 5-1. For engineers, this involved instruction in five main areas. The first part of instruction, which generally lasted two weeks, dealt with general subjects (Phase I) such as military courtesy, guard duty, first aid, drill, and care of clothing and equipment. Weapons firing (Phase II) was also part of this first two weeks. The following ten weeks dealt with more technical training. Phase III dealt with engineer subjects. This included rigging, fixed and floating bridges, general construction, and road construction. Following this (Phase IV), selectees worked on pioneer skills such as

The 89th Engineers loaded protions of a 25-ton ponton bridge on a trailer, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, January 1942.

obstacles, demolitions, and field fortifications. The last phase of the training dealt with the basic tactics of the infantry. Soldiers learned scouting and patrolling; infantry squad, platoon, and company tactics; and finally night operations.

On 22 April 1941 Headquarters, ERTC, Fort Leonard Wood, opened its doors for business. The following day Brigadier General Ulysses Grant III assumed command of the ERTC. Three weeks later the first group of white selectees —198 new soldiers-arrived from the reception center at Fort Leavenworth. On 21 May the first contingent of black soldiers came to the ERTC. The 26th Engineer Training Battalion, 6th Engineer Training Group, began the first class of instruction on 26 May. The training capacity of the ERTC was 10,000, and by the end of July, the center was operating atcapacity.

The ERTC cadre and selectees had to overcome a number of obstacles in the first year of training. The first of these was due to construction. Originally, the cadre was to arrive on post in mid-February, but construction delays, due mostly to weather, caused the ERTC to postpone its movement from Belvoir until April. The rail line to the post was so close to

Field expedient raft training with a 37-mm. gun, Big Piney River, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 1941.

the firing range that firing had to be suspended every time a train arrived. A general shortage of ranges meant that training schedules had to revolve around a unit's access to the ranges for weapons training. Classroom facilities were insufficient. The lack of company day rooms forced company trainers to hold a number of classes in the barracks, amidst the beds and footlockers. The battalion recreational halls were often the only structures available for showing films to the battalion.

Training materials were another problem. Training manuals and instructional texts, available in quantity at the beginning, were often verbose and contained outdated information. Updated texts were almost impossible to obtain for the instructors. Training aids were also inadequate. The ERTC had few resources for making its own support material, and higher headquarters, including the Seventh Corps Area Command, often failed to provide usable items. At one point, higher headquarters actually forbade local purchase or production of training aids such as posters and commercial fireworks. Like many of the manuals, training films were often obsolete.

Another problem was the quantity and quality of cadre. Few of the initial training instructors had extensive experience in the conduct or management of training. Most of the reserve officers had limited service time, if any. A number of NCOs lacked basic instructor training although they had been trained on special skills. Shortages in cadre, especially among enlisted personnel, were often met by retaining high quality selectees who had completed their training. These individuals received only a few weeks of supplemental training and practice before assuming their teaching responsibilities.

The last major problem to affect the ERTC, not only in its initial year but also in following years, was the erratic arrival of selectees for training. In some instances more selectees arrived than projected. Barracks designed for 64 men now housed 95 soldiers. In some instances tent cities housed the overflow. A flood of new trainees sometimes meant curtailing training for those in cycle in order to make space and training areas available. Because trainees were segregated by race, barracks space in the black training battalions could not be used to house white troops and vice versa.

The race issue made the ERTC leadership apprehensive about facilities off post. There were few blacks living in the surrounding communities. The nearest cities with sizable black populations were St. Louis and Kansas City. Some feared that local communities would not welcome black soldiers, and with comparatively few recreational facilities on post, black soldiers would have little opportunity for relaxation. However, local communities did respond to the needs of the black trainees. Several towns built black USOs on a par with the facilities for white soldiers. Recreation officers arranged excursion trips to St. Louis and Kansas City for black soldiers. To the extent possible, black recreation facilities on post were developed to the same extent as those for white personnel. As a result of these efforts, comparatively few racial problems occurred at the ERTC.

Even before the end of the first year of operation, the ERTC began making adjustments to its training program. One of the first involved soldiers who did not meet basic entrance standards. In September 1941, the center established an elementary school for those selectees who lacked a basic education. In time the post expanded this special training to four basic groups. The first included those who could not read or write, a second group consisted of individuals who scored low on the basic aptitude tests, a third included individuals considered mentally unstable, and the final category encompassed those who had physical limitations.

The program for these individuals involved both psychological and physical evaluation, and training geared to their special needs. The purpose was to bring these soldiers to the point where they could return to the regular training cycle. The numbers involved in this program were never significant. At one point, 80 soldiers were part of this program. Training for this group involved four two-week periods in areas such as military courtesy, guard duty, first aid, and care and maintenance of equipment. Other than those instances where mental or physical conditions required reclassification or separation, the program was generally successful. Few selectees had to complete the entire eight-week program before returning to standard training units. Much of this success was attributed to the high quality of officers

and NCOs involved in the effort. Many of them had extensive civilian experience in adult training and education.

Yet another adjustment to the ERTC training program involved specialist training. The engineer branch required an exceptionally large number of specialists. These individuals ranged from carpenters to construction foremen. There were a total of 91 different types of specialists required by the engineers. By comparison, the infantry required only 40 different specializations. In the average engineer unit, 60 percent of the troops were specialists, compared to less than 50 percent for most combat arms units.

The initial plan for the Leonard Wood ERTC called for minimal specialist training. General Grant, the first commander, limited specialist training to those areas of immediate need to the center such as cooks, drivers, and administrative personnel. It was believed that Fort Belvoir, particularly the Engineer School and the ERTC, would handle all engineer specialist training. However, it was soon recognized that Belvoir could not produce the numbers of specialists needed for the expanding U.S. Army. Consequently the Army established some engineer specialist training at Fort Leonard Wood.

The ERTC responded to this additional training requirement by forming specialist training units—at one point placing them in a special training group. Instructors were often excess personnel, or those whose duties allowed additional work. In some instances trainees with extensive civilian experience were retained as instructors after their training was completed. Facilities were never adequate for this training, and instructors for specialist training often had to scrounge for unoccupied space on an ad hoc basis.

The shifting demands for engineer units often brought abrupt shifts in specialist training. In one instance the ERTC had been alerted to prepare specialist training for a general service regiment. However, just prior to the completion of basic training for these soldiers, higher headquarters directed the conversion of the unit to a number of dump truck companies. This placed an additional training load of 1,000 soldiers on a motor vehicle operators course already having difficulty meeting replacement requirements.

Yet another added requirement, one not identified in the original mission of the ERTC, was officer training. Before the war, the ideal assignment for a young engineer officer was two years with troops, one year of graduate civil schooling, nine months at the Engineer School, and two years of rivers and harbors duty. The rapid expansion of the Army made this standard impossible. The development of officer candidate schools (OCS) and refresher training courses was an attempt to train as many engineer officers as possible in the shortest amount of time. As with specialist training, the initial plan called for all of this instruction to be conducted at the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir.

In the early days of the ERTC, many of the officer cadre reporting to Fort Leonard Wood had graduated from the Belvoir programs. However, as the Army expanded, more and more officers arrived without benefit of either the regular engineer officers course or even the refresher training. In January 1942 the Chief of Engineers directed the development of special officers training courses at the two ERTCs. The initial program at Fort Leonard Wood involved a six-week course: four weeks of refresher training and two weeks with a training company. However, the demand for officers was so great that, by the fourth class, this program had been reduced to two weeks. Ultimately the school established and maintained a four-week program until an overall shortage of students resulted in the end of the program in 1943. The prewar perception of the qualified professional engineer officer so dominated officer training that completion requirements were extremely rigid. Consequently, noncompletion rates for some classes ran as high as 50 percent.

The ERTC also conducted classes for those individuals selected for the engineer OCS. Again the requirements for successful OCS completion were so stringent that many individuals lacking basic engineering skills failed to complete the course. The OCS preparatory classes attempted to improve completion rates. In addition, the ERTC conducted special classes for officers assigned to railway construction and operation battalions. These individuals, generally commissioned directly from civilian life, needed a short but general orientation to their military duties.

The officer training programs suffered from the same problems as other ERTC courses. Instructors were in short supply. Initially many of the refresher course instructors were combat arms officers detailed to the course as an additional duty. It took some time for highly qualified officers to be secured for this effort. Training materials, equipment, and classroom facilities were always in short supply. Established primarily to provide engineer training to newly inducted individuals, the ERTC did not have the manpower or organization to develop officer training programs from scratch. It took time and considerable adjustment of resources for the problems of officer training to be resolved.

There were other factors that tended to affect the cadre of the ERTC and the soldiers they trained. In 1941, the first group of selectees received only eight weeks of training prior to being shipped to units participating in the Army maneuvers in Louisiana. The school shortened other cycles due to an unexpected influx of selectees. In September 1943, the 29th Engineer Training Battalion began the first 17-week training program. Every change in the length of the training program and every revision of the mobilization training plans caused major revisions of lesson material and complete changes in the scheduling of classrooms and ranges.

To a lesser degree, the change in command responsibility for replacement training also involved adjustments. Originally, Fort Leonard Wood was the Seventh Corps Area Training Center and came under the direction of that command. The Chief of Engineers was responsible for engineer doctrine and training, but Seventh Corps was the next higher headquarters. In 1942, Army responsibility for the ERTCs passed to the Army Service Forces (ASF). In 1944, the post was redesignated the Army Service Forces Training Center (ASFTC). Each change brought a different line of command, administrative, training, and logistical support. The ERTC/ASFTC often responded to training inspections from the War Department, the ASF, and the Chief of Engineers.

In the last year of the war, training at the ASFTC underwent some changes while other aspects of the center's effort remained constant. An increasing number of veterans of the European theater came to Leonard Wood for refresher training prior to shipment to the Pacific. The instruction and

management of this group differed from that given to newly inducted soldiers. In addition, the preactivation training for certain engineer units such as dump truck companies increased in scope. However, some training problems remained constant. Instructors continued to be in short supply, and facilities were limited, even with the end of divisional training in 1944. Standard issue equipment was often inoperable and the center was forced to use nonstandard equipment to complete training. This meant that soldiers were gaining proficiency on equipment which they did not use and was not covered by technical manuals. The designation of Fort Leonard Wood as one of three national basic training centers did nothing to ease the training pressures at the ASFTC.

The end of the war in the summer of 1945 turned the attention of the nation and the Army to demobilization. The trainee load at the center declined from 16,000 in July 1945 to 6,000 by the end of the year. The last training cycle for the Leonard Wood ASFTC began in January 1946 and ended in March. By that time the Army had shortened the training cycle to eight weeks and most unit and specialist training had been shifted to Fort Lewis, Washington.

On 31 March 1946 the ASFTC at Fort Leonard Wood closed its doors. In five years the ERTC/ASFTC had trained more than 170,000 engineer soldiers, both officer and enlisted. The post became an inactive installation serving National Guard units on summer training. However, only four years later another war, this one in Korea, brought engineer training back to the Missouri post. Since 1950, Fort Leonard Wood has had an unbroken history of training for the U.S. Army's engineers.

Sources for Further Reading

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